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  Abstract 
 
 Police around the world present evidence to suspects at different points 
during the interview. Some psychologists suggest that police should strategically 
delay disclosing evidence and test the truthfulness of a suspect’s account by 
comparing it with the evidence. Moreover, psychologists suggest interviewers who 
plan strategic evidence disclosure might be less guilt-presumptive about the suspect 
because they must consider alternative explanations of the evidence as part of their 
planning. In contrast, many lawyers argue that police should not strategically 
disclose evidence as it undermines a suspect’s fair trial rights and prevents lawyers 
from advising suspects effectively before the interview. 
 To address these conflicting perspectives from the domains of psychology 
and law, this thesis takes an interdisciplinary approach and considers strategic 
evidence disclosure within the broader legal context of a suspect’s custodial 
detention. First, a field study of police disclosure briefings with lawyers, lawyer-
client consultations, and police interviews, and a survey of lawyers highlights how 
lawyers rely upon the police’s evidence to advise suspects in custody. When police 
strategically disclose evidence, lawyers cannot provide informed legal advice and 
tend to advise suspects to not answer police questions. Second, three experiments 
and a mini meta-analysis show that generating alternative evidential explanations for 
criminal cases, as interviewers planning strategic evidence disclosure might do, has a 
very small effect, or plausibly no effect, on people’s beliefs about the suspect’s guilt. 
Finally, a mock crime experiment shows that, even two months after a crime, truthful 
suspects’ accounts fit evidence that was strategically withheld more than deceptive 
suspects’ accounts did. Independent laypeople from a follow-up experiment could 
distinguish between these truthful and deceptive accounts. Together, these findings 
suggest that strategic evidence disclosure could help deception detection even 
months after a crime, but it also impinges upon suspects’ legal rights and is unlikely 
to make interviewers less guilt-presumptive. 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
Chapter 1:  
Police Interviewing of Suspects in England and Wales 
 
True Detective, The Wire, The Night Of—there is a long list of television 
shows that portray dramatically the police questioning of suspects. In these shows, 
the police employ interviewing tactics, to varying degrees of success, to secure 
critical information from the suspects. The tactics might include deceiving the 
suspect, making threats, or offering a deal—all highly entertaining to watch. But 
what is the reality of police interviewing practices? More crucially, what tactics are 
legal, ethical, and actually effective in eliciting information from a suspect? In this 
chapter, I provide an overview of the psychology-law research and legislative 
changes that have shaped the way the police interview suspects in England and 
Wales. 
What is a Police Interview? 
 The police interview of a suspect is essentially a dynamic, social interaction 
(Gudjonsson & Pearse, 2011). In England and Wales, a police interview is defined 
legally as “the questioning of a person regarding their involvement or suspected 
involvement in a criminal offence or offences which, under paragraph 10.1 [also 
within Code C], must be carried out under caution” (Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984, Code C, 2017, p. 36). The police interview of a suspect is considered a 
crucial stage in the investigative process (Schollum, 2005; Williamson, 2007). It 
provides the police with an opportunity to gather new information directly from the 
suspect, resolve any unclear issues, highlight further lines of enquiry, or build a 
stronger case against the suspect (Hartwig, Granhag, & Vrij, 2005; Vrij, Hope, & 
Fisher, 2014). Unsurprisingly, the police rely heavily on suspect interviews when 
gathering evidence for the prosecution (Cape, Hodgson, Prakken, & Spronken, 2007; 
McConville, Sanders, & Leng, 1991). Given its importance in the criminal 
investigation process, police-suspect interviews have inspired a large body of 
psychology-law research.  
Research on the Police Interviewing of Suspects 
 Psychologists studying police-suspect interviewing are primarily concerned 
with one key question: What interviewing methods help the police elicit reliable 
information from suspects? (Kelly, Miller, Redlich, & Kleinman, 2013). In other 
15 
 
words, how can the police effectively encourage suspects to provide an accurate 
account of what happened (for guilty suspects, this might include a confession to 
committing the crime) and identify when suspects are providing unreliable 
information, such as a lie or a false confession (an innocent suspect’s account of 
committing a crime that they did not commit, Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). An 
overarching goal of research in this field is to improve the ‘diagnosticity’ of police 
interviewing techniques—both by increasing the ratio of true confessions to false 
confessions and by enabling the police interviewer to discriminate between truthful 
and deceptive statements made by a suspect (Meissner et al., 2014). Note that 
criminal justice scholars studying police-interview practices hold a different 
perspective—they are concerned with ensuring that suspects are able to act 
voluntarily and are accorded their rights, which in turn should ensure that suspects 
can provide reliable and voluntary information to the police (e.g., Blackstock, Cape, 
Hodgson, Ogorodova, & Spronken, 2014). To understand which police techniques 
allow suspects the opportunity to provide the most reliable information and 
ultimately, identify the most diagnostic interviewing strategies for the police, 
psychology and criminal justice scholars have employed various, complementary 
research methodologies (Kelly, Redlich, & Miller, 2015), including laboratory and 
real-world experiments which simulate crimes and police interviews (e.g., Kassin, 
Goldstein, & Savitsky, 2003; Russano, Meissner, Narchet, & Kassin, 2005; Vrij, 
Mann, Jundi, Hope, & Leal, 2012), surveys of police investigators (e.g., Kassin et 
al., 2007), interviews with offenders (e.g., Malloy, Shulman, & Cauffman, 2013), 
and field observations of live or recorded police interviews (e.g. Baldwin, 1993; Leo, 
1996; McConville & Hodgson, 1993; Soukara, Bull, Vrij, Turner, & Cherryman, 
2009).  
Such research has identified two broad approaches to police interviewing: 
accusatorial and information-gathering (Meissner et al., 2014). In the accusatorial 
style of questioning suspects, the suspect’s guilt is assumed from the outset and the 
goal is to secure a confession. This style of questioning suspects is typified in the 
two-stage Reid Technique which originated in North America (Inbau, Reid, Buckley, 
& Jayne, 2013). Note that, in the past, some police officers in England and Wales 
have also resorted to using Reid style tactics while questioning suspects in more 
serious cases (Pearse & Gudjonsson, 1999). In the first stage of this technique, 
entitled the ‘Behavioral Analysis Interview’, the police analyse a suspect’s responses 
16 
 
and behaviours to identify whether the suspect is deceptive and/or guilty. Research, 
however, has consistently shown that many of these non-verbal behavioural cues are 
not indicative of truth or deception (DePaulo et al., 2003; Masip, Herrero, Garrido, & 
Barba, 2011) and that police investigators tend to perform only slightly better than 
chance when distinguishing between truths and lies (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; 
Meissner & Kassin, 2002; Vrij, 2008). In the second stage, suspects classified as 
guilty are subjected to a nine-step interrogation process involving psychologically 
manipulative tactics aimed to overcome the suspect’s denials and pressure the 
suspect into confessing (Inbau et al., 2013). In light of the aforementioned 
shortcomings in the police’s deception detection abilities, it is likely that some 
innocent suspects are subjected to the guilt-presumptive interrogation too.   
Indeed, psychologists and criminal justice scholars have widely criticized the 
effectiveness of the Reid Technique, and the accusatorial approach more generally, 
because of its high risk of false confessions (e.g. Drizin & Leo, 2004; Kassin, Drizin, 
et al., 2010; Meissner & Lassiter, 2010). Accusatorial methods encompass deceitful 
and anxiety-inducing tactics, such as minimization (offering the suspect face-saving 
excuses, reducing the seriousness and consequences of the offence, sympathising 
with the suspect), presentation of false evidence implicating the suspect in the crime, 
and bluffing about the existence of such false evidence (Kassin, Drizin, et al., 2010; 
Perillo & Kassin, 2011). Each of these tactics have been shown to elicit false 
confessions from innocents. For instance, in a number of creative experiments, 
students were accused of transgressions such as making a computer crash, cheating, 
or stealing money and were subsequently interviewed using different tactics (Kassin 
& Kiechel, 1996; Narchet, Meissner, & Russano, 2011; Nash & Wade, 2009; Perillo 
& Kassin, 2011; Russano et al., 2005). Minimizing the offence, presenting false 
evidence, or bluffing about false evidence all increased the likelihood that innocent 
students, who did not commit the transgression, confessed to the transgression. 
Under the social pressure of these tactics, innocent suspects might simply comply 
with the interviewer by confessing—they prioritise the short-term reward of escaping 
the stressful police interview over the potential long-term costs of being prosecuted 
(Kassin, Drizin, et al., 2010). More worryingly, given the malleable, reconstructive 
nature of memory, some innocent suspects might temporarily internalize the 
confession and come to believe they committed the crime—particularly in the face of 
fabricated evidence suggesting their guilt (Kassin, 1997; Nash & Wade, 2009). 
17 
 
Given that accusatorial tactics influence innocent suspects to make wrongful 
confessions, accusatorial interviewing approaches are not very diagnostic. 
In contrast, information-gathering methods are truth-seeking—they aim to 
elicit information, rather than a confession, from the suspect (Meissner et al., 2014). 
This approach emphasizes building conversational rapport with the suspect, asking 
open-ended questions for a more detailed, complete account from the suspect, and 
addressing any contradictions in the suspect’s account by presenting (true) evidence 
strategically late in the interview (Meissner et al., 2014; Swanner, Meissner, 
Atkinson, & Dianiska, 2016). The next chapter will explore the research evidence in 
favour of strategically presenting evidence to suspects. Meanwhile, empirical 
research has shown that the remaining strategies improve cooperation from the 
suspect and the level of information gained during the interview. In one study, 
researchers analysed recordings of real police interrogations and found that 
accusatorial tactics reduced suspect cooperation, whereas information-gathering 
tactics, such as rapport and relationship-building, fostered suspect cooperation and 
willingness to divulge information (Kelly, Redlich, & Miller, 2016). In an 
experimental study, interviewers questioned students about whether another student 
cheated using either an information-gathering script, which asked students for a free 
recall, or an accusatorial script, which maximised students’ fears and manipulated 
their perceptions about the consequences of admitting information (Evans et al., 
2013). Students questioned with an information-gathering script were more talkative 
and provided more critical details than students questioned with an accusatorial 
script. Crucially, a meta-analysis of experimental studies found that information-
gathering interviews were more diagnostic, in that they had a higher ratio of true to 
false confessions, than accusatorial interviews (Meissner et al., 2014).  
 Having established that information-gathering interviews are more ethical 
and effective in eliciting reliable information from a suspect, researchers continue to 
investigate ways to improve the diagnosticity of police interviewing, particularly in 
the context of lie detection. In recent years, deception detection research has taken a 
new direction—instead of passively observing suspects for cues that they are lying, 
researchers began investigating how interviewers can actively elicit cues to 
deception from suspects, by better understanding the psychological states of truthful 
and deceptive suspects (Vrij & Granhag, 2012). For instance, consider the finding 
that lying might be more cognitively demanding than telling the truth (Vrij, Fisher, 
18 
 
Mann, & Leal, 2006). Building upon this, interviewers can impose greater cognitive 
load on suspects, for instance by asking them to tell their story in a reverse order, and 
benefit from deceptive suspects exhibiting more cues to deceit such as reporting 
fewer details in their stories (Vrij et al., 2008). Another insight into deceptive vs. 
truthful suspects’ strategies is that deceptive suspects tend to prepare for an interview 
more than truthful suspects do (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007). Thus, it is 
more diagnostic to ask suspects unanticipated questions—questions that they have 
not prepared answers for—such as questions about the spatial layout of a location 
that they allegedly visited (Vrij et al., 2009). In response to such unanticipated 
questions, deceptive suspects tend to be less consistent with their accomplices’ 
responses making it apparent that they are lying. The subject of this thesis, the 
strategic disclosure of evidence technique, forms part of this new repertoire of 
deception detection techniques—but before delving into the strategic disclosure of 
evidence, I review the revolution of police interviewing in England and Wales. 
A Brief History of the Police Interview in England and Wales 
 The police interviewing of suspects in England and Wales has undergone 
dramatic changes in the past four decades. In response to false confessions extracted 
from youths (Fisher, 1977), the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (1981) 
was set up to research police interrogation practices and soon after in 1984, the 
Police and Criminal Evidence (PACE) Act was introduced (Williamson, 1993). 
PACE regulates a range of police procedures, including the arrest, detention, and 
questioning of suspects (Sanders, Young, & Burton, 2010). Amongst other things, 
PACE provides suspects with access to free, independent legal advice before and 
during police questioning and requires that all suspect interviews are audio- or video-
recorded (Kassin, Drizin, et al., 2010). In this way, police interviews became more 
transparent and available for scrutiny. Moreover, under PACE, the police are not 
permitted to use oppression during interviews with suspects (Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984, Code C, 2017).  
Despite the introduction of PACE, police persisted in coercive and 
accusatorial interrogation practices and several notorious miscarriages of justice, 
such as the Guildford Four and Birmingham Six, came to light (Belloni & Hodgson, 
2000; Gudjonsson, 2003; Williamson, 1993). Given that the police’s hostility and 
intimidation tactics may have caused suspects in these cases to falsely confess to 
crimes that they did not commit, the Court of Appeal overturned a number of high-
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profile convictions (Shawyer, Milne, & Bull, 2009). During this time, the public 
justifiably harboured deep-seated concerns about the police questioning of suspects 
(Williamson, 1993). In response, the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (1991) 
was set up and building upon the resultant research, psychologists, lawyers, and 
police practitioners collaborated to develop a fair and ethical model for interviewing 
suspects: the PEACE model, which embodies the information-gathering approach by 
focusing on fact-finding rather than generating a confession (Kassin, Appleby, & 
Perillo, 2010). PEACE is a mnemonic for the recommended stages of the interview 
process; Prepare and plan before the interview, Engage with the suspect and explain 
their legal rights, invite an Account from the suspect and challenge or clarify any 
inconsistencies, Closure of the interview by way of summarizing what the suspect 
has said, and a post-interview Evaluation to enable the interviewer to reflect on their 
performance during the interview (Walsh & Bull, 2010). Through legislative changes 
such as PACE and nation-wide training of police officers in the PEACE model, the 
government sought to abolish the contentious concept of police ‘interrogation’ and 
instead promote ‘investigative interviewing’ (McConville, Hodgson, Bridges, & 
Pavlovic, 1994). In this way, the police interviewing of suspects in England and 
Wales was revolutionised.  
The Current State of Police Interviews 
Research has shown that the police generally comply with the PEACE model 
and PACE requirements when interviewing suspects, although a minority of 
interviewers still resort to manipulative tactics in serious cases (Bull & Soukara, 
2010; Clarke & Milne, 2001; Pearse & Gudjonsson, 1996, 1999; Soukara et al., 
2009). Moreover, while self-report might not reflect practice, police generally report 
that their aim in the interview is to get a truthful account from the suspect, rather 
than a confession (Soukara, Bull, & Vrij, 2002). Also in compliance with PACE, it is 
now an accepted practice for suspects to receive legal advice at the police station 
although only around half of all suspects request a lawyer while in custody, despite it 
being a free service for custodial suspects (Cape & Hodgson, 2014; Pleasance, 
Kemp, & Balmer, 2011). The success of the PEACE approach of interviewing 
suspects is underscored by its adoption in other countries such as New Zealand, 
Australia, and Norway (Kassin, Drizin, et al., 2010; Oxburgh, Walsh, & Milne, 
2011). 
20 
 
 Years have passed since the development of the PEACE interviewing 
approach, but the police and psychologists continue to collaborate on policing issues. 
For instance, organizations such as the Society for Evidence Based Policing and 
International Investigative Interviewing Research Group bring together academics 
and practitioners to exchange ideas and answer the question of what works in 
practice (Milne, Shaw, & Bull, 2007). It is against this backdrop that the strategic 
disclosure of evidence technique has developed. The police are trained to 
strategically disclose their evidence as it fits well with the PEACE model (Walsh, 
Milne, & Bull, 2016). Specifically, during the Account stage, the police can first 
elicit an account from the suspect and then while challenging the suspect’s account, 
disclose their evidence to the suspect. The next chapter describes the strategic 
disclosure of evidence technique in greater detail and explores psychologists’ and 
lawyers’ contrasting perspectives regarding its usage in police interviews with 
suspects.    
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Chapter 2: 
Strategic Disclosure of Evidence: Perspectives from Psychology and 
Law 
  
In most criminal cases, the police possess some evidence—the basis for their 
suspicion—before arresting a suspect for questioning (Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984, Code G, 2012). While questioning the suspect, the police are likely to 
disclose this evidence to the suspect. But when should they disclose their evidence? 
Early in the interview before the suspect starts talking, gradually throughout the 
interview one piece at a time, late in the interview once the suspect has finished 
talking, or perhaps even before the interview begins? Exactly when the police 
disclose their evidence while questioning a suspect has piqued the interest of 
psychologists and lawyers alike. Yet any discussions about police disclosure of 
evidence have remained separate in the psychology and law literatures—until now.  
The current chapter outlines and critically evaluates the research from the 
psychological and legal literatures on the strategic disclosure of evidence. I write this 
chapter as an interdisciplinary researcher in the hope that it might eschew extreme 
positions, raise awareness about key issues, and encourage more psychological 
scientists and legal scholars to work together to understand the broader implications 
of the strategic disclosure of evidence in police interviews. Of course, police practice 
and policy should be informed by empirical work in both fields—but more 
interdisciplinary, collaborative research in this area will achieve a better 
understanding of how interviewing techniques grounded in psychological principles 
translate into a practical, legal context.  
The Importance of Evidence Disclosure in Suspect Interviews 
Before outlining the different methods of strategic disclosure, let us consider 
three reasons why the disclosure of evidence to a suspect is important. First, it is a 
basic legal requirement in Europe that a person suspected of having committed an 
offence is informed about the accusation that is the basis for their detention (e.g., 
Council Directive, 2012 applying to all 28 Member States of the European Union). 
This process exists to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings and to ensure the 
effective exercise of the rights of the defence—including challenging the lawfulness 
of detention.  
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Second, evidence disclosure is an established technique used by police 
officers interviewing suspects held in police custody prior to charge in a variety of 
jurisdictions. In a study of 161 recorded police interviews with suspects in London, 
the most common police tactic for eliciting information was presenting evidence to 
suspects (Pearse & Gudjonsson, 1997). Similarly, a survey of 631 American police 
officers and Canadian custom officials found that only 1% of officers reported 
“never” presenting a suspect with evidence while 22% reported “always” using this 
tactic (Kassin et al., 2007, p. 388). In a more recent study, almost half of the 42 US 
military and intelligence interrogators interviewed claimed to use evidence 
presentation tactics to elicit information from detainees (Russano, Narchet, 
Kleinman, & Meissner, 2014). Clearly the disclosure of evidence is a popular and 
important technique in forensic contexts.  
Finally, evidence disclosure is important because it has been linked to 
confessions in various types of psychological research. In field research, for instance, 
an examination of recorded benefit fraud interviews conducted in England and 
Wales revealed an association between the disclosure of evidence and interviews in 
which the suspect shifted from denying the charge to making an admission (Walsh & 
Bull, 2012). Other field studies have examined the link between evidence and 
confessions more directly. When Icelandic and Northern Ireland prison inmates 
completed the Gudjonsson Confession Questionnaire, the results showed that 
inmates’ perceptions of the evidence against them was one of their foremost reasons 
for confessing (Gudjonsson & Bownes, 1992; Gudjonsson & Petursson, 1991; 
Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, 1999). Research with incarcerated Canadian offenders 
also showed that strong police evidence was the most important factor in offenders’ 
decisions to confess (Deslauriers‐Varin, Lussier, & St‐Yves, 2011). Laboratory-
based research has revealed similar results. In some studies, research assistants have 
persuaded people to cheat during an experiment. An experimenter then uses different 
police tactics to interrogate the subjects on whether they cheated or not before 
documenting their confessions and perceptions of the interrogation. Such studies 
have found that people’s perceptions regarding how much evidence the experimenter 
held influenced whether or not they confessed (Horgan, Russano, Meissner, & 
Evans, 2012; Narchet et al., 2011). Taken together these studies suggest that when 
suspects are presented with strong incriminating evidence they tend to confess, 
presumably because denials seem futile. 
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It is clear that the disclosure of evidence is important for several reasons, and 
this goes some way to explaining why the disclosure of evidence has attracted the 
attention of psychological scientists conducting research in the psychology and law 
domain. In the past decade, there has been a surge of psychological research on how 
evidence may be initially withheld from the suspect and then strategically disclosed 
during the interview to detect deception and to gain more information from the 
suspect (for example, Clemens, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2011; Dando, Bull, 
Ormerod, & Sandham, 2013; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, 2005). 
Crucially, strategic evidence disclosure forms part of the positive psychology 
movement: Researchers focus on identifying effective interviewing methods that law 
enforcement officials can use rather than exclusively detailing law enforcement 
officials’ errors and biases (Meissner, Hartwig, & Russano, 2010). A small but 
growing body of research shows that strategically disclosing evidence when 
questioning suspects helps the police to detect lies. Thus, a number of psychological 
scientists now recommend strategically disclosing evidence to suspects (Hartwig, 
Granhag, & Luke, 2014; Sellers & Kebbell, 2009; Walsh & Bull, 2015).  
In line with these recommendations, police forces in various countries, 
including Sweden (Fahsing & Rachlew, 2009), Australia (Moston, 2009), and 
England and Wales (King, 2002) already use strategic evidence disclosure 
techniques to interview suspects. Meanwhile, officers in other countries such as the 
United States of America are presently being trained to strategically use evidence 
when questioning suspects (Luke et al., 2016). Clearly police practice and policy in 
multiple countries already encourage strategically withholding evidence when 
questioning suspects of crime. Nevertheless, many legal scholars and practitioners 
have assumed an opposing position on strategic evidence disclosure and instead 
advocate extensive, pre-interview disclosure in which the suspect and their lawyer 
are informed of the evidence before entering the police interview (Cape, 2011; 
Jackson, 2001).  
Given psychology research is likely to inform and bolster current police 
practices that already emphasize withholding evidence from suspects until the 
interview (Association of Chief Police Officers1, 2014; Walsh et al., 2016), it is 
                                                          
1 Note that the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) no longer exists—it has been replaced by 
the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC). 
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important to reconcile psychologists’ arguments for developing increasingly 
sophisticated methods of evidence disclosure, with lawyers’ arguments against 
strategic evidence disclosure. Indeed, researchers, policy-makers, and practitioners 
can benefit from an overview of both the psychological and legal perspectives on 
strategic evidence disclosure when developing best practice. Thus the purpose of this 
chapter is to introduce a law perspective into the psychological literature, and a 
psychological perspective into the law literature, on strategic disclosure of evidence. 
Below I describe the strategic disclosure of evidence and its theoretical 
underpinnings before considering the conflicting arguments and research from the 
fields of psychology and law.  
Strategic Disclosure of Evidence 
The strategic disclosure of evidence can be grouped into two key forms: late 
disclosure and gradual disclosure. Both late and gradual disclosure of evidence form 
part of the interviewing technique known as the Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE) 
that was developed to detect deception (Hartwig et al., 2005). SUE comprises of a 
set of questioning and evidence disclosure tactics that amplify verbal differences 
between liars and truth-tellers.  
Under the SUE method of late disclosure, the interviewer starts by asking for 
the suspect’s account and asking several questions that can rule out other 
explanations for the evidence before revealing the evidence against the suspect 
(Granhag & Vrij, 2010). Thus, guilty suspects are not given a chance to fabricate a 
story that fits the existing evidence against them. Once the evidence is disclosed at 
the end of the interview, the suspect is required to explain any inconsistencies 
between their statements and the evidence. These ‘statement-evidence 
inconsistencies’ act as cues to deceit—liars are more likely to make statements that 
are inconsistent with the evidence when they are not aware that the police possess 
this evidence. Research suggests this technique works because liars, but not truth-
tellers, tend to avoid or deny incriminating information in an effort to appear 
innocent (Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Doering, 2010). A liar, for instance, may 
claim to have never been inside a stolen car while unaware that the police have 
found the suspect’s fingerprints on the stolen car’s steering wheel. In this way, late 
disclosure can facilitate lie detection.   
The SUE method of gradual disclosure also requires the interviewer to start 
by asking the suspect for an account and asking several other questions. Instead of 
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revealing all the evidence at the end of the interview, however, gradual disclosure 
involves revealing one piece of evidence at a time as the interview progresses (for a 
comparable gradual disclosure method, see Bull, 2014). English and Welsh police 
use a similar technique, referred to as ‘drip-feed’ or ‘phased’ disclosure, in which 
evidence is disclosed gradually across one or several interviews (Association of 
Chief Police Officers, 2014). With gradual disclosure of evidence, the interviewer 
manipulates the suspect’s perception of the evidence so that initially it might appear 
as if the interviewer does not hold much evidence (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015). 
Accordingly, a lying suspect may make statements that contradict the evidence as 
well as omit some information. Yet, once some evidence is disclosed, the suspect 
may come to believe that the interviewer possesses more evidence than they actually 
do. The suspect may then unintentionally provide new information to the interviewer 
(Granhag & Hartwig, 2015). Additionally, when evidence is gradually revealed, a 
lying suspect may change their account to fit the evidence and thus contradict their 
own previous statements (McDougall & Bull, 2015). These contradictions are known 
as ‘within-statement inconsistencies’ and act as further cues to deception in 
interview settings. 
Strategic Disclosure of Evidence: Theoretical Underpinnings 
So, why do lying suspects contradict the evidence so much more than truthful 
suspects when they do not know what the evidence is? Researchers suggest that 
truthful and lying suspects tend to adopt different counter-interrogation strategies 
during the interview (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008, 2015; Strömwall, Hartwig, & 
Granhag, 2006). For lying suspects, information incriminating them in the crime is a 
threat—an aversive stimulus that the interviewer might or might not possess 
(Granhag & Hartwig, 2008; Hartwig et al., 2014). In response to this threat, lying 
suspects might use an avoidance strategy during the interview. For instance, they 
might avoid mentioning that they visited the crime scene when freely recalling their 
story. Alternatively, lying suspects might adopt a denial strategy, and deny, for 
instance, any connection to the crime when questioned directly about it. In both 
strategies, lying suspects deal with the threat of incriminating information by 
concealing it. Accordingly, empirical research shows that mock suspects place 
importance on monitoring and controlling critical information when trying to deceive 
an interviewer (Hines et al., 2010). In doing so, lying suspects tend to unknowingly 
contradict evidence that links them to the crime.  
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In contrast, truthful suspects are more consistent with the interviewer’s 
evidence because they tend to be quite forthcoming with information and try to tell 
their story as it happened (Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman, Memon, Woods, & Michlik, 
2006; Strömwall et al., 2006). Truth-tellers’ forthcoming approach may reflect a 
belief that people get what they deserve, the belief in a just world phenomenon 
(Lerner, 1980), coupled with a tendency to assume that their inner states, thoughts, 
and emotions are evident to others, the illusion of transparency (Gilovich, Savitsky, 
& Medvec, 1998). Together, these concepts could explain why innocent suspects 
may come to believe that by talking to the police their innocence will shine through 
and justice will prevail (Kassin, 2005; Kassin & Norwick, 2004). Likewise, truthful 
suspects are likely to admit their presence at the crime scene even if the interviewer 
has not informed them of the evidence linking them to the crime scene. In this way, 
truthful suspects tend to make statements that are quite consistent with the evidence.  
Research and Arguments from Psychology 
 So what are the benefits of strategically disclosing evidence to suspects in 
police interviews? Psychologists favour strategic disclosure of evidence primarily 
because it is an effective lie detection method—though it may have other benefits as 
well (Sellers & Kebbell, 2009). The SUE technique of late disclosure has ample 
support for detecting deception, much of which arises from experimental studies in 
which subjects commit mock crimes, or similar acts in the case of ‘innocent’ 
subjects, and are then instructed to convince interviewers of their innocence. The 
interviewers, who are typically researchers and on occasion, police officers, employ 
either early disclosure of evidence as a control or late disclosure when questioning 
subjects. Early disclosure involves presenting the suspect with all of the evidence at 
the start of the interview and then asking for the suspect’s account and any further 
questions. Early studies revealed that late disclosure elicits more cues to deceit than 
early disclosure and that late disclosure leads accordingly to higher deception 
detection rates (Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Kronkvist, 2006; Hartwig et al., 
2005). For instance, in one study, police trainees interviewed students about a mock 
crime (stealing a wallet) and when trainees disclosed the evidence late, lying 
students contradicted the evidence more (Hartwig et al., 2006). As a result, the 
trainees who used late disclosure were more accurate in judging which students were 
lying than the trainees who used early disclosure.  
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Further studies have also found that late disclosure produces more cues to 
deceit than does early disclosure in adult samples (Jordan, Hartwig, Wallace, 
Dawson, & Xhihani, 2012), child samples (Clemens et al., 2010), co-suspects who 
jointly committed a mock crime (Granhag, Rangmar, & Strömwall, 2015), and 
suspects lying about their future intentions (Clemens et al., 2011). A recent meta-
analysis of eight empirical studies comparing liars and truth-tellers found that liars 
made more statements that were inconsistent with the evidence than truth tellers, and 
this effect was augmented by the use of late disclosure (Hartwig et al., 2014). Of 
course, liars cannot be equated to guilty suspects. Innocent suspects may lie too, for 
example, to protect the real perpetrator or to keep their own (non-crime related) 
affairs secret. Relatedly, innocent suspects can be mistaken or inconsistent in their 
alibis, or contradict the evidence which puts them at risk of appearing guilty (Luke et 
al., 2016; Strange, Dysart & Loftus, 2014). Indeed, it remains to be seen whether 
strategic evidence disclosure is effective in lie detection after an extended time delay 
between the crime and interview given that truth-tellers could forget their activity 
and also, unknowingly, contradict the evidence as liars tend to do (Hartwig et al., 
2006; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010). Nonetheless, research thus far suggests that 
strategically disclosing the evidence to a suspect late in the interview can improve lie 
detection.  
 Although the psychological research on late disclosure is largely optimistic, 
the empirical support for gradual disclosure in lie detection is mixed. Some studies, 
for instance, suggest that gradual disclosure leads to more accurate lie detection than 
early or late disclosure (Dando & Bull, 2011; Dando et al., 2013). In these 
experiments, people were assigned to one of two roles in a video game: liars acted as 
terrorists and truth-tellers acted as builders. Next, subjects were interviewed about 
their activity in the game. The game generated multiple pieces of evidence 
implicating both liars and truth-tellers in potential terrorist activity and the 
interviewers presented this evidence early, gradually, or late in the interview process. 
In this paradigm, gradual disclosure of evidence fostered deception detection more 
than late disclosure of evidence. However, in another study, late disclosure elicited 
more cues to deceit than did gradual disclosure when researchers interviewed 
students about mock terrorist acts such as transferring bomb materials to a new 
location (Sorochinski et al., 2014). In yet another study, Japanese police interviewed 
people who were innocent or guilty of cheating during an experiment with different 
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interviewing styles, including the gradual disclosure of two pieces of evidence 
(Wachi et al., 2017). Gradually presenting evidence did not improve the police’s 
ability to detect who was lying. In sum, the empirical research to date doesn’t 
provide a clear picture about the effectiveness of gradual disclosure vs. late 
disclosure in terms of detecting deception.  
 On top of the potential benefits for lie detection, psychologists argue that 
there are at least four reasons why evidence should be strategically presented during 
suspect interviews. First, strategic disclosure may assist in validating confessions. If 
the police present all their evidence to the suspect early in the interview, it may be 
impossible to verify the suspect’s confession—the information contained within it 
may simply reflect what the suspect learned before or during the interview rather 
than genuine memories of the crime (Sellers & Kebbell, 2009). In an analysis of 
proven false confessions statements, Garrett (2010) indicates how rich in detail and 
worryingly convincing the statements are and that this is likely due to the police, 
perhaps unintentionally, revealing case facts during the interview. Full, early 
disclosure essentially carries the risk of inadvertently contaminating a suspect’s 
confession (Napier & Adams, 2002). Wholly aware of this, the police often justify 
withholding evidence from the suspect to test the truthfulness of any account or 
confession a suspect might make (King, 2002). In this manner, strategic evidence 
disclosure may assist in another form of truth seeking—identifying false confessions. 
 Second, psychologists favour the police strategy of initially withholding 
evidence from suspects because early disclosure of evidence may disrupt rapport 
building (St-Yves & Meissner, 2014). Though there are several definitions and 
conceptualizations of rapport building, it broadly refers to the “bond” or 
“connection” that a police interviewer may develop with the suspect during the 
interview (Vallano, Evans, Compo, & Kieckhaefer, 2015, p. 369). Rapport building 
has been described as an essential component of investigative interviews, one that 
police interviewers are advised to implement at the start of the interview (Yeschke, 
2003). As evidence may contain inaccuracies, an early presentation of it may cause 
suspects to stop trusting the interviewer and become less co-operative (Sellers & 
Kebbell, 2009). In support of this claim, law enforcement practitioners and high-
value detainees, such as suspected terrorists from Australia, Indonesia, Norway, the 
Philippines, and Sri Lanka, reported that confronting a suspect with evidence harmed 
rapport and resulted in greater resistance from the detainee (Goodman-Delahunty, 
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Martschuk, & Dhami, 2014). Given that high-value detainees are atypical and only a 
small minority of suspects, general police evidence disclosure practices cannot be 
based on this study alone. Nonetheless, by strategically disclosing evidence 
gradually or later in the interview, the interviewer may be better able to focus on 
rapport-building at the start of the interview. 
Third, strategic evidence disclosure may result in fairer interviews. Some 
psychologists claim that suspects might find it fairer to give their account of what 
happened first, before being presented with the evidence against them (Sellers & 
Kebbell, 2009). Moreover, when planning strategic disclosure of evidence, 
interviewers need to think of alternative explanations that a suspect might offer for 
the evidence. Hence, forcing the interviewer to consider the evidence from various 
points of view might make them less guilt-presumptive when entering the interview 
with the suspect (van der Sleen, 2009). Given that investigators who presume guilt 
tend to use more coercive interview tactics, it follows that less guilt-biased police 
interviewers will conduct fairer interviews (Meissner & Kassin, 2004). To date, there 
is no published scientific evidence to support the notion that police officers are more 
open-minded and accordingly conduct fairer interviews or that suspects perceive the 
interview as fairer when the police employ late or gradual disclosure as opposed to 
early or pre-interview disclosure. Further research is needed to clarify whether 
strategic disclosure of evidence does indeed lead to fairer police interviews.  
Fourth, there is a small amount of research to suggest that strategic evidence 
disclosure may prompt more information from the suspect but this research must be 
interpreted with caution. For instance, in a recent study of recorded benefit fraud 
interviews, gradual and late disclosure interviews were more likely to be associated 
with gaining comprehensive accounts from the suspect than early disclosure 
interviews (Walsh & Bull, 2015). However, without experimental manipulations, the 
direction of these associations remains unclear so it is impossible to determine 
whether the timing of evidence disclosure actually caused the suspect to provide a 
more comprehensive account. Moreover, because the researchers did not consider 
the effect of having a lawyer present at the interview, it is unclear whether some 
lawyers informed suspects about the evidence against them before the interview 
commenced. This is important. If a lawyer was present for any of the interviews, the 
lawyer is likely to have received some or all of the evidence before the interview 
began. In such cases, the lawyer would have informed the suspect of this evidence 
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and the suspect would have entered the interview knowing about the evidence 
regardless of whether it was disclosed to them early, gradually, or late in the 
interview.  
Meanwhile, experimental studies have also found that strategic evidence 
disclosure could lead mock suspects to reveal more information compared to when 
the interviewers disclose the evidence early or not at all (May, Granhag, & Tekin, 
2017; Tekin et al., 2015). By strategically disclosing evidence, the interviewers 
manipulated the suspects’ perceptions of how much evidence the interviewers held. 
The researchers clarified that manipulating suspect perceptions about the evidence 
was not a deceptive tactic and was distinct from bluffing and false evidence ploys 
(Tekin et al., 2015). Critically, the studies did not include innocent suspects so the 
effects of leading an innocent suspect to wrongly believe that there may be more 
evidence against them remain unknown. Overall, there is some preliminary research 
to suggest that strategic disclosure of evidence may elicit more information from 
suspects but questions remain about the generalizability and reliability of these 
findings.   
In sum, psychologists endorse the strategic disclosure of evidence for its 
efficacy in lie detection, its potential in eliciting more information from suspects, and 
for producing fairer interviews. Additionally, psychologists posit that an earlier 
disclosure of evidence risks interfering with rapport-building and contaminating any 
confession the suspect might ultimately make.  
Research and Arguments from Law 
In contrast to the psychologists, legal scholars and practitioners working in 
criminal justice settings are concerned about the strategic disclosure of evidence. 
Lawyers prefer pre-interview disclosure in which the lawyer—and therefore the 
suspect—receive all of the evidence before the interview begins. Accordingly, 
lawyers have raised a number of issues that are rarely discussed in the psychological 
literature on strategic evidence disclosure. Below each of these arguments are 
discussed in turn.  
Central to lawyers’ arguments against the strategic disclosure of evidence, is 
the notion that withholding evidence from the suspect is unfair. Specifically, by 
withholding evidence until the police interview, the balance of power is swayed 
largely in favour of the police. This breaches the fair trial guarantees put in place by 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in particular, the principle 
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of ‘equality of arms’, that seeks to ensure that the accused is not at a “substantial 
disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent” (Toney, 2001, p. 39) Crucially, the fair trial 
protections set out in Article 6 also apply to the pre-trial process (Imbrioscia v. 
Switzerland, 1994), such as the right to custodial legal advice regarding the police 
interview. In other words, the police detention and questioning of suspects take place 
within a legal framework that recognizes the suspect’s defence rights (for example, 
see Council Directive, 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings or 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Code C, 2017). Note that the police 
questioning of a suspect is crucial to the resolution of a case and is often what 
determines the suspect’s fate, more so than what occurs in the courtroom (Cape, 
2011). Yet, unlike the court trial, the police interview represents a large imbalance of 
power and resources between the state and the individual. For instance, the accused 
cannot challenge the lawfulness of their detention and may struggle to produce a 
reliable account of their actions without some knowledge of the police’s evidence 
and the basis for the police’s accusation. Thus, in order to restore the equality and 
fairness of an adversarial procedure, the suspect and their legal representative need 
to be provided with greater disclosure of case information at the outset (Jackson, 
2001).  
 The first way in which police non-disclosure greatly diminishes the legal 
safeguards in place to protect suspects and allow them a fair proceeding is by 
undermining any legal advice the accused may receive. As the European Court of 
Human Rights highlighted in Sapan v. Turkey (2011), not allowing the lawyer to see 
the case file can “seriously hamper her ability to provide any sort of meaningful legal 
advice” to the client (p. 4). The solicitor, unaware of the case information held by the 
police, must navigate the uncertainty borne out of such police tactics and attempt to 
advise their client (Clough & Jackson, 2012). In his comprehensive guide to 
custodial legal advice, Cape (2011) consistently underscores the importance of 
acquiring information from the police as any legal advice in the face of non- or 
limited disclosure is likely to be inadequate. Even if the client has a genuine account 
of what happened, the lawyer confronted with an information deficit may not be able 
to determine whether or not it is a strong enough defence. When faced with non-
disclosure, lawyers tend to advise their client to remain silent during the police 
interview (Quinn & Jackson, 2007). Silence can serve as a negotiation tool to evoke 
some disclosure from the police (Blackstock et al., 2014). Given that around 45% of 
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suspects in English/Welsh police stations request lawyers, the impact of strategic 
disclosure on custodial legal advice is a major concern (Pleasence et al., 2011).  
It is also important to consider the remaining 55% of suspects who eschew 
legal representation. Legally unrepresented suspects may be particularly vulnerable 
to the heightened pressure of being presented with new, unanticipated evidence by 
the police. This is a second way in which strategic evidence disclosure may be unfair 
to suspects: It may be too stressful. The experience of being detained is reportedly 
imbued with fear, worry, confusion, humiliation, uncertainty, and isolation 
(Hodgson, 1994; Sanders et al., 2010). Non-disclosure may prevent the suspect, 
already vulnerable as a result of custodial conditions, from being prepared to answer 
questions and respond to allegations coherently. In practice, inconsistencies in a 
suspect’s account may indicate the suspect is attempting to deceive the police, 
however, the inconsistencies may also be a result of the suspect’s state of distress. As 
evidence is unveiled during the course of the interview, the innocent suspect in 
particular is likely to face greater shock and disorientation (Ofshe & Leo, 1997). 
Without knowing the amount of evidence held by the police, the suspect may 
perceive the situation to be hopeless. Indeed, some legal scholars suggest that 
strategic disclosure is a form of passive deception (Sanders et al., 2010). In this way, 
strategic disclosure of evidence may feed into the immense pressure suspects are 
placed under when in custody. Crucially, one of the primary reasons that lawyers 
want pre-interview disclosure is to ensure that the suspect provides a reliable and 
accurate account when questioned. As pre-interview disclosure might help the 
suspect consider the evidence more carefully before the interview and respond to 
questions more coherently during the interview, the police may be able to collect 
more reliable evidence from the suspect, which in turn benefits the prosecution. In 
this way, the interests and aims of defence lawyers and the police investigation could 
overlap. In essence, legal scholars argue that pre-interview disclosure allows the 
suspect to enter the inherently stressful police interview more prepared.  
 So far, I have discussed how strategic disclosure of evidence may be unfair 
because it undermines custodial legal advice and places more pressure on the 
suspects being questioned. In addition to the unfairness of strategic disclosure by the 
police, legal scholars argue that preventing suspects from knowing the evidence 
against them early on has important practical consequences, specifically inefficiency 
and poorer relations between the police and defence. For instance, strategic 
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disclosure of evidence may cause avoidable delays (Clough & Jackson, 2012). Some 
recommended strategies for lawyers to deal with police attempts at strategic 
disclosure include persistently requesting information or stopping the interview 
whenever new evidence is revealed in order to consult with the client (Cape, 2011). 
Each of these strategies can prolong the suspect’s detention and questioning. If such 
strategies fail, the lawyer may use the first interview as a way of gaining sufficient 
information and then request a second interview. In this case, the suspect will remain 
silent during the first interview, and once the evidence is revealed the suspect may 
then request another interview in order to defend themselves. This is a strategy that 
defence lawyers report advising their clients, along with choosing to interrupt the 
interview to consult with their client every time the police disclose evidence 
(Blackstock et al., 2014; Kemp, 2010; Quinn & Jackson, 2007). The police are 
warned that these are likely interview outcomes when they provide limited 
disclosure to the lawyer and withhold key evidence (Shepherd, 2007).  
Alternatively, suspects who may have made an immediate admission in 
response to pre-interview disclosure of evidence at the police station may then 
choose to remain silent during the interview and instead enter a guilty plea at court. 
Full pre-interview disclosure has the potential to allow the police, the lawyer, and the 
suspect to promptly gain a complete understanding of the situation and avoid the 
financial and emotional costs of trial (Azzopardi, 2002). In sum, strategic disclosure 
of evidence in practice may be inefficient and take unnecessary additional time and 
resources.  
 Finally, strategic disclosure of evidence may sour relations between the 
suspect and the interviewer, and dramatically affect the suspect’s willingness to 
respond to police questioning (McConville & Hodgson, 1993). Empirical research in 
England and Wales, including field observations of police station attendances by 
lawyers, has demonstrated that lack of disclosure is a point of conflict and 
misunderstanding between lawyers and police officers (Blackstock et al., 2014; 
Kemp, 2010, 2013; Quinn & Jackson, 2007; Skinns, 2009). The resulting tension and 
reduced cooperation between lawyers and the police can cause further delays and 
create a more hostile environment in which the suspect is interviewed. This is in 
contrast to the psychologists’ arguments that withholding evidence and instead 
focusing on building rapport will improve the suspect’s perception of the interviewer 
and lead to a more favourable interview outcome for the police.  
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Of course, the discrepancy between psychologists’ and lawyers’ claims about 
police-suspect relations may be an artefact of how psychology researchers generally 
approach the police interview. Psychological research on strategic evidence 
disclosure during police interviews rarely acknowledges the legal context of the 
detention and questioning of a suspect. The police interview is a legally regulated 
phase in a criminal investigation, during which legal safeguards must be respected. 
Of particular relevance to strategic evidence disclosure is the presumption of 
innocence and the suspect’s right to information (Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984, Code C, 2017; Council Directive, 2012 on the right to information in criminal 
proceedings). Relatedly, psychologists tend to consider the interview as an 
interaction primarily between the police and the suspect—an approach that may be 
appropriate for some countries where lawyers have either a minimal or no role in the 
police interview—but not for other countries (e.g., England and Wales). However, 
following the Salduz v. Turkey (2008) case and the Council Directive (2013) on the 
right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings, more European countries are 
adopting the right to a lawyer during police questioning (Cape & Hodgson, 2014), 
and such a discrepancy between the two disciplines is worthy of further 
investigation. In essence, legally represented suspects are unlikely to perceive the 
police as acting fairly when the police withhold evidence because lawyers will 
inform their clients that the police may be misleading them and violating legally 
enshrined principles, such as the right to information. Moreover, the resulting 
tension between lawyers and police may actually interfere with the police’s attempt 
to build rapport with the suspect. As a result, strategically disclosing evidence may 
have an adverse impact on the relations between the police and both the suspect and 
his or her lawyer. 
 By way of summary, lawyers argue that strategically disclosing evidence to 
suspects is unfair as lawyers cannot provide informed legal advice to their clients nor 
challenge the lawfulness of their client’s detention while suspects are likely to be 
placed under greater pressure without knowing all the evidence the police hold. 
Moreover, strategic disclosure of evidence may also reduce the efficiency of police 
station cases and lead to greater conflict between lawyers and police. Notably, 
lawyers do concede that there are exceptional circumstances during which the police 
may have no other option but to withhold evidence, for instance, to protect national 
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security or to prevent prejudicing of an on-going investigation (Blackstock et al., 
2014). 
Summary 
 In sum, psychologists have suggested strategic disclosure of evidence is a 
promising method for police interviews, highlighting its benefits for lie detection, 
verifiable confessions, fairer interviews, uninterrupted rapport-building, and eliciting 
information from suspects. Meanwhile lawyers continue to resist police disclosure 
tactics and express concerns about the detrimental effects that strategic disclosure 
may have on a suspect’s legal rights, in particular custodial advice, a suspect’s 
interview experience, efficiency, and working relations between lawyers and police. 
In this way, psychologists’ and lawyers’ views about evidence disclosure are at odds 
with one another.  
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Chapter 3: 
Research Outline 
 
 As described in Chapter 2, psychologists and lawyers have a host of 
contrasting arguments and research regarding the strategic disclosure of evidence. 
Many empirical questions arise from these conflicting views and given that police 
forces around the world are already using various strategic disclosure techniques, it 
is important to understand the associated benefits and risks of strategic evidence 
disclosure during police interviews. The time is ripe for an interdisciplinary effort in 
determining the evidence disclosure methods that best serve the criminal justice 
system. So, to move forward in resolving the discrepancies between the two fields, 
my PhD programme took an interdisciplinary, psychology-law approach to 
understanding the broader implications of strategic disclosure of evidence during 
suspect interviews. The current chapter looks at the nature and importance of 
interdisciplinary research and outlines the research questions and studies presented in 
in this thesis.  
Interdisciplinary Research 
 Interdisciplinary research can be defined broadly as “a mode of research by 
teams or individuals that integrates information, data, techniques, tools, perspectives, 
concepts, and/or theories from two or more disciplines or bodies of specialized 
knowledge to advance fundamental understanding or to solve problems whose 
solutions are beyond the scope of a single discipline or area of research practice” 
(National Research Council, 2004, p.2). Interdisciplinary research is on the rise 
(Jaffe, 2009), and while it may be challenging, its collaborative nature makes it more 
innovative and impactful (Bornstein, 2016; Wuchty et al., 2007; Yamamoto, 2013). 
Crucially, interdisciplinary research is useful when addressing real-world problems, 
such as the investigation of crime, that are relevant to multiple disciplines 
(Bornstein, 2016; Ellis, 2009).  
Indeed, the very application of psychological research to the legal system 
requires an understanding of theories, concepts, and perspectives from both 
psychology and law. As such, there are a number of high-impact, scholarly journals 
that encourage interdisciplinary, psychology-law research such as, Law and Human 
Behavior, Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, and Law and Society Review. Yet, 
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research on the authorship of papers published in these journals suggests that 
psychologists gravitate towards publishing in psychology-law journals, such as Law 
and Human Behavior and Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, while legal scholars 
tend to publish in more law oriented outlets, such as Law and Society Review 
(Bornstein, 2016). Moreover, legal psychologists might not read traditional criminal 
law journals while lawyers might not read applied psychology journals—as 
evidenced by the lack of communication and collaboration between the two fields on 
the topic of strategic evidence disclosure. Put another way, collaborative 
psychology-law research, even in the area of psychology and the law, may be rare. 
This is unsurprising given the challenges of bringing together two disciplines 
that vary in a number of aspects ranging from terminology (e.g. Strategic Use of 
Evidence or SUE in psychology is comparable to ‘phased disclosure’ in law), 
theoretical underpinnings (e.g. cognitive theories of suspect deception versus due 
process values in criminal procedures), empirical methods (e.g. psychological, lab-
based experiments with mock suspects versus legal scholars’ ethnographic, field 
observations of police practice), to writing style (e.g. scientific reports versus law 
reviews), and of course, perspectives on policy and practice (e.g. when the police 
should disclose their evidence to suspects and lawyers). Despite such challenges, 
bringing together psychological and legal approaches might be ideal when 
addressing an issue relevant to both disciplines, such as the timing of evidence 
disclosure to suspects at the police station.   
To accommodate both disciplines, I took a number of steps. First, my PhD 
programme was co-supervised by academics from psychology and from law. 
Second, the research was informed by the literature and past research from both 
disciplines. Thus, the PhD explored research questions posed by both psychological 
and legal work regarding the strategic disclosure of evidence. Third, in addressing 
these research questions, I employed empirical methods that are traditionally used in 
psychology (such as experiments) and in law (such as field observations) as well as 
in both disciplines (surveys). Fourth, work from my PhD programme has been 
published in interdisciplinary journals that are psychology dominated as well as law 
oriented to ensure that the findings transcend each discipline.  
Outline of Studies 
In this PhD programme, the overarching research question is: what are the 
broader implications of strategic disclosure of evidence in suspect interviews? 
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Psychology research, for instance, has focused primarily on how strategically 
disclosing evidence to suspects during the suspect interview helps the police catch 
the suspect lying (e.g., Hartwig et al., 2014). In contrast, my PhD research 
programme took a much broader look at strategic disclosure of evidence and how it 
fits into the wider police practices of detaining and questioning suspects. In doing 
this, the research incorporated lawyers’ concerns about the practical implications of 
the police withholding evidence from suspects. Crucially, the research considered 
how strategic evidence disclosure protocols impact the police interviewer, the legal 
advisor, as well as the suspect being questioned. 
Chapters 4–7 outline seven studies that address the broader implications of 
the police strategically disclosing evidence to suspects and their legal 
representatives. More specifically, Chapter 4 starts with a field study that examined 
current police disclosure practices, private lawyer-client consultations, and suspect 
interviews for a variety of serious and lesser offences. This study involved a month 
of observations at police stations around England and offers insights into the formal 
police disclosure process involving lawyers and how lawyers rely upon this 
disclosure to advise their clients in custody.  
Chapter 5 then asks the question of how the timing of police evidence 
disclosure impacts lawyers’ advice to suspects. To answer this question, 100 
criminal lawyers from across England and Wales took part in a survey in which they 
advised a hypothetical client at the police station. In this study, I systematically 
varied when the lawyers received disclosure from the police to investigate the nature 
of custodial legal advice with and without police disclosure.  
Next, Chapter 6 looks at the extent to which people who think of alternative 
explanations of the incriminating evidence, a crucial part of the strategic evidence 
disclosure technique for interviewers, are less likely to believe in the suspect’s guilt. 
To test whether such interview preparation influenced people’s guilt beliefs about a 
suspect, I conducted three experiments and a mini meta-analysis, in which lay people 
took on the role of interviewers and judged the suspect’s guilt. Some interviewers 
generated alternative explanations of the evidence in a criminal case and used these 
as the basis for their interview questions for the suspect, while other interviewers did 
not.  
Chapter 7 presents two experiments which examine how truthful and 
deceptive mock suspects respond to interview questions, when the evidence is 
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strategically withheld from them, after a more forensically-relevant time delay 
between the offence and the suspect interview. The first experiment investigated how 
mock suspects respond to specific SUE interview questions about the offence either 
immediately after the mock crime or after a time delay of two months. I was 
primarily interested in whether truthful suspects might forget what they did on the 
day of the offence when questioned a few months later, and as a result, contradict the 
evidence to the same extent as deceptive suspects. In the second experiment, I 
presented independent laypeople with the mock suspects’ responses to the SUE 
interview questions from the first experiment and asked them to detect who was 
telling the truth and who was lying. These experiments essentially examined how 
effective the SUE technique might be in lie detection when suspects are questioned 
two months after the alleged offence compared to immediately after the offence.   
Finally, the thesis finishes by bringing together the findings regarding 
strategic evidence disclosure from the lawyer’s perspective (Chapters 4 and 5), the 
police interviewer’s perspective (Chapter 6), and the suspect’s perspective (Chapter 
7), and highlights the practical implications for police interviewing practice in 
Chapter 8’s General Discussion.  
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Chapter 4: 
Behind Closed Doors: Live Observations of Current Police Station 
Disclosure Practices and Lawyer-Client Consultations 
 
When the police question a suspect about a crime, they can disclose their 
evidence to the suspect or their lawyer if they are represented, either before or during 
the interview. They can even do a combination of the two. Alternatively, the police 
may choose to withhold their evidence from the suspect and their lawyer until a later 
interview. Indeed, how and when the police disclose their evidence to suspects and 
their lawyers during the interview process is largely unregulated by the law in 
England and Wales (Clough & Jackson, 2012). So, how do the police in England and 
Wales currently disclose their evidence to suspects and their lawyers? In this chapter, 
I draw upon live observations of police disclosure to lawyers, the lawyer-client 
consultation, and the suspect interview, to offer a close look at how police disclose 
their evidence both before and during the suspect interview.    
Introduction 
  Until June 2014, the police in England and Wales were entirely free to 
decide how much evidence they disclose and whether to disclose it before 
questioning the suspect, while questioning the suspect, or not at all (R v. Imran and 
Husain, 1997). Field research, as well as interviews with police officers and lawyers, 
suggest that in practice, there is substantial variation in the level of pre-interview 
evidence disclosure. Some police are completely forthcoming with evidence, 
disclosing extensive details of the case matters to lawyers, while others reveal no 
evidence at all prior to the suspect interview (Blackstock et al., 2014; Kemp, 2013; 
McConville & Hodgson, 1993; Quinn & Jackson, 2007). In these studies, the 
different disclosure practices depended on factors such as how forthcoming 
individual officers were and whether the officer had a good relationship of trust with 
the lawyer (e.g., Blackstock et al., 2014).  
The purpose of disclosure is understood differently from the police and 
defence perspectives. Defence lawyers (and many criminal justice scholars) 
understand disclosure within a fair trial rights context in which suspects need to 
know the case against them in order to determine how and whether to respond. This 
has become increasingly important given the weight attached to the suspect’s 
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responses or silence, both for inferences at trial and the possibility of alternative 
forms of case disposition. Both criminal justice scholars and lawyers have 
highlighted the difficulty in deciding on an interview strategy for the suspect when 
disclosure is limited (Blackstock et al., 2014; Sanders et al., 2010). For the police, 
disclosure is understood in the context of their investigation; it is used as a tool to 
undermine the credibility of uncooperative suspects and obtain admissions. The 
police may hold back evidence to test the veracity of a suspect’s story (Association 
of Chief Police Officers, 2014). As a result, police and lawyers tend to disagree over 
what is an appropriate level of police disclosure (Kemp, 2010, 2013; Skinns, 2009).  
More recent field research suggests that the police do routinely offer lawyers 
a summary of the evidence in a case before questioning suspects (Blackstock et al., 
2014). The police may be motivated to make some pre-interview disclosure to 
lawyers because the police know that if they do not, lawyers may protest the lack of 
disclosure and advise their client to make no comment during the interview 
(Blackstock et al., 2014). Alternatively, the police may choose to disclose some 
information before the interview so that if the suspect chooses to remain silent 
during interview, adverse inferences may be drawn from the suspect’s silence in 
court (Cape, 2015). While the police may benefit from offering lawyers some pre-
interview disclosure, the extent of evidence disclosure remains ultimately at the 
discretion of each interviewing officer.   
In June 2014, the European Union legislated the EU Directive on the right to 
information in criminal proceedings (Council Directive, 2012), which, inter alia, 
requires the police to disclose why a person is suspected of an offence before 
questioning them. As the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) Code of Practice 
C previously only required the police to disclose the basic reasons for the suspect’s 
arrest and detention, it was revised to encompass this new pre-interview disclosure 
requirement:  
Before a person is interviewed, they and, if they are represented, their 
solicitor must be given sufficient information to enable them to understand 
the nature of any such offence, and why they are suspected of committing it 
(see paragraphs 3.4(a) and 10.3), in order to allow for the effective exercise 
of the rights of the defence. However, whilst the information must always be 
sufficient for the person to understand the nature of any offence (see Note 
11ZA), this does not require the disclosure of details at a time which might 
42 
 
prejudice the criminal investigation. (Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984, Code C, 2017, p. 36) 
In addition to this broad disclosure requirement, the Notes for Guidance specify the 
minimum level of pre-interview disclosure as follows:  
The requirement in paragraph 11.1A for a suspect to be given sufficient 
information about the offence applies prior to the interview and whether or 
not they are legally represented. What is sufficient will depend on the 
circumstances of the case, but it should normally include, as a minimum, a 
description of the facts relating to the suspected offence that are known to the 
officer, including the time and place in question. This aims to avoid suspects 
being confused or unclear about what they are supposed to have done and to 
help an innocent suspect to clear the matter up more quickly. (Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Code C, 2017, p. 39). 
Thus, the revised Code of Practice essentially allows the police to decide the level of 
disclosure and whether it is sufficient for each case. Put another way, the police are 
still at liberty to withhold the majority of their evidence before or while questioning 
a suspect (Cape, 2015). This may not allow “for the effective exercise of the rights of 
the defence” (p. 36) as set out in Code of Practice C, but will fulfil the minimum 
requirements as set out in the Notes for Guidance (Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984, Code C, 2017). For example, consider a murder case that involves DNA 
samples, CCTV footage, and the suspect’s fingerprints. The police need only 
disclose that they found the suspect’s fingerprints at the crime scene for the suspect 
to understand why they are suspected of committing the crime. The police could 
withhold any DNA evidence and CCTV footage, and choose to reveal it only after 
questioning the suspect so as not to prejudice their investigation. Indeed, the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) responded to the new disclosure 
requirement by emphasizing the importance of withholding some evidence to test the 
suspect’s account (2014). Meanwhile, the College of Policing have not issued any 
guidance or taken a clear stance on police disclosure practices. In essence, the police 
prefer to get the suspect’s version of events first before disclosing their evidence to 
the suspect (Kemp & Hodgson, 2016). Thus, even with the implementation of the 
EU Directive on the right to information, the police can withhold much of their 
evidence before questioning a suspect.  
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Like ACPO, some psychologists recommend that the police should 
strategically withhold evidence from the suspect until they have obtained an initial 
account during the interview—using the SUE approach (Hartwig et al., 2014). The 
reasoning is that the police might detect whether a suspect is lying by checking how 
consistent the suspect’s account is with the evidence (Hartwig et al., 2006; Luke et 
al., 2016). Indeed, there is some psychological research to suggest that questioning a 
suspect first and then strategically disclosing evidence helps interviewers detect lies 
(Clemens et al., 2010, 2011; Hartwig et al., 2005, 2006). In these psychology studies, 
people take on the roles of suspects and interviewers. The suspects either commit a 
mock crime—such as taking a wallet from a bookshop—and lie about it to the 
interviewer, or they complete a benign act—such as visiting the bookshop in search 
of a book—and tell the truth about it to the interviewer. These suspect behaviours are 
intended to mimic the behaviours of lying and truth-telling suspects, though in 
reality, not all lying suspects are guilty of a crime and not all innocent suspects are 
truthful during the interview. All suspects are then implicated in the mock crime by 
circumstantial evidence such as CCTV footage showing the suspect entering the 
bookshop. The interviewers, equipped with this evidence, typically question a 
suspect in one of two ways: by disclosing all of their evidence to the suspect early in 
the interview or by disclosing their evidence strategically late in the interview, after 
the suspect has provided an account. Generally, when lying suspects know the 
evidence against them, they fabricate an account to fit the evidence and interviewers 
have a harder time identifying whether the suspect is lying or telling the truth. In 
contrast, when suspects are unaware of the evidence against them, lying suspects 
contradict the evidence more than truth-telling suspects. For instance, a lying suspect 
might deny entering the bookshop to distance themselves from the crime, whereas a 
truth-telling suspect might admit to being in the bookshop (Hartwig et al., 2014). As 
a result of these inconsistencies between what the suspect says and what the 
evidence shows, interviewers are better able to detect whether a suspect is lying or 
telling the truth when they withhold and strategically disclose evidence. 
 Of late, psychologists have developed ways to withhold and strategically 
disclose even a single piece of evidence for the purposes of deception detection: the 
interviewer might initially introduce a piece of evidence in very general terms, but as 
the interview progresses, the interviewer might present that piece of evidence as 
increasingly precise and strong (Granhag, Strömwall, Willen, & Hartwig, 2013). 
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Returning to the murder case example, the interviewer might initially tell a murder 
suspect that they have information suggesting that the suspect visited a certain 
location, such as a hotel. Over the course of the interview, the interviewer might 
gradually reveal that they actually have CCTV footage showing the suspect entering 
the victim’s hotel room with a weapon. This gradual release of increasingly precise 
and compelling evidence is to encourage lying suspects to contradict the evidence or 
to change their own account during the interview, thus making the suspect’s attempt 
at deceit apparent. Again, psychological studies with people playing the roles of 
suspects and interviewers suggest that gradually reframing a single piece of evidence 
makes it easier for interviewers to identify which suspects are lying and which 
suspects are telling the truth (Granhag et al., 2013, 2015). Proponents of the SUE 
approach highlight that it fits well with English and Welsh interviewing protocols 
(Granhag & Hartwig, 2015). Holding back precise details of the evidence is certainly 
compatible with the current disclosure requirements for police (Cape, 2015). These 
psychology experiments, however, do not take account of the custodial context 
within which the criminal suspect is questioned, nor the legal and evidential factors 
to be considered, which may affect how and whether a suspect should answer police 
questions. Innocent suspects may lie to protect others, or because they do not 
understand the accusation, or they have insufficient information around which to 
frame an accurate response.  
In light of the introduction of a limited formal disclosure requirement and the 
growing body of psychology research that recommends delaying evidence 
disclosure, I was interested in how the police currently disclose evidence in practice. 
Although many studies have analysed electronically recorded police interviews (e.g., 
Kemp & Hodgson, 2016; Pearse & Gudjonsson, 1996, 1999; Soukara et al., 2009; 
Walsh & Bull, 2010, 2015), fewer studies have examined pre-interview disclosure 
and lawyer-client consultations as they occur (e.g., Blackstock et al., 2014; 
McConville & Hodgson, 1993; McConville et al., 1994). This is partly because 
lawyer-client consultations are private and confidential—typically, the lawyer’s 
notes are the only record of the consultation. Moreover, police forces vary in their 
practices of recording the police disclosure that is provided to lawyers (Shepherd, 
2007), so some police forces might have audiotaped records of their disclosure to 
lawyers, some might only have handwritten notes of their disclosure meeting with 
the lawyer, and others, no record at all. Thus, I observed police disclosure briefings 
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and lawyer-client consultations live at the police station. My observations took place 
in late 2015, following the revisions to PACE, Code of Practice C requiring the 
police to provide some pre-interview disclosure. In this chapter, I offer a glimpse 
into pre-interview disclosure practices, lawyer-client consultations, and the police 
questioning of suspects at a sample of police stations in England and Wales. 
Research Methodology  
Negotiating Access 
 Two law firms allowed the researcher to shadow all of their police station 
attendances for two weeks each. The study was given ethics approval by the 
University of Warwick’s School of Law and both law firms were informed of the 
measures in place to ensure the confidentiality of their lawyers and their clients in 
the consent forms. The lawyers were also informed that the researcher would be 
guided by what the lawyer considered to be in the best interests of their client—for 
example, if it was appropriate for the researcher to be present when the client was 
vulnerable.  
Nature of Observations 
 The researcher was based at the law firm during the study period and 
accompanied any lawyers who attended the police station. As noted in other field 
studies, the caseload was unpredictable—even during days when the firm was on call 
as duty solicitor there were often no cases (e.g., Blackstock et al., 2014). On other 
days, several cases came in simultaneously. On these occasions, the researcher 
shadowed the lawyer who attended the first case that was ready. To maximise 
observations and to gather a representative sample, the researcher made herself 
available to attend cases that came in after working hours, as well as during the day. 
 Upon arrival at the police station, the lawyer introduced the researcher to the 
custody sergeant and the interviewing and disclosure officers on the case as an 
observing PhD student. The police had no objections to the presence of the 
researcher. The researcher observed any interactions between the lawyer and police, 
including the pre-interview disclosure briefing, as well as lawyer-client 
consultations. The client was fully informed of the researcher’s role and interest in 
evidence disclosure, that the researcher was not part of the police nor the law firm, 
and that the client could ask for the researcher to leave at any point during the 
consultation or interview. Only one client was uncomfortable with the researcher’s 
presence and requested that she left. Information from that case has not been 
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included in this study. Following the pre-interview consultation, the researcher 
observed the police interview. The researcher did not participate in the disclosure 
briefing, the client consultations, or the interview, other than to introduce herself on 
the interview recording. Following the interview, the police often informed the 
lawyer whether the client would be bailed, charged, or cautioned.  
Recording and Analysing Data 
 For each case, the researcher completed a case log pro forma that included 
details about the lawyer, police station, case, suspect, consultation, and interview. 
This included the timings of the initial client consultation and police interview. The 
researcher also recorded detailed observational notes in a field diary throughout the 
police station attendances. These observational notes included who said what 
throughout the interview process. Following the field observations, the researcher 
typed up the notes and read through them to identify patterns in police disclosure 
practices—the main research theme of this study. Specifically, the researcher 
described and categorized the nature and format of police evidence disclosure before 
and during the interview in each case and whether lawyers referenced this disclosure 
in their advice to clients during their private consultations. The goal of this analysis 
was to provide a descriptive discussion of how and when the police disclosed their 
evidence to suspects and lawyers during the interview process.      
Findings and Discussion 
Sample of Cases 
 A total of 17 police station attendances (17 suspects, 16 cases) were observed 
over a four week period in 2015 with two law firms in two large, metropolitan cities 
in England. Five lawyers, including three police station accredited representatives 
and two solicitors, attended the cases. In total, three police forces were observed at 
nine police stations. 
Suspects were aged between 16–64 years old (M = 30.76, SD = 12.67 years), 
16 suspects were male, one was female. Suspect ethnicities, as recorded by lawyers, 
included British-White (47.1%), British-Mixed (17.6%), British-Asian (5.9%), 
British-Black (5.9%), Bangladeshi (5.9%), Caribbean-Black (5.9%), Jamaican-Black 
(5.9%), and Other-Black (5.9%). Suspects were arrested (64.7%), attended 
voluntarily (17.6%), or attended on bail (17.6%). All three juvenile suspects in the 
sample, as well as one suspect who had learning difficulties, had an appropriate adult 
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present. The suspected offences varied widely across cases, ranging from arson, 
rape, and grievous bodily harm to theft and possession of drugs. 
 When consulting with their lawyer, most suspects (94.1%) made claims 
about whether they were innocent or guilty. Six suspects claimed to be guilty 
(35.3%), one of which claimed to be guilty of a lesser offence and another claimed to 
have committed the offence by accident. Ten suspects claimed to be innocent 
(58.8%), although, one suspect did not understand that his actions amounted to a 
criminal offence. Once this particular suspect provided his account to the lawyer, the 
lawyer informed the suspect that he was guilty of the offence according to the law. 
The remaining suspect did not make any statement regarding his guilt or innocence.  
The length of the pre-interview consultations between the lawyer and client 
ranged from 8–73 minutes (M = 25.2, SD = 17.4 mins). The length of the police 
interview ranged from 6–62 minutes (M = 25.8, SD = 18.5 mins). Finally, the 
outcomes of detention for suspects were as follows: bailed to return (41.2%), bailed 
and cautioned (5.9%), charged (5.9%), charged and remanded (5.9%), left station 
(voluntary suspects, 11.8%), no further action taken (17.6%), recalled to prison 
(5.9%), and unknown (5.9%). Thus, in some cases, the observed interview led the 
police to make a decision, such as charging the suspect, which moved the case 
forward.  
Key Findings 
 Using the qualitative data collected in the field diary, I describe key insights 
into police disclosure practices and the lawyer-client consultations in this study.   
Pre-interview disclosure was a fixed practice. Pre-interview disclosure, 
whether it was minimal or comprehensive, always took place—in both cities, across 
nine police stations, and three police forces. It was a fixed practice, as the officer in 
charge of the case would be ready to provide pre-interview disclosure as soon as the 
lawyer arrived at the police station. This was a shared expectation of those involved 
in the custody procedure. For instance, one custody officer checked whether the 
lawyer had been given pre-interview disclosure yet (Case 1). Moreover, the police 
typically had a consultation room ready for the purpose of pre-interview disclosure 
once the lawyer arrived at the police station (Cases 1–3, 5–9, and 11–15).  
Pre-interview disclosure encompassed both disclosure of evidence and other 
case matters, thus serving as a general pre-interview briefing. Before arriving at the 
police station, lawyers often received only a brief email or phone call informing 
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them that a client was arrested. During pre-interview disclosure, the police briefed 
the lawyer about the allegation, the arrest, the offence(s), the evidence, and the client 
(including their fitness, drug test results, and criminal record). Such information, 
aside from the evidence, is highly useful as lawyers may rapidly gain an 
understanding of the case and the client’s situation (Cape, 2011).  
Notably, in one case, while waiting for the lawyer to arrive at the police 
station, the researcher observed the police make full disclosure directly to the suspect 
(Case 15). In this case, the suspect was attending voluntarily and the interviewing 
officer disclosed the victim’s allegation of criminal damage, the lack of forensic and 
eyewitness evidence, and that the interview was simply to gain an initial account. 
Note that ACPO (2014) have discouraged the police from making disclosure directly 
to a suspect as the suspect might have questions about the information disclosed, and 
as a result, the suspect may mistake the disclosure process for the interview. Overall, 
the police in this sample complied with the revised PACE Codes of Practice and 
briefed lawyers on at least basic case information before the interview as routine 
practice. 
Format of pre-interview disclosure. Pre-interview disclosure was given to 
lawyers either verbally (52.9%) or in a typed document (41.2%; format unknown for 
5.9% suspects). Sometimes, the disclosure documents included more than just the 
case evidence and information. In one disclosure document, the police reinforced 
their role as gatekeepers to the case evidence by reminding the lawyer that they were 
under no obligation to provide disclosure but they were offering it to help the lawyer 
advise their client (Case 5). In another disclosure document, the police encouraged 
lawyers and their clients to provide an account to the police. Specifically, the 
disclosure document informed the lawyer of the topics that would be covered in the 
interview before reminding the lawyer that this was an opportunity for the client to 
put forward a defence and alibi and that the police remained open-minded and 
unbiased—that the police were concerned only with truth and accuracy (Case 10). 
Such statements from the police are standard practice as illustrated by earlier 
research (e.g., Blackstock et al., 2014).  
Notably, even when disclosure was given in a typed document, detectives 
were still open to questions from the lawyer. With the exception of one case (Case 
10), all lawyers asked further questions when given pre-interview disclosure. In the 
exceptional case, the lawyer clarified to the researcher that they did not ask any 
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questions because they assumed that the police would not provide further 
information for a rape case. Moreover, the police disclosure document informed the 
lawyer that if they did require further information, they would have to put this 
request in writing for the police to consider. As the police intended to interview the 
suspect immediately, even if the lawyer did request further information, the lawyer 
may not have received further disclosure before the initial interview with the suspect.  
In the remaining cases, lawyers asked the police several probing questions, 
for example, whether there was any CCTV footage of the incident (Case 9), whether 
the client’s clothing matched the victim’s description (Case 11), whether the client’s 
clothing would be tested for the victim’s DNA (Case 11), and whether the victim had 
made any allegations against the client in the past (Case 15). Through these 
questions about the existing evidence, or lack thereof, and the evidence the police 
were still investigating such as DNA samples, lawyers acquired case information that 
was not included in the disclosure document and established the strength of the case 
against their client. Subsequently, when advising their clients on an interview 
strategy, lawyers tended to refer to the overall amount and strength of evidence that 
the police held. For instance, when a lawyer judged the evidence to be weak she 
advised the client that there was no need to submit a defence at this stage and 
recommended making no comment in the interview (Case 11). In sum, lawyers 
maximised how much information they received before the interview, regardless of 
the format of disclosure, and in turn, used this information to deliver advice to their 
clients.     
Lawyers rarely saw the actual evidence before the interview. The police 
rarely released victim or witness statements, CCTV footage, or photographs to the 
lawyer before the interview. Exceptions included showing the lawyer the knife the 
client allegedly carried (Case 8) and photographs of a repaired door that the client 
allegedly damaged (Case 13). As in other studies, the police typically informed 
lawyers that such evidence existed and whether or not it would be presented to the 
client during the interview (Blackstock et al., 2014). Likewise, lawyers rarely asked 
to see the evidence, although they did ask about the details and quality of evidence. 
In one instance, the detective openly admitted that the evidence was a “crap 
package” and through questioning, the lawyer established that the CCTV footage of 
the affray between the client (who was arrested at the scene) and alleged victim did 
not capture the full incident (Case 14). The police’s openness regarding the lack of 
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evidence is surprising but such frank disclosure has been attributed to good working 
relationships between the police and lawyers in past research (Blackstock et al., 
2014). 
Notably, withholding the actual evidence from the lawyer may also have 
been part of an evidence disclosure tactic. When one lawyer was not shown the 
witness statements before the interview, it was unclear whether the witnesses only 
heard or also saw the client damage the property—this key detail determined how 
incriminating the witness statements were (Case 13). Given that lawyers rarely see 
the CCTV footage or witness statements before the interview, the police may easily 
withhold specific details of the evidence as some psychologists recommend 
(Granhag et al., 2013, 2015). In other words, the police might withhold the strength 
and precision of their evidence initially while the suspect answers questions, and 
later, gradually disclose the details of their evidence in order to catch a suspect lying.  
Lack of pre-interview disclosure was not always a tactic. Sometimes, 
when the lawyer was unhappy with the pre-interview disclosure, it was not because 
the police were tactically withholding evidence, but because the investigation was 
still on-going and the police had not yet gathered and processed all the evidence. In 
one case, the lawyer highlighted to the client that the police still needed to record 
some witness statements and reformat the CCTV footage (Case 5). The police in this 
case used the first interview simply to get an initial account from the suspect; no 
evidence was presented during this interview. Likewise, in another case, the police 
confirmed that they still needed to check phone records to prove the timing, number, 
and content of the phone calls that the suspect allegedly made to the victim (Case 
12). Thus, while psychologists recommend withholding evidence to test a suspect’s 
account, this might not be practical; the police might simply not have much evidence 
to disclose or to compare with a suspect’s account in the initial interview.  
Evidence disclosure tactics used. In this study, three evidence disclosure 
tactics came to light: withholding information from the lawyer before the interview 
(35.3% of suspects), exaggerating the evidence to the suspect before the lawyer 
arrived at the police station (17.6% of suspects), and introducing new information 
during the interview (29.4% of suspects).  
It was apparent when the police withheld evidence from the lawyer before the 
interview because the police either refused to answer the lawyer’s questions about 
the evidence during the pre-interview briefing or the police released such 
51 
 
information during the interview. Sometimes they did both. The type of information 
being withheld varied widely, from whether there were screenshots of alleged phone 
calls from the suspect (Case 12), to whether fingerprint results would come back 
immediately (Case 9), to whether a key witness had made a statement (Case 3). One 
lawyer reported that the police often withheld information to create a sense of 
ambiguity in the hope of frightening a client into confessing to the crime (Case 9). 
The most worrying tactic was the police exaggerating the evidence to the 
suspect. Giving suspects false information is dangerous—psychological studies have 
demonstrated that innocent suspects are at risk of making wrongful confessions 
when they are faced with false evidence (Kassin, Drizin, et al., 2010; Nash & Wade, 
2009; Wright, Wade, & Watson, 2013). In one study, for instance, when students 
were informed about fake video evidence of them cheating in a gambling task, 
almost all of them confessed to cheating, even though none of them actually cheated 
(Nash & Wade, 2009). The courts have also excluded as unfair a confession made in 
response to the presentation of false evidence to the suspect and their solicitor (e.g., 
R v. Mason2, 1987). Yet, some police—though not necessarily the interviewing 
officers—may speak to the suspect informally when arresting or detaining the 
suspect and exaggerate the evidence they have. This is before the suspect is legally 
represented and afforded further protection (such as an electronic recording of the 
interview) against such tactics. This was an unexpected finding and caution is 
recommended in interpreting it given that the researcher did not observe this tactic 
directly. Instead, the tactic came to light when observing the private consultations 
between the lawyer and the client. In these consultations, three separate clients each 
asked their lawyers for further details of evidence that the police had informed the 
clients about, but not the lawyers. For instance, one suspect claimed the police had 
suggested they had CCTV footage of him during the incident (Case 9). This 
contradicted the pre-interview disclosure that the interviewing officer gave to the 
lawyer in which the police clarified that there was no CCTV footage evidence in this 
case. In another case, too, the suspect was concerned about CCTV footage that the 
police had told him about—the lawyer then clarified that the CCTV footage simply 
placed the suspect in the area and did not capture the offence (Case 11). Although 
                                                          
2 The confession in this case was excluded under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
(PACE) Act 1984 as it was unfair even though it had not been obtained by oppression, nor was it 
likely to be unreliable, and so section 76 of PACE did not apply. 
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some police officers may have made the case against the suspect seem stronger and 
more serious, it is important to note that the interviewing officer did not claim that 
such evidence existed during the suspect interview or during disclosure to the 
lawyer. Moreover, lawyers tended to inform clients immediately that such evidence 
did not exist. 
The final tactic involved the disclosure of new information during the 
interview, such as the client’s belongings being found near stolen vehicles (Case 9) 
or earlier victim allegations of assaults (Case 3). One lawyer suggested that the 
police did this to surprise or pressure clients into speaking when they were 
exercising their right to silence (Case 9). In some cases, only minor details, such as 
the suspect allegedly insulting the victim, were revealed during the interview and it 
was unclear whether this was done tactically or such details were simply not 
important enough to include in the pre-interview briefing with the lawyer (Case 16).  
Based on the lawyers’ comments, it seemed that all three evidence disclosure 
tactics aimed to pressure the suspect into speaking or making an admission of guilt. 
In this study, around half the suspects (52.9%) remained silent or responded with ‘no 
comment’ during the interview. Meanwhile, 35.3% of suspects answered all the 
police’s questions, either to deny committing the crime (23.5%) or to make a full 
admission (11.8%). The remaining 11.8% of suspects answered only some of the 
police’s questions and on the advice of their lawyer, invoked their right to silence for 
other police questions. While it is beyond the scope of this study to evaluate whether 
the police’s evidence disclosure tactics were effective in making the suspect speak 
during the interview, it is important to note that the police employed one or more of 
the three aforementioned evidence disclosure tactics with 41.2% of suspects in this 
study.  
Lack of disclosure caused tension between lawyers and police. In line 
with past research findings (Kemp, 2010, 2013; Skinns, 2009), lawyers argued with 
the police over the limited pre-interview disclosure in two cases (Cases 3 and 5). For 
instance, when a detective refused to disclose whether the victim had made a 
statement, the lawyer refused to provide the client’s details on tape during the 
interview, insisting that the detective could check the custody record (Case 3). In 
another case, the lawyer, unhappy with the pre-interview disclosure document, 
argued with the police regarding their knowledge of the case law on pre-interview 
disclosure (Case 5). Eventually, one of the officers ended the argument by agreeing 
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to provide further information about the suspect’s alleged obstruction. Thus, the 
lawyers and police in this study occasionally disagreed on the level of pre-interview 
disclosure the police provided. 
Advising the client during consultation. When advising the client, most 
lawyers (94.1%) presented the client with the evidence first before inviting an 
explanation from the client. This is a common approach when getting an account 
from the client (e.g., Blackstock et al., 2014). In contrast, one lawyer preferred to ask 
for the client’s account first to test it against the evidence, and then present the client 
with the evidence (Case 15). In both approaches, lawyers relied on the police’s 
evidence to elicit an account from the client.  
Lawyers advised 58.8% of suspects to make no comment during the 
interview for the following stated reasons: to avoid self-incrimination, since the 
evidence disclosed was not strong (Cases 1, 6, and 11) or the police still needed to 
gather further key evidence (Cases 3, 5, 9, and 14); to try and avoid prosecution 
(Case 2); and to avoid any new charges since the client was definitely going to 
prison (Case 13). Lawyers advised a few suspects (11.8%) to make no comment 
during interview and also wrote a prepared statement for the police setting out the 
suspect’s denial of the offence. Lawyers advised some suspects (23.5%) to deny the 
offence during the interview since the suspects had a full defence. Finally, one 
suspect (5.9%) was advised to make a full admission to the police so that he would 
receive only a caution and avoid going to court. Thus, as in past research, lawyers’ 
advice generally depended on the evidence disclosed and the client’s instructions 
(Kemp & Hodgson, 2016). 
Notably, not all suspects followed their lawyer’s recommended course of 
action for the police interview. Indeed, two suspects disregarded their lawyer’s 
advice to make no comment and instead answered the police’s questions during 
interview, despite continuing reminders from their lawyer to respond with “no 
comment” (Cases 1 and 15). Meanwhile, one suspect found it difficult to submit a 
prepared statement and remain silent during interview. So, during the interview, the 
suspect wrote his responses down on paper and requested that his lawyer read them 
to the police (Case 16). Thus, even with a lawyer present to advise them before and 
during the police interview, suspects may find it difficult to invoke their right to 
silence during police questioning. This finding is consistent with past research on 
suspects in police custody (McConville & Hodgson, 1993). During consultation, 
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suspects also expressed concerns about getting out of police custody quickly and that 
remaining silent during the interview would make them appear guilty (Cases 3, 4, 
and 16)—such concerns are standard suspect responses (Blackstock et al., 2014; 
McConville & Hodgson, 1993; Skinns, 2009). 
Conclusions 
Based on the observation of police disclosure briefings with lawyers, lawyer-
client consultations, and suspect interviews in 16 criminal cases, this study offers a 
detailed snapshot of current police disclosure practice. Not only did the police 
comply with the minimum disclosure requirements set out by the revised Codes of 
Practice, the police were generally quite open with lawyers compared to past 
research in which there has been a large variation in levels of pre-interview 
disclosure (McConville & Hodgson, 1993; Kemp, 2013; Quinn & Jackson, 2007). 
Regardless of the seriousness of the offence and amount of evidence in the case, the 
police in this study briefed the lawyer on case matters before questioning the suspect. 
Perhaps it was to ensure that adverse inferences may be drawn from a suspect’s 
silence or to elicit cooperation from the lawyer and suspect during interview. 
Moreover, the police typically answered lawyers’ questions even if disclosure was 
officially provided in writing. Lawyers rarely had the opportunity, however, to see 
the actual evidence before the interview and while the police are under no general 
obligation to disclose their case file to lawyers, any documents relevant to the 
legality of arrest and detention must be made available to them. Subsequently, 
lawyers drew upon the police disclosure in advising their clients. When the police 
did withhold evidence or information, it tended to be a single piece of evidence or 
specific details of the evidence. Thus, as recent psychological research suggests, the 
interviewing method of strategically withholding a single piece of evidence from the 
suspect would fit with current police questioning practice in England and Wales 
(Granhag & Hartwig, 2015). On a practical note, the police did not always have any 
further evidence to disclose or, alternatively, to withhold strategically during the first 
interview.  
Few empirical studies in recent years have used live observations of real 
police interviews, and fewer still have accessed police disclosure meetings and 
lawyer-client consultations. The generalizability of the findings, however, is limited 
by the use of a small sample of police station attendances from three police forces in 
England and Wales. It is possible that other police forces in the jurisdiction vary in 
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their evidence disclosure practices given the limited official guidance regarding 
disclosure. In addition, this study focused on pre-interview briefings to lawyers and 
relied exclusively on police station attendances by lawyers. Future research should 
explore cases with legally unrepresented suspects in which the police may disclose 
all or most of the evidence directly to the suspect during the interview.   
Overall, the study is consistent with findings from recent research, including 
routine police disclosure to lawyers, tension arising between lawyers and police over 
lack of disclosure, and lawyers’ reliance on the information disclosed by police when 
consulting with clients (Blackstock et al., 2014; Kemp, 2010, 2013; Quinn & 
Jackson, 2007; Skinns, 2009). This suggests that revisions to the PACE Code of 
Practice have had little impact in changing police practices around pre-interview 
disclosure. Troublingly, however, this study found that some police officers may 
give suspects the impression that they possess stronger, more damning evidence than 
they actually do. This is problematic for all suspects, but given the vulnerability of 
suspects in custody and the risks of false confessions, whether this occurs with 
legally unrepresented suspects, who will not have a lawyer to inform them of the true 
nature of the evidence, is worthy of further investigation.  
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Chapter 5: 
How the Timing of Police Evidence Disclosure Impacts Custodial 
Legal Advice 
   
As the fieldwork in the previous chapter highlighted, the police in England 
and Wales disclose their evidence at different points during the arrest and detention 
of a suspect. Given that lawyers rely on the evidence disclosed by police to advise 
their clients, this chapter examines how criminal defence lawyers advise a 
hypothetical client when given either pre-interview disclosure or disclosure at 
various points during the police interview (early, gradually, or late).  
Introduction 
In England and Wales, the police control the timing and amount of evidence 
that they disclose to a suspect and their lawyer during the interview process. By law, 
the police are under no obligation to disclose most of their evidence when 
questioning a suspect. For instance, the key legislation governing disclosure, the 
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA), offers comprehensive 
guidance on pre-trial disclosure by the prosecution but lacks any reference to 
evidence disclosure at the police station (Clough & Jackson, 2012). Likewise, the 
Police and Criminal Evidence (PACE) Act 1984 and Codes of Practice that govern 
police interviewing practices only require the police to disclose “sufficient 
information to enable them [the suspect and legal adviser] to understand the nature 
of any such offence, and why they are suspected of committing it” (Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Code C, 2017, p. 36) before the interview. Even in 
light of adopting the new EU Directive on the right to information3 (Council 
Directive, 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings), the police are 
afforded discretion with regard to the extent of their pre-interview disclosure (Cape, 
2015). Thus, the police are largely free to decide when and how they present their 
evidence while interviewing suspects. 
As a result, the police often strategically delay disclosing some evidence, 
such as a “golden nugget” or a “trump card”, to the suspect and their lawyer until the 
interview (Shepherd, 2007, p. 331). Indeed, the ACPO (2014) recently released a 
                                                          
3 The Directive encompasses the right to information about procedural rights, the right to information 
about the accusation, and the right of access to the materials of the case. 
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statement stressing the importance of withholding evidence from the suspect in order 
to test the suspect’s account. Likewise, psychology research recommends 
withholding evidence from suspects as it is easier to catch suspects lying when the 
suspect is not aware of the evidence against them (e.g., Hartwig et al., 2014). In view 
of these recommendations, self-reports and in-depth interviews of police 
investigators reveal a preference for disclosing the evidence to the suspect gradually 
during the interview, or late in the interview, as opposed to early in the interview 
(King, 2002; Smith & Bull, 2014; Walsh et al., 2016). Indeed, police investigators in 
England and Wales are trained to gradually present evidence when interviewing 
suspects (Walsh et al., 2016). 
 Consistent with police practice, the courts permit the police to use their 
discretion to determine the extent of pre-interview disclosure on a case-by-case 
basis. For instance, in R v. Nottle (2004), the court acknowledged the need for some 
pre-interview disclosure to allow the solicitor to advise their client properly but 
clarified that “the police were not obliged to disclose every piece of evidence that 
they had” (para. 14). In this case, the police did not reveal the misspelling on a 
vandalised car and the suspect once again misspelled the name ‘Justin’ as ‘Jutin’ in a 
handwriting test. The appeal on the ground that the police used a form of deception 
was dismissed and the police were given the freedom to determine the “quality and 
quantity of disclosure” (R v. Nottle, para. 14) for each case. R v. Farrell (2004) was 
another appeal against incomplete police disclosure, in which the court held that 
withholding evidence, such as false car number plates in this case, cannot be 
considered an act of trickery or deceit. The court further postulated that full 
disclosure would “threaten seriously to handicap legitimate police enquiries” (R v. 
Farrell, para. 22). It is apparent that the English and Welsh courts believe that 
limited pre-interview disclosure is sufficient for suspects and their lawyers to prepare 
for the interview, to the extent that the courts may even draw adverse inferences 
from a suspect’s silence during interview, regardless of whether the police provided 
the lawyer with full pre-interview disclosure (see R v. Argent, 1997). Even the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) does not support pre-interview access to 
the case file for lawyers (A.T. v. Luxembourg, 2015). In essence, withholding 
evidence until the interview is accepted as standard practice (R. v. W., 2006).  
 While the police, psychologists, and courts are largely in favour of 
withholding evidence from suspects, defence lawyers and criminal justice scholars 
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argue that lawyers cannot advise their clients at the police station effectively when 
the police fail to provide sufficient pre-interview disclosure (Sanders et al., 2010; 
Toney, 2001). Without knowing what evidence the police have, lawyers face great 
difficulty in determining whether a client should provide an account or remain silent 
in the interview and must often guess at the strength of the police’s evidence when 
providing this advice (Clough & Jackson, 2012). In his guide to police station 
advice, Cape highlights that evidence disclosure is crucial to advising clients 
accurately on how to respond in the police interview (Cape, 2011). For instance, if 
the evidence is very weak and circumstantial, the suspect may not need to answer 
any police questions at this stage. Conversely, if the evidence is quite strong and the 
suspect can provide an alibi or innocent explanation, it may be in their best interests 
to offer this account to the police. If the suspect claims to be guilty, lawyers are 
ethically only allowed to advise the suspect to remain silent during the interview or 
to make a full admission—lawyers cannot assist the suspect to deceive or mislead 
the police (Solicitors Regulation Authority, 2016). Deciding whether the suspect 
should admit their guilt to the police also requires knowing the strength of the 
police’s evidence. In this way, knowing the police’s evidence is critical to deciding 
on an interview strategy for the client.  
Thus, police station advisers are encouraged to seek further evidence 
disclosure from the police, for instance, by demanding that the police disclose more 
information or stopping the interview to consult with the client whenever new 
evidence is disclosed (Cape, 2011). Accordingly, past field research suggests that 
lawyers do tend to argue with the police for greater levels of pre-interview disclosure 
(Kemp, 2010, 2013; Skinns, 2009). Lawyers also try to negotiate further disclosure 
from the police by advising their clients to remain silent or to respond with ‘no 
comment’ to police questioning (Blackstock et al., 2014; Quinn & Jackson, 2007). 
Essentially, lawyers make it clear that if the police control the flow of information 
and limit disclosure, then the lawyers will similarly restrict how much information 
their client provides to the police. However, as mentioned before, advising silence 
may be problematic because the court may still draw adverse inferences from a 
suspect’s silence despite a lack of full, pre-interview disclosure (Azzopardi, 2002; 
Jackson, 2001). Ultimately, there is consensus amongst lawyers that when the police 
limit evidence disclosure before the interview, they limit the advice that lawyers can 
provide to their clients (Blackstock et al., 2014). Of course, the police and defence 
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represent two different ideologies and accordingly hold different objectives. On one 
hand, the police are investigating an offence and in arresting and detaining the 
suspect, they are not questioning the suspect in a neutral manner but as a suspected 
offender. This motivates delaying evidence disclosure to the suspect and lawyer. On 
the other hand, the defence must represent the interests of the suspect, including their 
due process and fair trial rights. This requires delivering considered legal advice to 
the client, which in turn requires earlier police evidence disclosure. Knowing the 
police’s evidence early in the interview process also helps the suspect to avoid being 
caught out in a lie. 
 Approaching this issue from the disciplines both of law and psychology, I 
sought to gather new data on lawyer responses to disclosure at different points in the 
detention and questioning of suspects. Thus, I set out systematically to examine how 
the timing of police evidence disclosure impacts custodial legal advice. To this end, I 
recruited 100 lawyers from England and Wales to participate in an online study. The 
study presented lawyers with hypothetical police station scenarios in which the 
police disclosed all of their evidence before the interview began (as lawyers prefer), 
early in the interview (before asking the suspect for an account), gradually during the 
interview (‘drip-feeding’ the evidence while questioning the suspect), or late in the 
interview (after questioning the suspect thoroughly). I selected early, gradual, and 
late disclosure during the interview because past researchers have categorized police 
disclosure strategies during the interview in this way (e.g., Walsh & Bull, 2015; 
Walsh et al., 2016). Additionally, I manipulated the scenarios to include either a 
client who claimed to be innocent or one who claimed to be guilty of the suspected 
offence, as this is a further factor likely to influence lawyers’ advice to the client. 
Participating lawyers reported how they would advise their clients both before and 
during the police interview in the hypothetical scenarios. Based on past research, I 
expected that lawyers who were given pre-interview disclosure would be better 
equipped to deliver legal advice to their clients than lawyers who were only given 
disclosure during the interview. 
Method 
Subjects and Design 
 I identified over 2000 law firms specializing in criminal defence via the 
official website of the Law Society in England and Wales, an independent 
professional body for solicitors. As this was an exploratory study, I aimed to recruit 
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as many lawyers as possible by contacting all the law firms listed on the Law 
Society’s official website. I sent emails containing the link to the online study and a 
brief description of the project to approximately 2156 law firms listed by the Law 
Society, in addition to the president of a local Law Society. Over a period of seven 
weeks, 100 lawyers working in criminal defence across England and Wales 
participated in the study.  
 The final sample consisted of 79 solicitors, 17 accredited police station 
representatives, 2 trainee solicitors, 1 chartered legal executive advocate, and 1 
respondent who chose not to provide their status. The number of years subjects spent 
in criminal defence ranged from 2 to 40 (M = 17.4 years, SD = 10.5). Only 89 
subjects were police station accredited as some were privately funded.4 Of the 
subjects who were accredited, the number of years they reported being accredited 
ranged from 1.5 to 385 (M = 14.8 years, SD = 9.2). Likewise, the number of clients 
they advised at the police station per month varied greatly from 0.2, with one subject 
reporting only a few clients a year, to 40 clients per month (M = 10.8 clients, SD = 
8.5). Only one subject reported that they had never represented a client at the police 
station. 
 Subjects were randomly assigned to one of eight groups produced by a 2 
(suspect: innocent vs. guilty) × 4 (disclosure timing: pre-interview vs. early vs. 
gradual vs. late) between-subjects design. Subjects read different scenarios 
depending on which group they were assigned to. As there were only 12 or 13 
subjects per group, inferential statistics were not appropriate. Thus, although the 
study was designed with an experimental approach, lawyers’ responses were 
analysed only qualitatively.  
Procedure 
 The study was conducted online and all of the data were collected 
anonymously. All subjects provided informed consent before starting the study. 
Subjects were initially presented with background questions regarding their job, their 
experience in criminal defence and police station advice work, as well as how 
frequently they advised clients at the police station. Next, subjects were presented 
                                                          
4 Police station accreditation is required in order to be eligible for legal aid payment for police station 
work. 
5 Police station accreditation was only introduced in 1994 so some lawyers might have interpreted this 
as ‘legally qualified’ to provide police station advice. 
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with one of eight scenarios depending on which group they were in. For all subjects, 
the first part of the scenario began by asking them to imagine they were representing 
a young male client (‘Christopher’), who had been arrested on suspicion of burglary, 
and was being held at the police station. Depending on the subject’s group, the client 
either claimed to be innocent or guilty and the police either revealed all three pieces 
of incriminating evidence they had (in the pre-interview disclosure groups) or simply 
stated that they had evidence that suggested the client’s involvement (in the early, 
gradual, and late disclosure groups). At this stage, subjects had to report what they 
would advise their client before the police interview. 
 Subjects were then presented with the second part of the scenario in which 
they were asked to imagine being present at the client’s police interview. They were 
informed that the client’s behaviour would depend on what was agreed upon prior to 
the interview. In the pre-interview disclosure groups, the interview consisted of the 
police asking the suspect (Christopher) for his account and questioning him about 
the evidence that the police had already revealed prior to the interview. In the early 
disclosure groups, the police revealed all three pieces of evidence that they possessed 
immediately after the caution and then asked for the suspect’s account and 
questioned him about the evidence that they had revealed early in the interview. In 
the gradual disclosure groups, the police asked for an account at the start of the 
interview and then asked further questions while steadily revealing one piece of 
evidence at a time in between the questions. After each piece of evidence was 
revealed, the suspect was asked to explain it. For example, the scenario stated that 
“The police then ask a few questions about the crime, before revealing CCTV stills 
of Christopher’s car parked in the victim’s neighbourhood around the time of the 
burglary. The police then ask Chris for an explanation.” In the late disclosure groups, 
the police asked the suspect for an account and then asked all of their questions. 
Only at the end of the interview, did the police reveal their three pieces of evidence 
and ask the suspect to explain the evidence. All subjects had to state whether they 
would advise the client during the interview, and those who stated that they would, 
were asked to describe what they would advise their client. 
 All eight scenarios were identical except for whether the client claimed to be 
innocent or guilty and the manner in which the three pieces of evidence were 
disclosed. The three pieces of evidence were CCTV stills of the client’s car parked in 
the victim's neighbourhood around the time of the burglary; a description of the 
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burglar by the victim's neighbour, which fit the client’s appearance; and the client’s 
fingerprint on the garden fence of the victim’s house (presented in that order). I 
chose these three pieces of circumstantial evidence for several reasons. First, none of 
the evidence was sufficient to prove that the client had committed the burglary, 
which is why a police interview was crucial. Second, all three pieces of evidence 
could plausibly exist for both guilty and innocent suspects. Third, the police are 
more likely to employ various strategic evidence disclosure methods such as gradual 
or late disclosure during the interview when a serious crime has been committed but 
the evidence is not strong enough to charge the suspect immediately.  
 Following the scenario, subjects who were assigned a guilty client were 
asked how their advice during the pre-interview consultation and their strategy 
during the interview would differ, if at all, had the client claimed he was innocent. 
Similarly, subjects who were initially assigned an innocent client were asked the 
same question but with a client who instead claimed to be guilty.  
Finally, all subjects were asked which level of disclosure they believed was 
fairest to their client (pre-interview, early, gradual, or late) and why. Additionally, 
subjects were asked how much of the evidence possessed by the police they required 
to advise their clients effectively. The whole study took an average of 16 minutes 
(SD = 15 minutes) to complete. 
Results and Discussion 
In this section, I first outline how I analysed the data before describing and 
comparing the overall characteristics of lawyers’ responses to pre-interview 
disclosure and early, gradual, and late disclosure of evidence during the police 
interview in the hypothetical scenario. Next, I examine the effect of the suspect’s 
assertion of innocence on how lawyers would advise their client. Finally, I discuss 
responses to the general follow-up questions on police disclosure and some 
limitations of this study.   
Given the small sample size of this study, I chose to analyse lawyers’ 
responses to the various hypothetical scenarios qualitatively. Moreover, given that 
lawyers frequently referred to the amount of police disclosure they received or the 
suspect’s claims of being innocent or guilty in their responses, it was not possible for 
research assistants to blindly code the data. As a result, I analysed the data myself for 
insights into how lawyers might advise a client and their reasons for such advice. 
Although this qualitative approach might be somewhat subjective, I treated lawyers’ 
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responses as systematically as possible by creating categories for the types of advice 
lawyers offered and the reasons for such advice—these categories and how I 
developed them are outlined in greater detail below.  
To examine whether evidence disclosure and suspects’ innocence affect how 
lawyers say they would advise their clients, I looked at four key aspects of the 
responses: what lawyers advised their client to do in the interview; the reasons 
behind those recommendations; whether or not interviews were interrupted; and the 
reasons why these interruptions took place. An initial read-through of the responses 
revealed that the two main reasons lawyers provided for their advice were the type of 
evidence disclosure (specifically, the lack of disclosure or the strength of the 
evidence when it was disclosed pre-interview) and suspects’ innocence, indicating 
that the manipulations of the scenarios were effective. Responses could not be 
categorized according to what lawyers advised their client to do as some lawyers 
(20%) gave non-directive advice and let the client decide how to proceed in the 
interview. However, advising the client to make no comment, to submit a prepared 
statement or to answer questions, and arguing with the police officers, were common 
interview strategies, thus I identified the frequency of such advice across groups. The 
initial read-through also revealed that regardless of the police disclosure strategy 
during the interview (i.e. early, gradual, or late), lawyers provided similar reasons, 
namely the lack of pre-interview disclosure, for recommending specific strategies. 
As lawyers treated the three types of disclosure similarly, responses to early, gradual, 
and late disclosure during the interview will be discussed together. Lawyers were 
assigned labels according to their job and response number and are referred to 
according to their label throughout the results section, see Table 5.1 for label 
meanings. 
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Table 5.1 
Lawyers’ labels and what they represent 
Note. x indicates subject number and ranges from 1–100. 
 
Hypothetical Scenario 
 A preliminary analysis of the word count of responses indicated that lawyers 
considered the hypothetical scenario carefully. Respondents typed an average of 70.2 
words (SD = 62.3) in response to the key question: ‘What would you advise 
Christopher before the interview begins?’ 
Pre-interview disclosure. 
Innocent client.  Depending on whether the client could provide a plausible 
account, approximately half the lawyers (53.8%) in the innocent, pre-interview 
group advised cooperating with the police either by putting forward a prepared 
statement or by answering questions. In deciding this interview strategy, some 
lawyers (38.5%) took instructions from the client on the evidence: 
First,6 I would find out why Christopher was in the area at the time the 
burglary happened and whether he had any connection to the residents of that 
property, given Christopher's fingerprints on the garden fence. Depending on 
the response from Christopher, if he did know the residents and there is an 
explanation as to reasons for being in the vicinity, then I would suggest that 
Christopher answer the officer’s questions. However, if there is no reasonable 
explanation for his presence in the vicinity then I would have suggested a ‘no 
comment’ interview due to the potential doubt of the evidence which does 
not prove Christopher entered the house or actually committed the burglary. 
(Respondent51) 
                                                          
6 Minor grammatical changes were made to the quotes to make them more readable. 
Job Label  
(x = assigned subject number) 
Solicitor Solx 
Trainee solicitor TSolx 
Police station accredited representative Repx 
Chartered legal executive advocate Execx 
Unanswered  Respondentx 
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The finding that lawyers took time to ask for the client’s account and compare it with 
the police’s evidence echoes my field observations in Chapter 4.  
However, not all lawyers advised cooperating with the police as 30.8% of 
lawyers in this group directed clients to make no comment in the interview due to the 
circumstantial nature of the evidence. For example, one lawyer concluded that the 
client need not answer questions because, 
[T]he police have not disclosed where on the fence the fingerprint was found. 
If the fence faced the pavement Christopher could have put his hand on it as 
he walked past. Although Christopher matches the description the neighbour 
has given, a formal ID procedure should be offered. (Rep4) 
The remaining 15.4% of lawyers did not recommend an interview strategy. 
Regardless of whether or not lawyers advised the client to cooperate in the interview, 
the majority of lawyers (76.9%) explicitly referred to the nature and strength of the 
evidence they were given before offering their client advice that was specific to case 
facts. Lastly, all lawyers claimed they would not intervene in the interview unless 
there was more disclosure (and there was not) or if they had to remind the client to 
stay silent. 
  Guilty client.  The two most common responses in the guilty, pre-interview 
disclosure group were advising a ‘no comment’ interview (53.8%) or letting the 
client choose whether to make an admission (30.8%). As for the reasoning behind 
this advice, some lawyers (53.8%) responded similarly to those in the innocent, pre-
interview disclosure group by evaluating the nature and strength of the disclosed 
evidence. However, their advice was also influenced by the client’s admission of 
guilt, for example: 
It would be in Christopher's best interest to make a ‘no comment’ interview.  
After admitting his involvement to me he would be unable to deny the 
allegation. The evidence does not put him in the victim’s property. His car 
being in the vicinity means nothing. I would want to know whether the 
fingerprint was found inside or outside the fence. Also whether it was the 
front fence or back fence of the property. (Rep58) 
This focus on the client’s guilt was particularly apparent in the responses (15.4%) 
that disregard the disclosure of evidence: “he has two options available to him, 
namely, he can answer questions and admit his guilt at the earliest opportunity, 
therefore retaining sentencing credit. Or alternatively, he can put the police to proof 
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and provide a ‘no comment’ interview” (Rep99). Of course, legal advisers only have 
two options once a client has admitted their involvement in a crime. Nonetheless, 
pre-interview disclosure still assisted lawyers in assessing how the client should 
proceed: “Make no comment in interview. Disclosure given does not provide 
evidence linking client to the actual building. No identification procedure has been 
conducted to identify the person witness saw. Not in client’s interest to make 
admission at that time” (Rep77). 
The remaining 15.4% of lawyers did not specify an interview strategy in their 
responses. Finally, just like respondents in the innocent, pre-interview disclosure 
group, all lawyers claimed they would not interrupt the interview except to remind 
their client to remain silent. 
Early, gradual, and late disclosure during police interview.  
Innocent client.  For innocent clients, over half the lawyers (56.8%) firmly 
advised the client to make no comment and a further 16.2% of lawyers 
recommended the same, unless the client had a complete alibi. The only reason 
lawyers provided for the ‘no comment’ interviews was lack of disclosure:  
I would advise Christopher to enter a prepared statement which reads “I have 
not been provided with details of a prima facie case against me and for that 
reason I exercise my right to silence. At such time as the police comply with 
their disclosure obligations I will review my position”. (Sol53) 
 Thus, unlike police beliefs that legal advisers always advise suspects to make 
no comment due to inexperience and regardless of evidential strength (Kemp, 2013), 
there are legitimate reasons, such as lack of disclosure, for advising a client to make 
no comment. Crucially, advising ‘no comment’ is a tactic aimed to elicit more 
disclosure and is well documented in field studies of police interviews and custodial 
legal advice (Blackstock et al., 2014; McConville & Hodgson, 1993; McConville et 
al., 1994; Quinn & Jackson, 2007). 
 In addition to ‘no comment’ interviews, lawyers demonstrated other tactics 
for dealing with the absence of police disclosure including making “reps 
[representations] with custody sergeant that he [the client] should be released 
immediately as there are no grounds or reasons for arrest” (TSol62) and making “a 
protest to the police regarding lack of disclosure” (Sol65). These responses highlight 
the much more active and adversarial role legal advisers claim to play and support 
conclusions that custodial legal representation has improved since the introduction of 
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the accreditation scheme for police station advisers in England and Wales (Bridges 
& Choongh, 1998). Moreover, these tactics are in line with Cape’s recommendations 
on how legal advisers should deal with police strategic disclosure, including pushing 
the officers for more information or advising ‘no comment’ until further disclosure is 
made (2011). In contrast to the majority of lawyers that advised ‘no comment’, 
24.3% of lawyers advised submitting a prepared statement and only 2.7% of lawyers 
suggested that if the client had a credible account, then he (Christopher) should 
answer questions during the interview. 
 Notably, two lawyers not only advised on the lack of disclosure but also 
attempted to second-guess the evidence the police may have: 
If he wants to deny the matter I would then have to discuss whether he knows 
of the address, its occupiers, whether he has been to the address at all with 
friends. Then advise him about DNA, fingerprints, DNA samples. Then ask 
whether there is any possibility of his DNA being at the address. (Rep24) 
Thus, as indicated in the literature, legal advisers who are denied disclosure resort to 
speculating on what type of evidence the police might have for the case in question 
(Clough & Jackson, 2012). This reiterates how knowing what evidence the police 
hold is a pre-requisite for delivering adequate custodial legal advice to a client.  
 Following the pre-interview consultation, over half the lawyers (64.9%) 
chose to interrupt the police interview once the evidence was disclosed. Lawyers 
reported that they would consult privately with their client and take instructions on 
the evidence. One lawyer underlined the tense and non-cooperative relations that 
arise between legal advisers and police interviewers as a result of withholding 
evidence: 
[these pieces of evidence] implicate him as a suspect but do not by any means 
represent an overwhelming case and I would say that to him. Print on fence—
which side? How fresh? Etc. Car—yes, police can rely on presumption that 
registered owner is the driver of a car at any material time but so what—who 
else has use of it? However, given what has occurred and the inappropriate 
cat and mouse behaviour of the police I would [be] reluctant to advise him to 
answer questions. (Sol65) 
As this response indicates, the mid-interview consultation following disclosure was 
often the first time lawyers asked clients for an account. Lawyers may believe that 
clients cannot provide a meaningful account without knowing the evidence against 
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them. For example, before knowing that the client’s car was seen near the location of 
the burglary the lawyer could not question the client on who else used that car.  
 Guilty client.  When the client was guilty, lawyers provided quite similar 
advice to that provided to innocent clients, with 83.8% advising ‘no comment’ 
interviews. However, lawyers attributed this advice not only to the police’s lack of 
disclosure but also the client’s admission of guilt. Just as with the responses of 
lawyers with innocent clients, this advice was often tactical: 
The safest course is to advise Christopher to go ‘no comment’ and justify it 
by a short introduction at the start of the interview saying that there has not 
been proper disclosure therefore no comment. This might lead to further 
disclosure. (Sol13) 
Even following an admission of guilt, lawyers actively sought police disclosure: 
No Comment. In fact I'd have kicked off with the custody Sergeant over his 
arrest and detention due to the lack of disclosure. I'd have made 
representations as to the grounds for arrest. I'd have told the client not to 
speak to anyone and let me deal with it. I'd have advised him that his 
instructions to me were confidential and he still had a right to have a case 
proved against him. (Sol14)  
Thus, although guilty clients can only proceed in two ways with a lawyer present—
to make ‘no comment’ or an admission of guilt in the interview—some lawyers still 
claimed they would invest time and effort to acquire more case information to 
protect their client’s best interests. Clearly, even lawyers advising guilty clients need 
to know the strength of the evidence against the client. Aside from ‘no comment’ 
interviews, a few lawyers (10.8%) let the client decide whether to make an 
admission or to make no comment and others (5.4%) did not specify any interview 
strategy.  
 Over half (56.8%) of the lawyers claimed that they would interrupt the police 
interview following disclosure in order to take instructions, a similar move to those 
advising ‘innocent’ suspects. At this stage a variety of responses were made. Of the 
lawyers who interrupted the interview, some (42.9%) reported that they would 
continue their current interview strategy of making no comment, because “the 
evidence against him [the client] is circumstantial and there is an issue of 
identification” (Sol85), while others (14.3%) considered the potential benefits of an 
early admission, such as a reduced sentence at court.  
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 Further, two lawyers were unhappy with delayed disclosure tactics and 
claimed that the police were conducting “an interview by ambush” (Sol47). The 
following response underlines how withholding evidence may worsen working 
relationships, and as a consequence, cooperation between police and legal advisers; 
“I would demand the interview be stopped. I would criticise the police for failing to 
give proper disclosure in advance of the interview” (Sol55).  
 Although lawyers who were assigned guilty clients clarified that they would 
not sit through an interview in which the client lied or denied their guilt, surprisingly 
one lawyer did advise their client to present a false alibi following disclosure: “admit 
presence as his [the client’s] girlfriend lives there” (Sol98).7 While the police have 
reported concerns that full disclosure will only enable lawyers and their clients to 
concoct false accounts and avoid charges (Kemp, 2013), lawyers are not allowed, 
both legally and ethically, to remain in an interview when a client lies to the police 
(Solicitors Regulation Authority, 2016). While it is a possibility that lawyers may 
use police disclosure of evidence to create a false account of the evidence, we rely on 
lawyers being professionally ethical.  
 Finally, it is vital to note that although the responses across the early, 
gradual, and late disclosure groups were similar, two lawyers responded to gradual 
disclosure by choosing to interrupt the interview not once but multiple times—
essentially, following each disclosure. As a result, the client would receive advice on 
each piece of evidence separately over the course of a long, fragmented interview. 
Pre-interview vs. early, gradual, and late disclosure during police 
interview.  As mentioned above, there were many similarities between the early, 
gradual, and late disclosure groups. Next I outline key differences between these 
three groups (early, gradual, and late disclosure, or during-interview disclosure) and 
pre-interview disclosure. 
 The most apparent difference between pre-interview disclosure and during-
interview disclosure was that the legal advice offered to clients with pre-interview 
disclosure was considerably more detailed and tailored to case facts. Lawyers offered 
insight into the strength of the case and could decide how to proceed with the client’s 
                                                          
7 This anomaly is troubling. It is surprising that a lawyer would act, and admit to acting, unethically in 
this way. The reference to a fact that was not contained in the hypothetical scenario seems unlikely, as 
if advanced in interview, it would quickly be shown to be false. Unfortunately, I was unable to seek 
further clarification as all responses were anonymous. 
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best interests in mind. In the remaining disclosure groups, legal advice was focused 
on the lack of disclosure and how to respond to such a police tactic. Often, it was 
only during a mid-interview consultation following disclosure that lawyers took the 
client’s account and advised the client on the case. It is apparent that lawyers’ 
questioning of their client is directly related to the evidence presented and to which 
suspects would be required to respond. Unlike the pre-interview consultation, the 
mid-interview consultation requires actively interrupting the police interview and 
therefore, the mid-interview consultation is likely to be more pressurized and urgent. 
Thus, lawyers and clients may not be able to take their time when discussing the 
evidence presented in the interview.  
 The second key difference between disclosure before and during interview, 
was that there were virtually no lawyers choosing to interrupt the interview in the 
pre-interview disclosure group whereas in the remaining disclosure groups, more 
than half (60.9%) of the lawyers claimed they would interrupt the interview to speak 
to their client privately. The finding that lawyers only chose to intervene when 
evidence was disclosed during the interview highlights how vital evidence disclosure 
is to custodial legal advice. After all, the purpose of disclosure is to inform the 
lawyer of the case facts and enable them to advise the client properly. Thus, it is 
likely that pre-interview disclosure leads to shorter and smoother interviews.  
 The third difference was that innocent clients were advised to cooperate early 
on, either by giving an account or participating in identification procedures in the 
pre-interview disclosure group, more often than in the later disclosure groups. No 
comment interviews were only advised in the pre-interview disclosure group if the 
client had no explanation for the evidence or the evidence was judged as too weak. 
For early, gradual, and late disclosure, no comment interviews were frequently 
advised to innocent clients. Even after disclosure in the interview, lawyers were 
reluctant to cooperate with the police due to their earlier tactics of withholding 
evidence. 
 The final difference between disclosure before and during interview is the 
reasons why lawyers advised guilty clients to make no comment interviews. Across 
disclosure groups, such legal advice was partially based on the client’s admission of 
guilt. With pre-interview disclosure, the advice was also because lawyers judged the 
evidence to be weak. Conversely, in the remaining disclosure groups, the advice was 
due to the lack of disclosure. 
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Innocent vs. guilty.  The main difference between the innocent and guilty 
groups worthy of highlighting, is that 34% of lawyers in the innocent group 
suggested or at least considered submitting a prepared statement to the police 
whereas none in the guilty group did. Lawyers representing innocent clients may 
simply be more willing to cooperate with the police. Alternatively, lawyers 
defending guilty clients may judge that if the client is to cooperate with the police 
and make an admission, the client may as well answer police questions rather than 
submit a prepared statement. In addition, the client (Christopher) was described as 
nervous and lawyers often suggest submitting a prepared statement because nervous 
suspects may find it less stressful than answering police questions (Blackstock et al., 
2014).  
Reverse guilt.  Recall that all of the lawyers were asked how their advice 
would differ if their client had actually claimed to be innocent instead of guilty or 
vice versa. Unfortunately, lawyers in the early, gradual, and late disclosure groups 
tended to respond as if they had been given disclosure before the interview by 
referring to the incriminating evidence in deciding their interview strategy. 
Essentially, lawyers’ hindsight prevented them from responding as if they were in 
the same scenario again but with a client whose guilt status had been reversed. 
 Nevertheless, lawyers in the pre-interview groups did consider how they 
would advise their clients if guilt or innocence was reversed and the evidence was 
released prior to the interview. Only 7.7% of lawyers assigned innocent clients and 
23.1% of lawyers assigned guilty clients maintained their advice of ‘no comment’ 
regardless of the client’s new guilt status—the remaining lawyers all changed their 
interview strategy when their client’s guilt status was reversed. Most lawyers 
(69.2%) with innocent clients advised putting forward an account to the police if the 
client had an explanation while most lawyers (76.9%) given a guilty client advised 
making no comment or suggested it as an option. This pattern of findings fits well 
with the earlier responses to the hypothetical scenario. Essentially, lawyers were 
more cooperative when they were representing innocent clients at the police station: 
If he told me he was innocent then personally I would advise him on the 
matters disclosed that they provide strong circumstantial evidence that he was 
in the area at the time of the burglary. If he can provide an explanation for 
each piece of disclosure he should give it—it may avoid him being charged 
and mean that the police will need to make some further enquiries before 
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deciding how to proceed. There might be any number of reasons why he was 
around at the time…I have had many, many clients released without charge 
because they have given a full explanation at the earliest opportunity. (Sol27) 
Follow-up Questions 
Reasons for wanting pre-interview disclosure.  Of the 90 lawyers who 
answered the follow-up question on which level of disclosure is fairest to the client, 
all selected the pre-interview disclosure option and 87 provided reasons. I read over 
the reasons why lawyers preferred pre-interview disclosure and determined that there 
were four main categories of responses: [1] Effective legal advice, [2] Informed 
client, [3] Efficiency, and [4] Role of police. Some responses included multiple 
reasons and were categorized according to the main reason provided. The categories 
are displayed in Figure 5.1 and will be discussed in order of frequency. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Lawyers’ responses to the question of why pre-interview disclosure is 
fairest to the client. 
 
 More than a third of lawyers (40.2%) claimed that pre-interview disclosure 
was necessary to advise their client effectively on interview strategy. Deciding 
whether the client should answer questions or remain silent and risk adverse 
inferences being drawn in court is a fundamental facet of custodial legal advice 
(Cape, 2011). Yet, lawyers explained that without pre-interview disclosure, such 
decisions became problematic: 
40.2%
31.0%
24.1%
4.6%
Effective legal advice
Informed client
Efficiency
Role of police
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Because without knowing what evidence there is, it is impossible to advise 
the client on the strength of the case against him/her or potentially whether 
the offence is even made out. Fuller disclosure leads to better advice and 
quite often, more admissions. With scant disclosure there is more 
justification for a no comment interview. (Sol2) 
 A substantial portion (31.0%) of lawyers advocated pre-interview disclosure 
for the sake of having an informed client. An informed client is aware of the case 
against them, can provide a carefully thought out response, and is less likely to be 
distressed in the police interview. Here are some illustrative responses: 
Clients are generally nervous in interviews, they think more clearly and are 
more coherent if presented with evidence before and given an opportunity to 
consider it and to give instructions so that they can be advised before being 
interviewed. (Rep40) 
Likewise it is unfair if police disclose late trying to trick a client into making 
up a story or prompting a lie. People admit things for many reasons—best not 
to know and cat and mouse is more than likely to lead to a miscarriage of 
justice. (Sol65) 
So he is not ambushed. So he has time to recall how the evidence came to be. 
So that he doesn’t get flustered or nervous during the interview and 
accidentally say something incorrect. (Sol67) 
Evidently, lawyers believe uninformed clients are at a disadvantage in the police 
interview as the balance of power and resources is further swayed in favour of the 
police. This mirrors existing arguments that the lack of pre-interview disclosure 
violates the principle of equality of arms, a key part of the right to a fair trial as set 
out in Article 6, ECHR (Jackson, 2001). In addition, lawyers were particularly 
concerned about innocent clients being tricked or destabilised into producing 
unintentional inconsistencies during the police interview. Importantly, the lawyers’ 
desire for pre-interview disclosure was to get the most considered and accurate 
account from the suspect during the interview—not to concoct a false account of the 
evidence for the police. Providing the police with a reliable account is increasingly 
important as so many cases are dealt with through out of court disposals—either at 
the police station or based on the interview evidence gained at the police station 
(Cape, 2011). In line with the arguments on the client’s emotional state and resulting 
inability to withstand the interview, one lawyer highlighted: 
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It is extremely difficult for a suspect to make up a defence as it goes along 
and therefore gradual and poor disclosure serves little purpose. Good 
disclosure can often present opportunities to raise non-court disposals before 
the interview takes place. (Sol75) 
A third and pragmatic reason for favouring pre-interview disclosure was 
efficiency. Lawyers (24.1%) echoed past research by arguing that without pre-
interview disclosure, the result would be costly, lengthy, and fragmented police 
interviews (Kemp, 2010): 
[I]t saves time and money—I have been in numerous interviews where I have 
been "drip fed" disclosure and have told officers openly that we will [make] 
no comment until they provide what I consider to be sufficient evidence to 
identify a crime and evidence to identify that my client is a suspect. I can 
recall one in particular where if the officers had given proper disclosure at the 
beginning it would have saved us all a lot of time and effort. (Sol8) 
 Finally, 4.6% of lawyers indicated that withholding evidence is not part of 
the police officer’s role. The following response summarises a number of arguments 
against withholding evidence and reveals yet another tactic legal advisers have 
developed to gain further information before the interview: 
It often proves difficult/impossible to make an assessment of the client's 
position without disclosure. Police will withhold to test the veracity of the 
account or to "catch out" defendants which is inconsistent with their role as 
investigators and duties under the CPIA. Where drip fed disclosure is given it 
results in delay, interruption to the interview process, but rarely results in the 
confessions officers clearly hope will arise…Officers, just as clients, find 
refusing to respond to questions a challenging prospect and much can be 
learned through what is not said in response to carefully aimed questioning in 
the disclosure process. (Sol7) 
Similarly, another lawyer reiterated how police strategic disclosure violates the 
presumption of innocence: 
Police drip-feed disclosure is an archaic manner of disclosure. It is regularly 
used to catch out criminals lying or attempting to lie. It also drags out a case 
and turns a ten minute interview into a two hour interview. The interview 
should be a presentation of the evidence by the impartial investigating officer 
for the comment of the alleged criminal. As innocent until proven guilty, the 
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approach of staged disclosure seems to question that and places a more 
adversarial role on the police. It is for the court to judge the evidence and not 
the impartial investigating officer. (Sol74) 
Lawyers’ comments are consistently grounded in principles of procedural fairness. 
Importantly, their criticisms levelled at the police highlight how police disclosure 
tactics may fuel the pre-existing tension between legal advisers and police 
interviewers and may contribute further to the “hostile” (Sol26) atmosphere of the 
suspect interview. Likewise, previous empirical research has also demonstrated that 
lack of disclosure is a point of conflict and misunderstanding between lawyers and 
police officers (Kemp, 2010, 2013; Skinns, 2009). 
Amount of evidence needed to advise clients effectively.  For the final 
follow up question on how much of the police’s evidence lawyers needed in order to 
advise their client effectively, I determined that there were six main categories of 
responses: [1] All of the evidence, [2] Anything indicating guilt, [3] Specific pieces, 
[4] As much as possible, [5] Depends on case, and [6] Not much. The categories are 
shown in Figure 5.2 and these, too, will be discussed in order of frequency. 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Lawyers’ responses on how much of the police’s evidence they need to 
advise their client effectively. 
 
 As is evident from Figure 5.2, approximately a third of lawyers (34.5%) 
claimed that they required all of the evidence held by the police to advise their 
clients effectively but that this “never happens” (Rep91). Lawyers seemed to believe 
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such full and timely disclosure was beneficial to all parties involved, including the 
police. Thus, when asked how much evidence should be disclosed prior to the 
interview, this lawyer was typical in responding: 
All of it. I appreciate that in certain circumstances the police wish to test the 
truthfulness of the client's answers, but generally speaking, by not disclosing 
properly, the police will not get what they want. In this scenario Christopher 
is almost certainly going to be convicted and therefore if I had known the 
evidence prior to the interview my advice may have been very different. It is 
not the client's responsibility to admit the offence but if the evidence obtained 
is overwhelming he may as well admit it. (Sol69)  
 Some lawyers (21.8%) claimed that any evidence that indicated the client’s 
guilt and that would be the subject of questions in the interview, would enable them 
to offer effective advice. In essence, the disclosure had to allow them to prepare for 
the interview. Such a response is in line with the minimum disclosure requirements 
set out in the aforementioned EU Directive on the right to information (Council 
Directive, 2012).   
 Others (19.5%) listed specific types of evidence that they believed was key to 
custodial advice, such as, “identification, CCTV, phone evidence, DNA, dates, times 
and places” (Sol15). Notably, these subsets of evidence may not only indicate guilt 
but also an alibi for the client.  
 A few lawyers (16.1%) were willing to settle for as much disclosure as 
possible from the police while a handful (4.6%) highlighted that the amount of 
evidence needed depended on the case. Lastly, three lawyers (3.4%) stated that it 
was not essential to know all the evidence the police had and that ultimately they 
could advise their client effectively “with whatever level of evidence the police 
provide” (Exec83). 
Limitations  
 This study is chiefly limited by its sole reliance on what lawyers say they 
would do in response to a hypothetical scenario as opposed to what they would 
actually do in reality. Although lawyers were encouraged to be as honest as possible 
and all responses were anonymous, some respondents may still have provided 
idealized accounts. However, many of the findings, such as advising clients to make 
no comment when the police withhold evidence, are in line with past field research 
(Blackstock et al., 2014; Quinn & Jackson, 2007). Thus, it is unlikely that subjects’ 
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responses in this study differ greatly from their advice at the police station. 
Moreover, by presenting subjects with hypothetical scenarios, I could control for all 
other case factors and thus identify the specific effects that the timing of evidence 
disclosure and the suspect’s assertion of innocence have on custodial legal advice. In 
this way, I combined the disciplines of law and psychology to draw on a different 
type of data to explore the consequences of various types of disclosure. 
 A second limitation is with regard to the recruitment of subjects—the lawyers 
who were willing to take part in the study may feel more strongly about police 
disclosure tactics, hence their interest in this research. Thus, their views on how 
much pre-interview disclosure is necessary for custodial legal advice may not reflect 
the views of all criminal defence lawyers in England and Wales.  
 A final limitation is the ecological validity of the hypothetical scenarios 
presented to subjects. In the scenarios, all the evidence was disclosed before the 
interview, early in the interview, gradually during the interview, or late in the 
interview whereas in practice, the police may use a combination of those approaches. 
For instance, the police often disclose some evidence before the interview begins in 
order to avoid a ‘no comment’ interview from the suspect but that they strategically 
disclose the remaining evidence during the interview (Kemp, 2013). In other cases, 
the police strategically disclose evidence during several interviews (King, 2002). The 
hypothetical scenarios used in this study did not capture such possibilities. Thus this 
study’s findings cannot generalize to lawyers’ advice in response to more complex 
police disclosure strategies. 
Conclusions 
In sum, lawyers’ responses to both the hypothetical scenario and follow-up 
questions advocate pre-interview disclosure of evidence as opposed to early, gradual, 
or late disclosure of evidence during the interview. As I expected, the pre-interview 
disclosure scenario allowed lawyers to provide more comprehensive, tailored legal 
advice highlighting how essential pre-interview disclosure is to ensuring the 
effectiveness of the right to legal assistance in practice. In contrast, early, gradual, 
and late disclosure of evidence during the interview led lawyers to advise tactically 
to elicit more disclosure, for example, by advising ‘no comment’ or arguing with the 
police. Such advice mirrors field observations in past research (Blackstock et al., 
2014; Kemp, 2010, 2013; Quinn & Jackson, 2009; Skinns, 2009).  
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Although lawyers were more cooperative when advising an innocent client 
compared to when advising a guilty client, withholding evidence until the interview 
discouraged lawyers to advise even innocent suspects to cooperate. In addition, 
early, gradual, and late disclosure typically led to more interruptions from the 
lawyers indicating that pre-interview disclosure may be a more effective and 
efficient way for police to gather information from suspects. As for the amount of 
pre-interview disclosure needed to advise clients, lawyers varied in their responses 
but the most common response was to receive all of the case evidence before the 
police interview.  
 Thus, by drawing upon a large sample of English and Welsh lawyers and 
employing a novel psychology-law procedure, this study provides further empirical 
support for the view that lawyers need pre-interview disclosure from the police in 
order to provide informed legal advice to their clients (Cape, 2011; Sanders et al., 
2010). This study’s findings, along with past field research, carry important 
implications for how the police disclose evidence to suspects and their lawyers 
(Blackstock et al., 2014; Kemp, 2013). Currently, some police show a preference for 
strategically releasing evidence during the interview (King, 2002; Smith & Bull, 
2014; Walsh et al., 2016)—an approach that the courts support (e.g., R v. Farrell, 
2004). Yet, preventing lawyers from knowing the evidence against their client can 
greatly limit their ability to advise their clients before the interview and as a 
consequence, suspects will not benefit from case-specific legal advice. Thus, 
although the police in England and Wales dominate the process of disclosing 
evidence to suspects and their lawyers, it is vital that they consider the detrimental 
effects of delaying evidence disclosure for suspects. 
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Chapter 6: 
Generating Alternative Explanations of Incriminating Evidence 
Probably Only Slightly Reduces People’s Belief that a Suspect is 
Guilty 
 
Having explored strategic disclosure of evidence from the lawyer’s 
perspective, Chapter 6 considers strategic evidence disclosure from the police 
interviewer’s perspective. Recall that police interviewers who strategically present 
evidence to a suspect are first expected to generate any alternative explanations that 
a suspect might provide when presented with the evidence (Granhag & Vrij, 2010). 
It is crucial that the interviewer exhausts these alternative explanations of the 
evidence early in the interview so that a deceptive suspect cannot resort to using 
those alternative explanations when the evidence is finally disclosed to them. An 
alleged benefit of strategic evidence disclosure is that when police interviewers 
generate these alternative evidential explanations, they become less guilt 
presumptive about the suspect (van der Sleen, 2009). Given the lack of evidence 
supporting this claim, this chapter presents three experiments and a mini meta-
analysis empirically testing whether people who generate alternative explanations of 
the evidence change their beliefs about a suspect’s guilt. 
Introduction 
 A 2015 television documentary, Making a Murderer, captivated viewers 
worldwide by raising questions about the validity of Steven Avery’s murder 
conviction. Though Avery was found guilty of a grisly murder, the series presented 
viewers with counter-explanations for what really happened, in particular, that police 
corruption and evidence tampering played a key role. After watching the series, more 
than ½ million people signed a petition to free Avery from prison—at least some of 
whom were persuaded that, in light of the alternative explanations for the evidence, 
Avery may have been wrongfully convicted. This real-world case raises an important 
applied question: If people generate their own alternative explanations for criminal 
evidence, are they less likely to judge a police suspect to be guilty? That is the 
question I was interested in here.      
 From the moment a suspect is arrested, various decision-makers within the 
criminal justice system tend to make judgments about the presumed guilt or 
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innocence of the suspect. Research shows that people typically behave in accordance 
with that judgment. For instance, when laypeople take on the role of an interviewer 
and expect a mock suspect to be guilty, they are more likely to use coercive and 
guilt-presumptive questions while questioning the suspect compared to interviewers 
who expect the suspect to be innocent (Hill, Memon, & McGeorge, 2008; Kassin et 
al., 2003). Moreover, mock investigators that are biased towards thinking that a 
research subject is guilty of cheating in an experiment are more likely to elicit false 
confessions from people who have not cheated (Narchet et al., 2011). Even highly 
trained forensic examiners and police officers may evaluate evidence, such as 
fingerprints and DNA samples, in line with their beliefs about a person’s guilt 
(Charman, Kavetski, & Mueller, 2017; Dror, Charlton, & Peron, 2006; Dror & 
Hampikian, 2011; for a comprehensive review of the forensic confirmation bias, see 
Kassin, Dror, & Kuckuka, 2013). Taken together, research shows that laypeople and 
experts alike may presume that a suspect is guilty without careful consideration of 
alternative suspects and theories of what transpired during the crime.  
For years, criminal justice scholars have noted that tunnel vision plagues 
much of the criminal justice system, from the police and prosecutors to the judge and 
jury (e.g., Belloni & Hodgson, 2000; Dixon, 1999; Findley & Scott, 2006). In the 
most tragic cases, people may wrongfully judge and convict an innocent person for a 
crime that they never committed. To counter such tunnel vision, researchers have 
suggested that criminal justice professionals should generate alternative hypotheses 
about how a crime might have occurred (Burke, 2007; Kerstholt & Eikelbloom, 
2007; Simon, 2012). Accordingly, police interviewers are encouraged to first think 
of all alternative explanations that the suspect might provide for the evidence, to 
exhaust those explanations during the interview, and only then present their evidence 
to suspects in the SUE technique (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015; Hartwig et al., 2014). 
Proponents of the SUE technique posit that interviewers who use this method will be 
forced to think about the evidence from different perspectives and will, as a result, be 
less guilt-presumptive about the suspect than interviewers who haven’t considered 
alternative explanations (van der Sleen, 2009).  
 There are good reasons to predict that thinking of alternative explanations 
could reduce guilt-presumptive beliefs. Research in non-forensic contexts shows that 
generating alternative explanations reduces people’s judgmental biases (Hirt, Kardes, 
& Markman, 2004). In a series of social judgment studies, generating counter-
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explanations for a phenomenon reduced people’s biased belief in their original 
explanation for the phenomenon (Anderson & Sechler, 1986; Hirt & Markman, 
1995; Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984). For instance, when subjects initially 
explained one hypothetical outcome for a high school football game, such as a 
convincing win by Team A, they judged this outcome to be more likely (i.e., 
explanation effect, Hirt & Markman, 1995). However, subjects who also explained 
alternative outcomes such as a convincing win by Team B or even a close win by 
Team A, did not judge the original outcome of Team A’s convincing win as more 
likely. Presumably, when subjects were forced to consider alternative explanations, 
they evaluated more thoroughly the evidence for various outcomes, and their 
confidence in their initial, focal explanation was undermined (Hirt & Markman, 
1995).  
Considering alternatives can also reduce overconfidence in one’s knowledge 
(Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980), the tendency to estimate a numerical value 
close to a previously considered number (i.e., the anchoring effect, Mussweiler, 
Strack, Pfieffer, 2000), and the tendency to assume that an event could have been 
anticipated once it has already occurred (i.e., hindsight bias, Sanna, Schwarz, & 
Stocker, 2002). Despite researchers investigating the effect of generating alternatives 
in a range of domains, the underlying psychological principles are not as yet clear. 
What we do know is that the corrective effect of generating alternatives is enhanced 
when people perceive their alternatives to be plausible (Hirt & Markman, 1995). In 
addition, the alternatives need to be relatively easy to generate because when 
alternatives are difficult to generate, people might infer that there are not many 
alternatives or that the alternatives are less likely to be true than the original outcome 
or explanation (i.e., the conceptual fluency effect, Sanna & Schwarz, 2006; Sanna et 
al., 2002). In sum, in domains outside of the criminal justice system, thinking of 
alternative explanations, hypotheses, and outcomes has led people to make more 
balanced judgements. 
 Yet, research is mixed with regard to whether generating alternative 
explanations for a criminal case reduces people’s belief in the prime suspect’s guilt. 
One might expect that if people generate alternative explanations for incriminating 
evidence (for example, that a suspect who was seen at the crime scene was actually 
making postal deliveries as part of his job), they might lose confidence in the 
hypothesis that the suspect is guilty and be less likely to believe that the suspect 
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committed the crime. Based on past research, however, it is unclear whether people 
adjust their initial beliefs about a prime suspect’s guilt or whether people’s guilt 
beliefs persevere even in light of alternative suspects and theories of what happened. 
For instance, one study showed that when people were led to believe a prime suspect 
was guilty, asking them to think of why they might be wrong reduced their belief in 
the prime suspect’s guilt but asking them to think of alternative suspects did not 
(O’Brien, 2009). In another study, criminal investigators were presented with a 
murder case and asked to make a judgment about the prime suspect’s guilt (Ask & 
Granhag, 2005). Some of the investigators were furnished with a motive for the 
prime suspect while others were informed about the existence of another suspect 
who had threatened the murder victim in the past. Regardless of whether they knew 
about the prime suspect’s motive or the existence of the alternative suspect, the 
investigators made similar guilt judgments about the prime suspect. When students 
took part in this study, however, they were less likely to judge the prime suspect to 
be guilty when informed about the alternative suspect (Ask & Granhag, 2005). It is 
possible that laypeople are more accepting of alternative explanations in a criminal 
case compared to criminal investigators. Overall, it is unclear whether thinking of 
alternative explanations for criminal evidence would impact people’s beliefs about 
the prime suspect’s guilt.  
 Moreover, the process of generating alternative evidential explanations as 
part of the SUE technique might not map onto past research on debiasing via the 
generation of alternative outcomes. In past studies of alternative generation, subjects 
constructed alternative scenarios that led to a different outcome (e.g., a different 
team won the game, or a different combatant won the battle or war, Hirt & 
Markman, 1995; Sanna et al., 2002). A key element of that task was that subjects 
built a scenario that plausibly explained an entirely different outcome. In contrast, 
police interviewers’ alternative explanations of the evidence might not always imply 
that the suspect is innocent of the crime—it might change the exact nature of the 
crime scenario, but it is unclear to what extent it implies a different outcome, or 
more importantly, a different judgment of the suspect’s guilt.    
 To extend our understanding of the effect of generating alternative 
explanations on people’s judgements of guilt, I conducted three experiments in 
which I presented laypeople with criminal cases and evidence that seemed to 
incriminate a suspect. Subjects were asked to come up with their own alternative 
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explanations for the evidence before judging the suspect’s guilt. To the best of my 
knowledge, no study has examined whether lay subjects who produce multiple, 
alternative explanations for criminal evidence are less likely to believe a suspect is 
guilty than subjects who do not produce any explanations. On the one hand, thinking 
of alternative explanations for incriminating evidence might undermine people’s 
belief and confidence in the hypothesis that the suspect is guilty. On the other hand, 
people might form an initial belief about the suspect’s guilt which is highly resistant 
to change despite the generation of alternative evidential explanations. In this 
chapter, I first present the findings of the three main experiments with the standard 
null-hypothesis significance testing approach and a simple Bayesian analysis. After 
that I present a mini meta-analysis of the data to obtain a more precise estimate of 
the effect size of generating alternative explanations (Cumming, 2014).  
Experiment 1 
 In Experiment 1, I aimed to test to what extent people lowered their belief in 
a suspect’s guilt when they thought of alternative explanations for incriminating 
evidence. To this end, laypeople read a fictional case and either generated alternative 
explanations for the evidence in the case or completed various control tasks before 
judging the suspect’s guilt.  
Method 
Subjects.  A total of 85 psychology students from the University of Warwick 
took part in the study, either for course credit or voluntarily (82 subjects provided 
their age, M = 19 years, SD = 2.1, range = 17–31; 76 women, 8 men, and 1 subject 
who preferred not to say). As this was an initial, exploratory study, I aimed for a 
minimum of 25 subjects per condition and stopped data collection at the end of the 
University term. No subjects were excluded.  
Design.  The experiment used a single factor, between-subjects design. The 
independent variable was the type of interview questions that subjects planned and 
there were three levels: control, suspect questions, and alternative questions. The 
primary dependent variable was subjects’ belief in the suspect’s guilt. Additionally, 
the study measured subjects’ confidence in their judgments, how strong they thought 
the evidence was, and how difficult they found the task. 
Procedure.  All subjects were informed that they would first read a 
hypothetical crime scenario. Subjects read a 146 word fictional scenario in which a 
suspect (David) is arrested for stealing construction materials. The scenario included 
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a brief description and accompanying photos of three pieces of circumstantial 
evidence: [1] CCTV footage of a man in a black hoodie entering the storage room 
containing the stolen materials—a black hoodie was found at David’s house, [2] 
security records showing that the password to the storage room was only entered 
once and correctly when the man in the black hoodie entered the storage room, and 
[3] CCTV footage of a man in a black hoodie getting into a white van and driving 
away from the building a few hours before the materials were discovered to be 
stolen—the white van was registered in David’s ownership. Circumstantial evidence 
was used so that subjects could think of multiple, alternative explanations for all 
three pieces of evidence. For instance, someone might have borrowed David’s white 
van to steal the construction materials. 
 Next, subjects were randomly assigned to one of the three question type 
conditions. In the control condition, subjects completed an unrelated filler task—
producing 15 interview questions for their favourite celebrity (n = 28). In the suspect 
questions condition, subjects were asked to imagine that they were the detective in 
charge of the case and that they would be interviewing David to gather as much 
information as possible (n = 26). Subjects were told to produce five questions for 
each piece of evidence. To guide subjects, I presented them with example questions 
for another piece of evidence (David's fingerprints found on a box of stolen 
materials), such as: ‘Have you seen this box before? Have you touched this box 
before? Why did you touch this box? When did you touch this box?’  
In the alternative questions condition, subjects were given similar 
instructions about interviewing David except that they were instructed to produce 
interview questions about alternative explanations that David might give them (n = 
31). Hereafter I refer to these interview questions as ‘alternative questions’. Subjects 
were asked to think of “interview questions about alternative explanations”, similar 
to the interview questions that law enforcement officers might create when using the 
SUE technique, so that the procedure would better mirror police interview 
preparation in practice. Accordingly, subjects were guided with sample alternative 
questions (once again, with regard to David’s fingerprints), such as: ‘Did anyone 
force you to touch this box? Did you touch this box accidentally? Did you touch this 
box for work purposes? Did someone ask you to touch this box?’ All subjects 
produced 15 interview questions in total. 
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 Finally, subjects used 7-point scales to indicate to what extent they believed 
David was guilty of stealing the materials (1 = not at all; 7 = very much), how 
confident they were in this guilt rating (1 = not at all; 7 = very confident), how 
strong they thought the evidence against David was (1 = not strong at all; 7 = very 
strong), and how difficult they found their task (1 = not difficult at all; 7 = very 
difficult).  
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analysis.  Most subjects (96%) in the suspect questions 
condition spontaneously produced a few alternative questions, therefore I checked 
that subjects in the alternative condition produced more alternative questions than 
those in the suspect condition. I defined ‘alternative questions’ as questions that a) 
considered why the suspect (David) might be innocent, or b) referred to other 
potential suspects (O’Brien, 2009). To be conservative, open-ended questions, such 
as ‘Where were you at time X?’ were not classified as alternative questions. Two 
thoroughly-trained independent raters, blind to condition and the hypotheses, 
separately coded all subjects’ responses from the suspect questions and alternative 
questions conditions. The raters decided whether or not each question a subject 
generated was an alternative question. There was substantial agreement between the 
two raters, к = .61 [95% CI: 0.55, 0.66], p < .001 (Landis & Koch, 1977) and 
disagreements were resolved via discussion. Subjects in the alternative questions 
condition generated more alternative questions than did subjects in the suspect 
questions condition, Malt = 8.23, SDalt = 3.99 vs. Msus = 3.46, SDsus = 1.68, t(41.77) = 
–6.04, d = 1.56 [95% CI: 0.95, 2.17], p ˂ .001. This analysis indicated that the 
experimental manipulation was effective.  
Main analysis.  Figure 6.1 displays mean ratings of suspect guilt, 
confidence, and evidence strength. The results revealed that generating alternative 
explanations had no significant effect on subjects’ guilt ratings. Moreover, subjects 
reported similar levels of confidence in their decisions and made similar judgments 
of evidence strength, regardless of question type. Across conditions, subjects made 
mid-level ratings of the suspect’s guilt, their confidence, and the strength of 
evidence. A 3 × 3 MANOVA indicated that ratings of all three measures did not 
differ between conditions, Pillai’s trace = .109, F(6, 162) = 1.55, p = .165, ηp2 = .054.  
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   A.  
   B.   
   C.  
Figure 6.1. Subjects’ mean ratings of (A) their belief in the suspect’s guilt, (B) their 
confidence, and (C) evidence strength by question type in Experiment 1. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Recall that subjects also rated the difficulty of the task. Figure 6.2 displays 
subjects’ difficulty ratings across conditions. Control subjects found their task 
easiest, while subjects in the suspect questions and alternative questions conditions 
found their task relatively more difficult. A one-way ANOVA on subjects’ ratings of 
difficulty revealed a significant difference between question type conditions, F(2, 
82) = 8.37, p ˂ .001, ηp2 = .169. Post-hoc Tukey tests indicated that subjects in the 
suspect questions condition found the task more difficult than did control subjects, 
Mdiff = 1.14 [95% CI: 0.13, 2.15], p = .023, and subjects in the alternative questions 
condition found the task more difficult than did control subjects, Mdiff = 1.63 [95% 
CI: 0.66, 2.60], p < .001. There was no difference in the difficulty ratings made by 
subjects in the suspect questions and alternative questions conditions, p = .466.  
 
 
Figure 6.2. Subjects’ mean difficulty ratings in Experiment 1. Error bars represent 
95% confidence intervals.   
 
In sum, thinking of alternative explanations did not seem to sway subjects’ 
judgments about the suspect’s guilt and the strength of the case. There were, 
however, two potentially important limitations in the experiment that could have 
influenced the results. First, the instruction to think of ‘alternative explanations’ for 
the evidence may have been ambiguous. For instance, consider the alternative 
explanation that the suspect was forced to steal the construction materials—in this 
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implausible, thus disregarding them when judging a suspect’s guilt. Therefore, in 
Experiment 2, I amended the procedure to address these concerns. Using three new, 
different criminal cases (to ensure that the findings were not fixed to a single mock 
case), subjects were instructed to think of explanations of the evidence that 
specifically suggested that the suspect was innocent. At the end of the study, 
alternative questions subjects were asked to judge the plausibility of their alternative 
explanations of the evidence. In addition, all subjects were probed for suspicion 
about the true purpose of the study.  
Experiment 2 
Method 
Subjects.  I conducted a power analysis using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Lang, & Buchner, 2007), assuming a large effect size, f = 0.4, based on past research 
and an α error rate of 0.01 for 3 groups with 3 repeated measures and found that a 
sample size of 93 subjects would be sufficient for a power of 0.95 (d = 0.99, Ask & 
Granhag, 2005). Thus, I aimed to recruit a minimum of 31 subjects per condition. In 
total, 154 people voluntarily took part in this study online. No financial 
compensation was provided. Prior to any analyses, I excluded 6 of these subjects—3 
subjects who produced inappropriate or case irrelevant questions and 3 who guessed 
the true purpose of the study. Once two independent blind raters coded the remaining 
data, a further 8 subjects in the alternative questions condition were excluded for 
failing to produce alternative questions. Of the remaining 140 subjects, 76 were 
women, 56 were men, 4 identified as other, and 4 chose not to say (132 subjects 
reported their age, M = 25, SD = 7.2 years, range: 17–50).  
Design.  The study used a 3 × 3 mixed factorial design, with task (control vs. 
suspect questions vs. alternative questions) as the between-subjects factor and type 
of case (murder vs. arson vs. criminal damage) as the within-subjects factor. Subjects 
were randomly assigned to one of the three task conditions. All subjects read all 
three cases in a randomized order. Similar to Experiment 1, the dependent measures 
were ratings of guilt, confidence, evidence strength, and task difficulty. In addition, 
subjects in the alternative questions condition judged whether or not each of their 
alternative explanations of the evidence were plausible. 
Procedure.  Subjects were recruited through social media to participate in an 
online study on how well laypeople completed police tasks. I created three cases for 
subjects to read: [1] A 72 word murder case in which CCTV footage showed a man 
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with an eagle tattoo leaving the victim’s apartment on the day of the murder—the 
suspect had a matching eagle tattoo, [2] A 67 word arson case in which a distinctive 
footprint found at the crime scene matched the suspect’s shoes, and [3] An 81 word 
criminal damage case in which the suspect’s fingerprints were found on the broken 
windows of the school and the suspect’s shoes had paint that may match the paint 
poured in the school classrooms. The cases included a photo of the murder victim’s 
apartment building, the footprint, and the fingerprint respectively.  
In the control condition, subjects read each case and then completed a filler 
task that involved listing ten cities in a continent (n = 47). In the suspect questions 
condition, subjects read each case and were instructed to produce five interview 
questions to ask the suspect (n = 53). In the alternative questions condition, subjects 
read each case and were instructed to produce five interview questions that 
considered explanations of the evidence that suggested the suspect was innocent (n = 
40). In the suspect questions and alternative questions conditions, subjects were 
guided by unrelated, example interview questions.    
 After reading each case and completing the accompanying task, subjects 
filled in a case report by selecting which crime had been committed and rating their 
belief in the suspect’s guilt, their confidence, the strength of the evidence, and task 
difficulty on the same scales that were used in Experiment 1. Once the final (third) 
case report was completed, subjects in the alternative questions condition were 
presented with the 15 interview questions they had produced for the three suspects. 
For each question, subjects made a forced choice response as to whether the question 
referred to a plausible or implausible explanation of the evidence. Finally, all 
subjects were asked for their age and gender, and they were asked to describe what 
they thought the study was about.  
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analysis.  To determine whether subjects in the alternative 
questions condition were indeed producing more alternative questions than subjects 
in the suspect questions condition, two independent raters, blind to condition and the 
study’s hypotheses, separately coded all responses from the suspect and alternative 
questions conditions. The raters decided whether or not each question a subject 
generated suggested that the suspect was innocent. There was substantial agreement 
between the two raters, к = .63 [95% CI: 0.59, 0.67], p < .001 (Landis & Koch, 
1977) and all disagreements were resolved via discussion. It was at this stage that I 
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excluded eight subjects from the alternative questions condition for failing to follow 
instructions and not producing any alternative questions for one or more of the 
cases.8 Thus, the final sample size was 140 subjects. For all three cases, the 
remaining subjects in the alternative questions condition generated significantly 
more alternative questions than those in the suspect questions condition, which 
suggests the experimental manipulation was effective, see Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1  
Comparing alternative questions produced in the suspect and alternative conditions  
 Mean number of alternative 
questions (SD) 
  
Case 
 
Suspect  
condition 
Alternative  
condition 
t Effect size  
Cohen’s d [95% CIs] 
Murder  1.09 (0.82) 3.28 (1.18) t(65.9) = -10.05* 2.16 [1.64, 2.68] 
Arson  0.96 (0.81) 3.68 (1.16) t(66.0) = -12.63* 2.72 [2.15, 3.29] 
Criminal 
damage  
0.83 (0.85) 3.45 (1.52) t(57.2) = -9.82* 2.13 [1.61, 2.65] 
Note. * p < .001.  
  
Main analysis. 
Comparing conditions.  As Figure 6.3 shows, subjects made similar 
judgments of guilt, confidence, and evidence strength across conditions. As in 
Experiment 1, generating alternative explanations did not lead subjects to lower their 
belief in the suspect’s guilt. Furthermore, generating alternative explanations did not 
cause subjects to be less confident in their guilt judgments nor did it lead subjects to 
perceive the evidence to be weaker. For each case, I ran a MANOVA for subjects’ 
ratings of guilt, confidence, and evidence strength. Between conditions, subjects did 
not differ on any measure for the murder (Pillai’s trace = .035, F(6, 272) = .80, p = 
.570, ηp2 = .017), arson (Pillai’s trace = .004, F(6, 272) = .09, p = .998, ηp2 = .002), or 
criminal damage case (Pillai’s trace = .038, F(6, 272) = .89, p = .506, ηp2 = .019).   
 
 
                                                          
8 Including these subjects in the analyses did not change the pattern of results. See analyses presented 
in Appendix A. 
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   A.  
   B.  
   C.  
Figure 6.3. Subjects’ mean ratings of (A) their belief in the suspect’s guilt, (B) their 
confidence, and (C) evidence strength in Experiment 2. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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Comparing cases.  Subjects’ ratings across the three cases were compared to 
examine whether the case facts, unlike subjects’ alternative explanations, had any 
influence on subjects’ judgments about the suspect. Overall, subjects judged the 
criminal damage case to have the most compelling evidence against the suspect, 
followed by the murder case, and then the arson case which subjects found to be the 
weakest case. This suggests that subjects were reading and understanding the case 
facts. For instance, people might have concluded that the criminal damage suspect 
was more likely to be guilty given that he had a prior criminal history and his 
fingerprints matched those found at the crime scene. In contrast, people might have 
considered a shoe print match, like in the arson case, relatively weak evidence and 
concluded that the arson suspect was less likely to be guilty.  
This pattern is also reflected in subjects’ judgments of guilt, confidence, and 
evidence strength as shown in Figure 6.3. Repeated-measures ANOVAs showed that 
subjects’ ratings for all three measures differed between cases, Guilt, F(2, 278) = 
92.92, ηp2 = .401; Confidence, F(2, 278) = 30.61, ηp2 = .180; Evidence strength, F(2, 
278) = 110.69, ηp2 = .443, all ps < .001. Pairwise comparisons were run for all three 
measures with the Bonferroni corrected critical p-value of .017. Guilt ratings for all 
three cases were significantly different from each other, Mmur = 4.55, SDmur = 1.29; 
Marso = 3.52, SDarso = 1.32; Mcrim = 5.28, SDcrim = 1.33, ps < .001. Confidence ratings 
for the criminal damage case, M = 4.96, SD = 1.59, were significantly higher than 
confidence ratings for both the arson case, M = 3.93, SD = 1.61, and murder case, M 
= 4.19, SD = 1.65, ps < .001, but there was no significant difference in confidence 
ratings between the arson and murder cases, p = .045. Evidence strength ratings were 
significantly different from each other for all three cases, Mmur = 4.02, SDmur = 1.67; 
Marso = 2.84; SDarso = 1.45; Mcrim = 5.21, SDcrim = 1.48, ps < .001. There were no 
interaction effects between condition and case for guilt, confidence, and evidence 
strength, ps = .659, .893, and .289 respectively. 
Difficulty ratings.  Given that alternative explanations are more likely to 
influence people’s beliefs when they are relatively easy to generate, I examined 
subjects’ difficulty ratings across conditions and cases (Sanna & Schwarz, 2006; 
Sanna et al., 2002). Figure 6.4 displays subjects’ ratings of task difficulty. For the 
murder and criminal damage cases, subjects found the control task easiest, followed 
by the suspect questions and alternative questions tasks in order of increasing 
difficulty. For the arson case, subjects also found the control task easiest, however 
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they found the suspect questions and alternative questions tasks to be similarly 
difficult. Case type and condition had an interactive effect on subjects’ perceptions 
of task difficulty, F(4, 274) = 6.86, p < .001, ηp2 = .091. Between-subject ANOVAs 
showed that for all three cases, subjects’ ratings of difficulty differed between 
conditions, ps < .001. Post-hoc Tukey tests showed similar patterns for the murder 
and criminal damage cases. Subjects found the control task easier than the suspect 
questions task, Mdiff = 1.18 [95% CI: 0.53, 1.83]; Mdiff = 1.31 [95% CI: 0.66, 1.97] 
respectively, ps < .001. Subjects also found the control task easier than the 
alternative questions tasks, Mdiff = 2.42 [95% CI: 1.73, 3.11]; Mdiff = 2.17 [95% CI: 
1.46, 2.87] respectively, ps < .001. Finally, subjects found the suspect questions task 
easier than the alternative questions task, Mdiff = 1.24 [95% CI: 0.56, 1.92], p < .001; 
Mdiff = 0.85 [95% CI: 0.17, 1.54], p = .010 respectively. For the arson case, subjects 
found the control task easier than the suspect and alternative questions tasks, Mdiff = 
1.72 [95% CI: 1.06, 2.38]; Mdiff = 1.50 [95% CI: 0.79, 2.21] respectively, ps < .001, 
but found the suspect and alternative questions tasks similarly difficult, p = .720. 
Overall, subjects found generating alternative explanations of the evidence relatively 
difficult. 
 
 
Figure 6.4. Subjects’ mean difficulty ratings in Experiment 2. Error bars represent 
95% confidence intervals. 
  
Plausibility judgments.  Recall that subjects in the alternative questions 
condition were asked to judge whether or not their self-generated alternative 
explanations of the evidence were plausible. Only questions that the blind raters 
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categorized as “alternative” were included in this analysis.9 Thus, subjects judged a 
mean of 2.35 (SD = 1.2), 2.78 (SD = 1.3), and 2.35 (SD = 1.4) of their alternative 
explanations of the evidence as plausible for the murder, arson, and criminal damage 
cases respectively. Put another way, subjects judged 73.6%, 75.8%, and 72.9% of 
their alternative explanations of the evidence to be plausible for the murder, arson, 
and criminal damage cases respectively. This finding suggests that, when judging the 
suspect’s guilt, subjects were not simply dismissing their alternative explanations 
because they seemed implausible.   
 To summarize, using three new criminal cases and a much larger sample, 
Experiment 2 replicated the basic pattern observed in Experiment 1—thinking of 
alternative explanations for the evidence did not appear to influence people’s belief 
in a suspect’s guilt. Indeed, this finding held across all three cases, regardless of 
whether people tended to believe the suspect was not guilty (arson case) or that the 
suspect was guilty (criminal damage case). In essence, the case facts influenced 
people’s judgments but their own alternative explanations of the case facts did not—
despite people judging most of their alternative explanations to be plausible. This 
contrasts with past research in which people’s consideration of plausible alternative 
outcomes, but not implausible alternative outcomes, influenced their beliefs about 
the likelihood of the original outcome (Hirt & Markman, 1995).  
One possible explanation for the findings is that subjects found it a difficult 
task generating so many alternative explanations in which the suspect is innocent, 
and thus inferred from this experienced difficulty that the alternative explanations, 
while plausible, were less likely than the suspect being guilty. Indeed, the ease or 
difficulty with which people generate certain thoughts often informs their judgments 
about the content of these thoughts, known as the fluency effect (e.g., Sanna et al., 
2002; Tan & Agnew, 2016; Whittlesea, 1993). For instance, in one study, people 
who thought of 12 childhood memories, a relatively difficult task, ironically judged 
their memory to be worse than people who thought of only four childhood 
memories, a relatively easy task (Winkielman, Schwarz, & Belli, 1998). Likewise, in 
another study, people who thought of two alternative outcomes for a past event 
found their task easier than those who thought of 10 alternative outcomes, and as a 
                                                          
9 Three subjects out of the remaining 40 subjects in this condition did not complete this part of the 
study. Therefore, the plausibility results are for the remaining 37 subjects. 
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result, the two-outcome people were less likely to believe the actual event outcome 
was predictable (i.e., hindsight bias, Sanna et al., 2002). In other words, people can 
misattribute the difficulty of generating alternatives to the likelihood of those 
alternatives occurring, rather than to the large number of alternatives that they had to 
generate. Such a fluency effect could explain why subjects who thought of multiple 
alternative explanations judged the suspect’s guilt similarly to other subjects, given 
that subjects found it relatively difficult to generate multiple alternative explanations 
for the murder and criminal damage cases. 
To test this fluency account, in Experiment 3 I used a common and powerful 
fluency manipulation in which subjects were asked to generate either a single 
alternative explanation or multiple alternative explanations of the evidence. If 
fluency does indeed affect people’s guilt judgments about a suspect, then subjects in 
the single alternative explanation group should find their task easier and provide 
lower guilt ratings than subjects in the multiple alternatives group.   
 Experiment 3 
Method 
Subjects.  Once again, I conducted a power analysis using G*Power (Faul et 
al., 2007), assuming a large effect size, f = 0.4, based on past fluency research and an 
α error rate of 0.01 for 3 groups with 2 repeated measures and found that a sample 
size of 102 subjects would be sufficient for a power of 0.95 (e.g., d = 0.77, 
Experiment 2, comparing 10- vs. 2- thoughts conditions, Sanna et al., 2002). So, I 
aimed for a minimum of 34 subjects per condition. In total, 224 people took part in 
this study on Amazon Mechanical Turk and received a payment of $1 for their time. 
Only people who rated their English language ability as excellent or native were 
allowed to take part in the study. Initially, prior to the preliminary analyses, 6 
subjects were excluded for guessing the true purpose of the study. After two 
independent raters coded the remaining responses, I excluded 34 subjects from the 
single alternative condition and 18 subjects from the multiple alternatives conditions 
for failing to produce one alternative question or multiple alternative questions 
respectively. Of the remaining 166 subjects, 88 were men, 77 were women, and 1 
subject preferred not to say (165 subjects reported their age, M = 36, SD = 10.5 
years, range: 19–63).  
Design.  The study used a 3 × 2 mixed factorial design, with task (control vs. 
single alternative vs. multiple alternatives) as the between-subjects factor and type of 
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case (murder vs. arson) as the within-subjects factor. Subjects were randomly 
assigned to one of the three task conditions. Once again, the dependent measures 
were judgments of guilt, confidence, and evidence strength.  
Procedure.  The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 2. Subjects 
read the murder and arson cases from Experiment 2 in a random order. In the control 
condition, subjects read each case and then completed the same filler task of listing 
ten cities in a continent (n = 60). In the single alternative condition, subjects read 
each case and were instructed to produce a single alternative question to ask the 
suspect (n = 44). In the multiple alternatives condition, subjects read each case and 
were instructed to produce six alternative questions for the suspect (n = 62). Again, 
in the latter two conditions, subjects were guided by unrelated, example alternative 
questions that considered how a suspect might be innocent.    
 For each case, subjects completed their respective task and filled in the same 
case report as in Experiment 2, excluding the attention check question on which 
crime the suspect committed. In addition, subjects were asked to rate how likely it 
was that the suspect committed the crime (0 = not likely at all; 100 = extremely 
likely). Finally, all subjects were asked for their age and gender, and to state what 
they thought the study was about.  
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analysis.  To examine whether subjects in the single alternative 
and multiple alternatives conditions were indeed producing single or multiple 
alternative questions respectively, two independent raters, blind to condition and the 
study’s hypotheses, separately coded subjects’ responses from the single alternative 
and multiple alternatives conditions. There was substantial agreement between the 
two raters, к = .78 [95% CI: 0.75, 0.82], p < .001 (Landis & Koch, 1977) and 
disagreements were resolved via discussion. At this point 52 subjects were excluded 
for failing to follow instructions, that is, subjects in the multiple alternatives 
condition who did not produce multiple alternative questions for each suspect, and 
subjects in the single alternative condition who did not produce one alternative 
question for each suspect (these subjects typically produced an open-ended interview 
question for the suspect instead).10 Following these exclusions, 166 subjects 
                                                          
10 Including these subjects did not change the main pattern of results. All main analyses with these 52 
subjects are presented in Appendix A. 
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remained in total. These subjects were still focused on the study and seemed 
motivated to complete it, given that subjects in the multiple alternatives condition 
generated significantly more alternative questions than did subjects in the single 
alternative condition, murder case: Mmult = 4.35, SDmult = 1.32 vs. Msing = 1.00, SDsing 
= 0; arson case: Mmult = 4.48, SDmult = 1.20 vs. Msing = 1.00, SDsing = 0, ps < .001.  
Next, I checked whether the fluency manipulation worked by comparing 
subjects’ difficulty ratings across conditions and cases. In other words, did subjects 
find it easier to generate a single alternative explanation compared to multiple 
alternative explanations? Case and condition had an interactive effect on subjects’ 
ratings of task difficulty, F(2, 163) = 37.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .316. For the arson case, 
subjects’ difficulty ratings differed between conditions, F(2, 163) = 86.44, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .515. Post-hoc Tukey tests showed that control subjects found their task easier 
than did single alternative subjects, Mdiff = 2.66 [95% CI: 1.96, 3.36], and multiple 
alternatives subjects, Mdiff  = 3.44 [95% CI: 2.80, 4.08], ps < .001. Most importantly, 
subjects found thinking of a single alternative question easier than thinking of 
multiple alternative questions, Mdiff  = 0.78 [95% CI: 0.08, 1.48], p = .024.  
For the murder case, subjects’ difficulty ratings also differed between 
conditions, F(2, 163) = 4.13, p = .018, ηp2 = .048. Post-hoc Tukey tests showed that 
control subjects found their task easier than multiple alternatives subjects did, Mdiff = 
0.89 [95% CI: 0.15, 1.62], p = .013, however single alternative subjects did not find 
their task easier or more difficult than the control or multiple alternatives subjects 
did, p = .283 and p = .515 respectively.11 So, for the murder case, subjects did not 
find it easier to generate a single alternative explanation than to generate multiple 
alternative explanations. Subjects might have found it quite difficult generating even 
a single alternative explanation for the murder case because they, like subjects in 
Experiment 2, perceived the evidence (CCTV footage) to be quite compelling. In 
sum, the fluency manipulation was only effective for the arson case, not the murder 
case.  
                                                          
11 Since type of case was a repeated-measures variable, I had to create two different filler tasks for the 
control group to complete—one filler task per case. For the murder case, control subjects had to name 
10 cities in Asia—a task that subjects found quite difficult in comparison to naming 10 cities in North 
America, the control task associated with the arson case. I did not anticipate that one filler task would 
be more difficult than the other given that the same filler tasks were administered in Experiment 2 and 
subjects found the tasks similarly difficult. 
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Figure 6.5. Subjects’ mean difficulty ratings in Experiment 3. Error bars represent 
95% confidence intervals.  
 
Main Analysis. 
 Comparing conditions.  Recall the prediction that subjects who generated a 
single alternative explanation would be less inclined to believe the suspect was guilty 
than subjects who generated multiple alternative explanations. Instead, for the 
murder case, subjects did not differ in their guilt ratings across conditions. For the 
arson case, subjects who generated multiple alternatives provided lower guilt ratings 
than subjects who generated a single alternative. Overall, subjects rated the 
likelihood of the suspect’s guilt, their belief in the suspects’ guilt, their confidence, 
and the evidential strength similarly across conditions, see Figure 6.5.  
For the murder case, a MANOVA suggested that subjects’ ratings of guilt 
likelihood, guilt belief, confidence, and evidence strength did not differ between 
conditions, Pillai’s trace = .075, F(8, 322) = 1.58, p = .130, ηp2 = .038. For the arson 
case, a MANOVA suggested that subjects’ ratings differed between conditions, 
Pillai’s trace = .099, F(8, 322) = 2.10, p = .035, ηp2 = .050. Specifically, subjects’ 
ratings of guilt likelihood, F(2, 163) = 4.03, p = .020, ηp2 = .047, and guilt belief, 
F(2, 163) = 4.33, p = .015, ηp2 = .050, differed between conditions, while their 
ratings of confidence, p = .163, and evidence strength, p = .194, did not. Post-hoc 
Tukey tests indicated that subjects made lower guilt likelihood ratings in the multiple 
alternatives condition compared to the single alternative condition, Mdiff  = 9.74 [95% 
CI: –0.07, 19.54], p = .052, and the control condition, Mdiff  = 9.47 [95% CI: 0.46, 
18.48], p = .037, but that subjects’ guilt likelihood ratings did not differ between the 
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single alternative and control conditions, p = .998. Likewise, subjects in the multiple 
alternatives condition made lower guilt belief ratings compared to the single 
alternative condition, Mdiff = 0.72 [95% CI: 0.09, 1.35], p = .020, and the control 
condition, Mdiff = 0.54 [95% CI: –0.03, 1.12], p = .069. Subjects’ guilt belief ratings 
did not differ between the single alternative and control conditions, p = .782. So, in 
contrast to the predictions, subjects who had the relatively difficult task of generating 
multiple alternative explanations made slightly lower guilt ratings of the arson 
suspect than subjects who had the relatively easy task of generating a single 
alternative explanation. 
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C.  
D.  
Figure 6.6. Subjects’ mean ratings of (A) the likelihood that the suspect is guilty, (B) 
belief in suspect’s guilt, (C) their confidence, and (D) evidence strength in 
Experiment 3. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Comparing cases.  As in Experiment 2, subjects perceived the murder case to 
be stronger than the arson case, see Table 6.2. This finding could explain why 
subjects found it quite difficult to generate even a single alternative explanation for 
the murder case, but not for the arson case. There were no interaction effects of case 
and condition on subjects’ guilt likelihood, guilt belief, confidence, and evidence 
strength ratings, ps = .921, .842, .245, and .826 respectively. 
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Table 6.2 
Subjects’ judgments of the murder and arson cases 
Measure Means for  
murder case  
(SD) 
Means for 
arson case  
(SD) 
Mean difference 
[95% CIs] 
 T 
Guilt likelihood 66.55 (19.27) 56.97 (21.42) 9.58 [6.30, 12.86] t(165) = -5.76** 
Belief in guilt 4.87 (1.28) 4.21 (1.37) 0.66 [0.44, 0.88] t(165) = -5.93** 
Confidence  4.63 (1.61) 4.37 (1.53) 0.25 [0.02, 0.48] t(165) = -2.17* 
Evidence strength 4.63 (1.65) 3.71 (1.66) 0.92 [1.20, 0.63] t(165) = -6.40** 
Note. * p = .032; ** p < .001. Using the Bonferroni correction the critical p-value is 
.0125. 
 
Overall, in Experiment 3, people found it easier to think of a single 
alternative explanation for the evidence rather than multiple alternative explanations 
of the evidence in one case (arson) but not the other (murder). This pattern of results 
was surprising given that several studies have manipulated the ease of a cognitive 
task, such as recalling childhood memories or making future plans, by simply 
varying the number of items subjects needed to think of (e.g., Sanna et al., 2002; 
Spielmann, MacDonald, & Wilson, 2009; Tan & Agnew, 2016; Tormala, Petty, & 
Briñol, 2002; Winkielman et al., 1998). Since people found it easier to generate a 
single alternative explanation for the arson case, rather than multiple alternative 
explanations, one might expect single alternative subjects to be less inclined to 
believe the arson suspect was guilty than multiple alternatives subjects were. Instead, 
I found the opposite: the multiple alternatives group was less likely to believe that 
the arson suspect was guilty than the single alternative group. Meanwhile, for the 
murder case, subjects in the single- and multiple-alternative groups did not differ in 
their difficulty ratings or their guilt belief ratings. Therefore, I did not find support 
for a fluency effect in which people who think of one alternative explanation find it 
easier to imagine how the suspect might be innocent, and as a result, are less inclined 
to believe the suspect is guilty compared to people who think of multiple alternative 
explanations (Sanna et al., 2002; Winkielman et al., 1998).  
To summarize, thinking of multiple alternative explanations appeared to 
influence people’s guilt beliefs for a specific case within Experiment 3, but not in 
Experiments 1 and 2 in which subjects who thought of alternative explanations 
judged the suspect’s guilt similarly to other subjects who did not think of alternative 
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explanations. To further examine these mixed findings, I re-analysed the data from 
all three experiments using a Bayesian approach. 
Bayesian Analysis of Experiments 1–3  
Bayesian statistics enable researchers to quantify how much the data favour 
the null hypothesis (for criticisms directed at the traditional null hypothesis 
significance testing approach, see for example, Krueger, 2001; Wagenmakers, 2007; 
Wagenmakers, Lee, Lodewyckx, & Iverson, 2008). Put another way, it allows 
researchers to assess how likely it is for observed data to occur when the null 
hypothesis is true compared to when the alternative hypothesis is true (Ecker, 
Lewandowsky, & Apai, 2011; Jarozs & Wiley, 2014). I calculated Bayes Factors 
(JASP Team, 2016) for the main measure of interest: subjects’ guilt belief ratings as 
shown in Table 6.3. A Bayes Factor is the ratio of the probability that the data 
occurred under the null hypothesis to the probability that the data occurred under the 
alternative hypothesis (Ecker et al., 2011). Here, Bayes Factors (BF01) above 1 are in 
favour of the null hypothesis while Bayes Factors below 1 are in favour of the 
alternative hypothesis. For instance, the Bayes Factor of 12.71 for the arson case in 
Experiment 2 suggests that the data are approximately 12.71 times more likely to 
occur when generating alternative evidential explanations does not influence 
people’s beliefs about a suspect’s guilt compared to when it does.  
As Table 6.3 shows, the Bayes Factors for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 
suggest that coming up with alternative explanations did not lead people to change 
their judgments about a suspect’s guilt. In contrast, Experiment 3 suggests the 
opposite: that thinking of alternative evidential explanations might influence 
people’s beliefs about whether a suspect is guilty of a crime. To what extent, then, 
does generating alternative explanations influence people’s guilt-presumptive 
judgments? To answer this question, I aimed to calculate a more precise estimate of 
the effect size by conducting a mini meta-analysis of all three studies (Cumming, 
2012, 2013). 
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Table 6.3 
Bayes factors for guilt belief measure in Experiments 1–3  
Experiment Case BF01 
1 Theft 3.38 
2 Murder 10.11 
2 Arson 12.71 
2 Criminal damage 6.48 
3 Murder  0.40 
3 Arson 0.22 
 
 
Mini Meta-Analysis on the Effect of Generating Alternative Explanations on 
Guilt Judgments  
 For the mini meta-analysis, I was primarily interested in the size of the 
difference between guilt belief ratings made by the control and alternative groups 
(i.e., the multiple alternatives group in Experiment 3).12 People’s guilt belief ratings 
were averaged across cases for Experiments 2 and 3 and these group mean ratings 
were compared in original units. Specifically, I compared people’s mean ratings for 
the extent to which they believed the suspect was guilty on the aforementioned scale 
of 1 = Not at all to 7 = Very much. Using ESCI software (Cumming, 2013), I ran a 
random-effects model meta-analysis, see Figure 6.7 for the resultant forest plot. The 
meta-analytic result showed that people who thought of multiple alternative 
explanations of the evidence made guilt belief ratings that differed from the control 
group by an estimated –0.11 units [95% CI: –0.67, 0.45] on the guilt belief scale of 
1–7, z = –0.375, p = .707. Put another way, subjects who generated alternative 
explanations lowered their guilt belief on average by 1.79%. Thus, generating 
alternatives had a very small effect, or plausibly no effect, on subjects’ guilt beliefs 
about the suspect. 
                                                          
12 The meta-analysis presented here only includes data from subjects who followed instructions in 
each experiment. Including subjects who did not follow instructions in Experiments 2 and 3 did not 
change the result of the meta-analysis, see Appendix B for further details. 
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Figure 6.7. Forest plot displaying mean differences in guilt belief ratings between 
the control and alternative groups in Experiments 1–3. The mean difference between 
the two groups in each experiment is indicated by the location of the square on the 
horizontal axis. The size of the square indicates how the study was weighted in the 
meta-analysis. Studies with larger squares had a bigger sample size and a smaller 
standard deviation and thus, had a higher weighting in the meta-analysis. The meta-
analytic result is represented by the diamond. When the symbol is to the right of the 
zero line, the alternative group was more likely to believe the suspect was guilty 
compared to the control group. When the symbol is to the left of the zero line, the 
alternative group was less likely to believe the suspect was guilty compared to the 
control group. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
General Discussion 
I asked the question: to what extent does thinking of alternative explanations 
for criminal evidence reduce people’s belief in a suspect’s guilt? Across three 
experiments and four criminal cases, I found that people were capable of generating 
multiple explanations of the evidence in which the prime suspect could be innocent. 
For instance, when the prime suspect had a tattoo that matched someone seen near 
the murder scene, people questioned whether the tattoo was common, a gang 
affiliation, or a recent acquisition by the suspect—suggesting that someone other 
than the suspect had been seen near the murder scene and that the suspect might, in 
fact, be innocent. What’s more, people found most of their alternative explanations 
to be plausible. Yet, as highlighted by the results of the mini meta-analysis, people 
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who generated alternative explanations were only slightly less inclined, by about 2%, 
if at all, to believe the suspect was guilty compared to people who did not think of 
multiple, alternative explanations of the evidence.  
 On one hand, these findings fit with past research in which thinking or being 
told about alternative suspects for a crime did not always influence people’s guilt 
judgments about the prime suspect. Both laypeople who thought of multiple, 
alternative suspects in a criminal case and police who were informed about an 
alternative suspect did not lower their belief in the prime suspect’s guilt (Ask & 
Granhag, 2005; O’Brien, 2009). Notably, some laypeople in past research lowered 
their guilt ratings of the prime suspect when informed about an alternative suspect 
(Ask & Granhag, 2005).  
On the other hand, the findings contrast with research on people’s judgments 
in non-forensic contexts in which thinking of plausible alternative hypotheses, 
explanations, and outcomes forced people to evaluate the evidence more 
comprehensively, and ultimately reduced people’s biased tendency to believe in an 
initial hypothesis, explanation, or outcome (e.g., Hirt & Markman, 1995; Sanna et 
al., 2002). So, why didn’t thinking of alternative explanations of evidence influence 
people’s judgments when it came to criminal cases? It is possible that while people 
generated alternative explanations of the evidence that changed the exact nature of 
the crime scenario, they did not construct entirely different outcomes for the criminal 
case the way people generated entirely different outcomes for a football game or a 
battle in past research (Hirt & Markman, 1995; Sanna et al., 2002). Future research 
could encourage people to construct entirely different outcomes for each criminal 
case by providing people with both incriminating and exculpatory evidence 
regarding the prime suspect.  
Another possible explanation for the findings is that when subjects read the 
criminal cases, they formed an initial belief about the culpability of the suspect and 
the strength of the case, and this belief persevered in spite of their alternative 
evidential explanations. Put another way, people’s self-generated alternatives were 
simply not compelling enough to sway their initial beliefs about the suspect’s 
involvement in a crime. The knowledge that someone had been labelled as a suspect 
in the case might have outweighed subjects’ other considerations about the case. 
Indeed, initial beliefs about a suspect and criminal evidence can be quite powerful 
and influence subsequent interpretations of criminal evidence made even by 
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professional crime analysts, whose job it is to provide the police with alternative 
explanations of the evidence and to counter tunnel vision (Kerstholt & Eikelbloom, 
2007). Future research could compare directly the effects of alternative generation in 
criminal cases to alternative generation in other domains (e.g. sporting or historical 
events) to examine whether people are less willing or less motivated to change their 
beliefs about a suspect’s guilt compared to their beliefs about the outcome of, say, a 
football game.  
Relatedly, given that Experiments 1 and 2 found generating alternative 
evidential explanations had no effect on people’s guilt beliefs and Experiment 3 and 
the mini meta-analysis found a small effect of alternative generation on people’s 
guilt beliefs, the effect might be dependent on the circumstances under which people 
generate alternative explanations. For instance, the strength of the initial evidence in 
the case and whether it affords subjects the option of generating multiple plausible 
alternative explanations might determine the extent to which subjects shift their guilt 
beliefs about a suspect. While the three experiments used a variety of different cases, 
with evidence of varying strength, and Experiment 2 even measured subjects’ self-
reported plausibility, future research could actually manipulate the strength of the 
case evidence and consequently, the number of plausible alternative explanations a 
subject can generate to identify which circumstances might lead subjects to change 
their guilt beliefs about a suspect.  
Notably, the findings are also at odds with past research in which people 
found it easier to think of only a few alternative event outcomes and inferred from 
this ease, that an event could occur in a number of ways, and thus adjusted their 
judgments about the inevitability of the original event outcome accordingly (i.e., 
hindsight bias, Sanna et al., 2002). In the present studies, people found it difficult to 
think of just one alternative explanation of the evidence (see Figure 6.5), so it was 
difficult to create a feeling of fluency by manipulating the number of alternative 
explanations people had to generate. If subjects are indeed relying upon the difficulty 
with which they generated one or more alternative explanations as a cue to the 
likelihood of those alternatives, then future research could eliminate this fluency 
effect by leading subjects to attribute their experienced difficulty to something else, 
such as the nature of the task. For instance, informing subjects that most past 
research subjects found it difficult to generate alternative explanations could prevent 
current subjects from drawing upon their own experienced difficulty of generating 
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alternatives when making guilt judgments about the suspect (e.g., Schwarz et al., 
1991). 
The practical implications of the findings are evident—simply telling people 
to think of different explanations for incriminating evidence may be insufficient in 
leading criminal justice professionals to make more balanced judgments about a 
person’s guilt. Police interviewers that employ the SUE method (e.g., Hartwig et al., 
2014) may think of alternative explanations of the evidence and base their interview 
questions on these explanations, but there is little evidence to suggest that this 
technique will lower their belief in the suspect’s guilt. Of course, only laypeople 
took part in this research and they were aware that the criminal cases they were 
reading were hypothetical. Future research could examine to what extent 
professionals, such as police investigators, adjust their guilt beliefs about a suspect 
when thinking of alternative explanations of the evidence for real criminal cases. It 
might be even more difficult, however, to influence the beliefs of criminal justice 
professionals who have a vested interest in charging a suspect or convicting a 
defendant and as a result, will be reluctant to prove themselves wrong and have 
wasted time with the wrong person. For example, some prosecutors remain 
convinced that the defendants they convicted are guilty even in the face of evidence 
that proves the defendant’s innocence (Bandes, 2005; Burke, 2007). Likewise, in the 
infamous Dutch Schiedam Park case, police and prosecutors ignored the possibility 
of alternative suspects despite evidence indicating their prime suspect’s innocence—
their prime suspect was wrongfully convicted before being exonerated years later 
(Brants, 2013). Indeed, Simon (2012) suggested that while thinking about 
alternatives may be effective in reducing simple cognitive biases, such as the 
hindsight bias, it may be less successful in forensic contexts where motivational 
factors contribute to people’s judgments about someone’s guilt. Generating 
alternative theories and explanations may simply not have the potential to tackle 
people’s tunnel vision in the criminal justice system (O’Brien, 2009).  
In conclusion, when laypeople generated their own alternative explanations 
of criminal evidence, they were only marginally less likely, or not at all less likely, to 
believe the suspect was guilty. Unlike the overwhelming public response regarding 
the potential innocence of Steven Avery from Making a Murderer, people’s beliefs 
about the suspects in this research were barely affected by alternative explanations of 
incriminating evidence, even though they were creating those alternative 
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explanations themselves. Thus, it seems unlikely that police interviewers who 
prepare interview questions based on alternative explanations of the evidence, as per 
the SUE protocol, will be less guilt-presumptive about their suspect and as a result, 
treat the suspect fairer than if they had not employed the SUE technique. 
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Chapter 7: 
Truth-Tellers Stand the Test of Time and Contradict Evidence Less 
than Liars, Even Months After a Crime 
 
Having considered the broader implications of strategic evidence disclosure 
from both the lawyer’s and police interviewer’s perspectives in preceding chapters, 
Chapter 7 shifts the focus to the suspect. When deceptive suspects are unaware of the 
evidence the police hold against them, they contradict that evidence more than 
truthful suspects do—a useful cue to deception and the key motivation for strategic 
evidence disclosure techniques. But given that, over time, truthful suspects might 
forget the past and also contradict the evidence, how effective is strategic evidence 
disclosure in lie detection when suspects are questioned months after a crime? To 
test this, this chapter presents a mock crime experiment in which mock suspects 
either committed a theft (liars) or a benign activity (truth-tellers) and were 
questioned either shortly after or two months later without being informed of the 
evidence implicating them in the theft. In a follow-up experiment, independent 
laypeople read mock suspects’ responses and rated how deceptive they were. 
Introduction 
 Do you remember what you were doing exactly two months ago? Maybe not. 
Now imagine you are suddenly a suspect in a criminal case and the police ask you 
for an alibi for that day. You are probably struggling to remember the details. You 
might even say something that contradicts the police’s evidence. The obvious danger 
for truthful suspects, like yourself, is that forgetting the past and contradicting the 
evidence could make you look like a liar. This scenario is not as farfetched as it may 
seem: We know that police around the world are instructed to rely on inconsistencies 
between suspects’ statements and the available evidence to detect if suspects are 
lying (e.g. Association of Chief Police Officers, 2014; Hartwig et al., 2006; Luke et 
al., 2016). In this chapter, I ask whether lie detection techniques that hinge on the 
consistency between a suspect’s statements and the evidence the police hold may be 
effective after a long delay. 
It is unsurprising that the police capitalize on verbal cues to detect deception: 
a growing body of psychological research suggests that, when unaware of the 
evidence, liars are more likely to make statements that contradict the evidence than 
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are truth-tellers (e.g., Clemens et al., 2010, 2011; Hartwig et al., 2005). This 
difference between liars and truth-tellers can be attributed to the different counter-
interrogation strategies that suspects adopt when being questioned about a crime 
(Granhag & Hartwig, 2008, 2015). For liars, incriminating evidence is a threat and 
the interviewer might or might not possess such evidence (Granhag & Hartwig, 
2008; Hartwig et al., 2014). To deal with this threat and to appear credible, liars 
either avoid mentioning or deny any connection to the crime during the interview. In 
doing so, liars can unknowingly contradict the evidence that links them to the crime, 
known as statement-evidence inconsistencies (Hartwig et al., 2006).  
In contrast, truth-tellers are typically more consistent with the interviewer’s 
evidence because they tend to be forthcoming with their information and simply try 
to provide an account of what transpired (Colwell et al., 2006; Strömwall et al., 
2006). Recall that truth-tellers’ forthcoming approach may reflect a belief in a just 
world (Lerner, 1980) coupled with an illusion of transparency (Gilovich et al., 
1998). As a result, truthful suspects might believe that by speaking to a police 
interviewer, their innocence will become apparent and justice will triumph (Kassin, 
2005; Kassin & Norwick, 2004). For instance, in one experiment, a detective 
accused students, some innocent and some guilty, of stealing $100 and informed 
them of their right to silence. While only 36% of the guilty students waived their 
right to silence, a striking 81% of the innocent students waived their right to silence, 
chose to talk to the detective, and explained that they “did nothing wrong” and 
“didn’t have anything to hide” (Kassin & Norwick, 2004, p. 216). Similarly, truth-
tellers are likely to admit their connection to a crime even if the interviewer has not 
informed them of the evidence linking them to the crime. In this way, truth-tellers 
tend to make fewer statement-evidence inconsistencies than do liars. 
Accordingly, psychology researchers have developed a new repertoire of 
police interviewing techniques that use suspects’ inconsistencies as a means of 
detecting deception (e.g., Leins, Fisher, & Vrij, 2012; Leins, Fisher, Vrij, Leal, & 
Mann, 2011; Vrij et al., 2009). The SUE approach is one such technique with 
growing empirical support (Hartwig et al., 2014). Recall that SUE involves 
interviewers asking suspects to freely recall their activity during the time of the 
crime and to answer specific questions (e.g., “Did you see a briefcase?”; “Did you 
handle a briefcase?”) before disclosing to the suspect the evidence that implicates 
them in the crime. For instance, in one study looking at SUE, mock suspects either 
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stole a wallet from a briefcase in a bookshop and lied about it to the interviewer or 
visited the bookshop in search of a hole-punch in a box underneath the same 
briefcase and told the truth about it to the interviewer (Hartwig et al., 2006). The 
study was set up so that evidence, such as the mock suspects’ fingerprints found on 
the briefcase containing the wallet, implicated both the deceptive and truthful 
suspects in the theft of the wallet. Interviewers trained in SUE disclosed this 
evidence only after they had questioned the mock suspects on their activity in the 
bookshop. In these interviews, deceptive mock suspects made more statement-
evidence inconsistencies than truthful mock suspects and as a result, trained 
interviewers accurately detected 85.0% of truthful mock suspects and 85.7% of 
deceptive mock suspects. Indeed, a meta-analysis of eight studies found a large 
difference (d = 1.89) between deceptive and truthful mock suspects’ statement-
evidence inconsistencies when evidence was disclosed late in the interview (Hartwig 
et al., 2014). These findings suggest that statement-evidence inconsistencies could be 
a robust and diagnostic cue to when suspects are lying.  
Further research is needed, however, to explore whether lie detection 
techniques that rely on suspects’ inconsistencies, such as SUE, might work in a 
variety of forensically relevant conditions—including when suspects are questioned 
weeks or months after a crime (e.g., Birgitte Tengs case, Shawyer et al., 2009). Up 
until now, the time delays used in published strategic evidence disclosure studies 
have been typically short. Upon reviewing the literature, I found 22 published studies 
in which mock suspects were questioned with some variant of the SUE technique 
(see Appendix C for details). In 20 of these studies, suspects were questioned within 
one hour of the activity that they needed to lie or tell the truth about. The only 
exceptions were Hartwig et al. (2005) with a one week delay and McDougall and 
Bull (2015) with a delay of 7–10 days. Yet, over a longer delay, say, several weeks 
or months, truthful suspects might forget what they were doing and also contradict 
the evidence, leading them to be mistaken for deceptive suspects.  
Indeed, truthful suspects’ ability to respond consistently with the evidence is 
likely to be compromised over time given that information encoded in memory can 
be rapidly forgotten, and over time, becomes increasingly difficult to retrieve 
(Ebbinghaus, 1913; Schacter, 1999). For instance, in a recent study, truth-tellers and 
liars witnessed a social interaction and then reported it either immediately after or 
three weeks later (Harvey, Vrij, Leal, Hope, & Mann, 2017). For all of the liars and 
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some of the truth-tellers, the social interaction was important to their task and they 
intentionally encoded it. For the remaining truth-tellers, the social interaction was 
unimportant and they incidentally encoded it. Immediately after, truth-tellers who 
intentionally encoded the interaction reported more details than both liars and truth-
tellers who incidentally encoded the interaction. Three weeks later, however, there 
were no differences in the amount of detail reported by liars and both types of truth-
tellers—truth-tellers simply forgot some details, while liars continued to report the 
same amount of detail. Meanwhile, in a study exploring memory for alibi evidence, 
people were asked to produce an alibi for three weeks earlier and then spend a week 
searching for evidence to verify this alibi before retelling their alibi (Strange et al., 
2014). People were mostly inconsistent when retelling their alibis, simply because 
they had not accurately recalled what they did three weeks ago the first time around. 
Similarly, researchers suggest that a longer time delay might put truthful suspects at 
risk of forgetting their past activities and making more statement-evidence 
inconsistencies (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008; Hartwig et al., 2006; Vrij et al., 2010)—
but this hypothesis has not been tested, until now.  
If truth-tellers do make more statement-evidence inconsistencies after a 
longer time delay, the key issue is that they could be perceived to be lying. People 
generally perceive verbal inconsistencies as a sign of deception (Brewer, Potter, 
Fisher, Bond, & Luszcz, 1999). For example, both police and laypeople are more 
likely to judge suspects to be guilty when they change their alibis (Culhane & Hosch, 
2012). Relatedly, professional lie-catchers such as police, prosecutors, and judges 
expect truthful statements to be more internally consistent than deceptive statements 
(Strömwall & Granhag, 2003). It is therefore likely that if truthful suspects are 
inconsistent with police evidence after a longer time delay, they will appear 
deceptive, which in turn reduces the diagnostic utility of statement-evidence 
inconsistencies as a cue to deception.  
In two experiments, I explored whether truthful and deceptive suspects 
contradict evidence to the same extent after an extended time delay. In Experiment 4, 
subjects were asked to visit a university bookshop and search for a hole-punch 
(truth-tellers) or steal a wallet from a bag (liars) in a procedure similar to that of 
Hartwig et al. (2006). The activity was set up to generate evidence, such as 
eyewitness accounts, that implicated both truth-tellers and liars in the theft of the 
wallet. Subjects were questioned about their activity in the bookshop either shortly 
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after or two months after without being informed of the evidence implicating them in 
the theft. Note that in this study, as in past SUE research, all truth-tellers were 
innocent and all liars were guilty (e.g., Hartwig et al., 2005, 2006). The factors of 
guilt and deception were not manipulated separately given that deliberately deceptive 
innocent suspects are likely to be uncommon in the real world and truth-telling guilty 
suspects would essentially be confessing to the crime, a scenario in which lie 
detection would be unnecessary. In Experiment 5, an independent group of laypeople 
read these subjects’ responses and judged to what extent the subjects were lying.  
Experiment 4 
Method 
Subjects and design.  A power analysis using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007), 
assuming a large effect size of f = 0.4 (based on Hartwig et al., 2014), and α = 0.05 
for 4 groups, suggested a sample size of 84 subjects (21 subjects per group) would 
be sufficient for a power of 0.95. In total, 136 people from the University of 
Warwick community participated in Phase 1. Six subjects from the truthful condition 
were excluded at Phase 1 for bringing the wallet to the researcher (n = 3) or for 
failing to touch the bag while searching for the hole-punch (n = 3, confirmed by a 
research assistant observing the subject). A further 11 subjects (4 long-delay truth-
tellers, 4 long-delay liars, 2 short-delay truth-tellers, and 1 short-delay liar) failed to 
complete Phase 2, and one subject was excluded from the deceptive condition after 
Phase 2 for not lying about stealing the wallet. The final sample consisted of 118 
subjects (112 provided their age, M = 20.6 years, SD = 3.4, range = 18–44; 74 
women, 42 men, and 2 subjects who identified as other). Subjects were randomly 
assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (suspect: truth-teller vs. liar) × 2 (time 
delay: short vs. long) between-subjects design. Cell size ranged from 28–31 subjects. 
The key dependent variable was subjects’ statement-evidence inconsistencies.  
Upon completing the experiment, subjects were entered in a lottery to win 
one of ten £10 vouchers. The research was approved by the University of Warwick 
Psychology Department Research Ethics Committee. 
Procedure 
 Phase 1.  The study was advertised online as a real-world search and retrieval 
study. Subjects participated individually. They met a researcher at the Warwick Arts 
Centre who instructed them to retrieve an object from the University bookshop, also 
located within the Arts Centre. Subjects had to enter the bookshop and walk past two 
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pot plants at the entrance. Truth-tellers had to retrieve a hole-punch from inside an 
orange box in the second row of bookshelves (the Law section), where a computer 
and telephone are prominently located. If they could not find the hole-punch after 
searching for a minute, subjects were to return to the researcher. In fact, there was 
never a hole-punch in the orange box, so no one found the hole-punch. To search for 
it, however, truth-tellers had to move a black bag, with a brown wallet sticking out, 
from on top of the orange box. 
Meanwhile, liars were informed that the study would involve committing a 
fake crime: stealing a wallet from the bookshop. For ethical reasons, subjects were 
informed that this was not a real crime since the wallet belonged to the researcher 
and the bookshop’s manager and employees were fully aware that the study was 
taking place. If subjects did not object to stealing the wallet (none did), they visited 
the second row of bookshelves and searched for the same black bag that truth-tellers 
searched for and moved. Liars took the wallet from the bag and brought it back to 
the researcher. Following Phase 1, which took between five to ten minutes, all 
subjects were told that they would be sent an online questionnaire within a few 
months. To simulate a real-life criminal investigation in which innocent suspects are 
unaware that they will be later questioned about their actions, subjects were not 
informed what the online questionnaire was about. All subjects were thanked and 
sent home. 
 During Phase 1, a research assistant covertly observed subjects from within 
the bookshop. The research assistant, positioned a few meters away from the orange 
box and bag, verified whether each subject visited the Law section and handled the 
bag, either while searching for the hole-punch or while removing the wallet. Thus, 
Phase 1 generated three pieces of evidence implicating each subject in the theft of 
the wallet: (1) eyewitness testimony that the subject entered the bookshop; (2) 
eyewitness testimony that the subject visited the Law section where the wallet was 
located; and (3) the subject’s fingerprints found on the bag containing the wallet.  
 Phase 2.  Phase 2 took place online to minimize attrition in the long-delay 
conditions. Short-delay subjects received an online questionnaire on the day they 
completed Phase 1 and long-delay subjects received the questionnaire two months 
after they completed Phase 1. Long-delay subjects who failed to complete the 
questionnaire in a timely manner were sent a reminder one week later. Short-delay 
subjects completed Phase 2 within 0–3 days of Phase 1 (M = 0, SD = 0.8 days) while 
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long-delay subjects completed Phase 2 within 55–80 days of Phase 1 (M = 63, SD = 
3.6 days).   
The questionnaire started by asking subjects what they thought was the 
study’s purpose (no one guessed correctly). All subjects were then informed that 
they were suspected of stealing a wallet from the bookshop. They were told that the 
investigators had some information indicating their guilt, but as they were not 
certain, they wanted to question the subject. Truth-tellers were instructed to tell the 
truth about their Phase 1 activity while liars were instructed to lie about taking the 
wallet. All subjects were told that to stand a chance to win a £10 voucher, they 
needed to convince the investigators of their innocence. In fact, all subjects were 
entered into a lottery to win £10 vouchers regardless of their performance on the 
task. As a comprehension check, subjects were asked what they were expected to do 
next and given four options (e.g., “I should lie about what I did in Phase 1 of the 
study”). Subjects could only proceed with the study when they answered correctly 
according to their condition. If subjects answered incorrectly, they were prompted to 
reread the instructions and answer the question again. 
 Next, subjects were asked SUE-style questions relating to evidence generated 
in Phase 1, see Table 7.1. These questions were modelled on interview questions 
used in past SUE research (Hartwig et al., 2014; Luke, Hartwig, Shamash, & 
Granhag, 2016). While SUE also involves asking suspects for a free recall account, 
subjects in this study were only asked specific questions because liars contradict 
evidence more when answering evidence-specific questions than when freely 
recalling an account (Hartwig et al., 2011). Each question was presented on a 
separate page so that subjects could not change their answers to earlier questions. 
Unlike face-to-face interviews in which an interviewer can flexibly change their line 
of questioning based on a suspect’s responses, the online questionnaire required 
subjects to answer a fixed set of questions regardless of how they answered initial 
questions. For instance, even if a subject claimed they did not visit the bookshop in 
response to the first question, they were still presented with the remaining questions 
about their activity within the bookshop. In response, subjects continued to deny 
visiting the bookshop. All subjects were asked whether they took anything from the 
black bag (everyone said no). Subjects were never informed of the evidence 
implicating them in the theft. Finally, subjects rated the difficulty of the task (1 = not 
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difficult at all; 7 = extremely difficult), provided demographic information, and were 
debriefed. 
  
Table 7.1.  
SUE-style interview questions relating to each piece of evidence.  
Eyewitness testimony of 
subject entering 
bookshop 
Eyewitness testimony of 
subject visiting second row of 
shelves 
Subject’s fingerprints found 
on the bag containing wallet 
Did you visit the 
bookshop on campus? 
Did you pass by the two 
pot plants? 
What did you do in the 
bookshop? 
Which parts of the bookshop 
did you visit? 
Did you see a computer and 
telephone? 
Did you visit the Law section 
of the bookshop? 
 
Did you see a black bag in 
the bookshop? 
If yes, where was the black 
bag? 
Did you do anything with 
the black bag? 
Did you handle the black 
bag? 
Did you see anything in the 
black bag? 
If yes, what did you see in 
the black bag? 
 
Results and Discussion 
Coding subjects’ responses.  To measure subjects’ statement-evidence 
inconsistency, two highly trained independent raters, blind to condition and the 
study’s hypotheses, separately coded all subjects’ responses. The raters followed 
Sorochinski et al.’s (2014) coding scheme. For each piece of evidence, the raters 
decided whether the subject’s statements, as a whole (across all 12 questions), were 
completely consistent with the evidence (score of 1), partially or possibly consistent 
with the evidence (score of 2), or completely inconsistent with the evidence (score of 
3). Although the 12 questions were formulated in relation to specific pieces of 
evidence (see Table 7.1), subjects sometimes described their complete activity within 
the bookshop in response to a single question. Thus, raters considered subjects’ 
responses to all 12 questions when assigning them statement-evidence inconsistency 
scores for each of the three pieces of evidence.  
For an example of how raters coded a subject’s statements, consider a subject 
who responded to the questions by stating that they entered the bookshop, cannot 
remember whether they visited the Law section (or the second row of bookshelves as 
some subjects recalled it), and definitely did not handle a black bag. This subject 
would receive statement-evidence inconsistency scores of 1, 2, and 3 for evidence 
pertaining to their bookshop entry (eyewitness testimony), their Law section visit 
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(eyewitness testimony), and their handling of the black bag (fingerprint evidence) 
respectively. Put simply, each subject received three statement-evidence 
inconsistency scores—one per piece of evidence. Finally, the raters gave each 
subject a summed, total statement-evidence inconsistency score that could range 
from 3 (completely consistent with all three pieces of evidence) to 9 (completely 
inconsistent with all three pieces of evidence). Thus, in my example above, the 
subject would receive a total statement-evidence inconsistency score of 6. Note that 
only one subject made internally inconsistent statements by claiming that they did 
not visit the Law section of the bookshop but that they did handle the black bag 
(which was located in the Law section). For this subject, the raters assigned 
statement-evidence inconsistency scores of 3 (completely inconsistent) for the 
evidence pertaining to the Law section visit and 1 (completely consistent) for the 
evidence that they handled the black bag.  The two raters had almost perfect 
agreement, к = .85 [95% CI: 0.80, 0.90], p < .001 (Landis & Koch, 1977) and 
disagreements were resolved via discussion. 
Main analysis 
 Statement-evidence inconsistency.  Figure 7.1 shows mean statement-
evidence inconsistency ratings for subjects’ responses. In line with past research, 
liars contradicted the evidence more than truth-tellers did—presumably because liars 
were denying their connection to the theft of the wallet while truth-tellers were 
forthcoming about their bookshop activity (e.g., Clemens et al., 2011; Hartwig et al., 
2014). Additionally, long-delay subjects contradicted the evidence more than short-
delay subjects did, fitting with past research in which people forget details and tell 
less consistent stories over time (Harvey et al., 2017; Strange et al., 2014). A 2 × 2 
between-subjects ANOVA on subjects’ statement-evidence inconsistency scores 
revealed main effects of suspect condition, F(1,114) = 113.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .500, 
and time delay, F(1,114) = 7.55, p = .007, ηp2 = .062, but no interactive effect of 
suspect condition and time delay, F(1,114) = .30, p = .588, ηp2 = .003. Specifically, 
liars made more statement-evidence inconsistencies than did truth-tellers, Mdec = 
7.18, SDdec = 1.55 vs. Mtru = 4.50, SDtru = 1.23, d = 1.92, [95% CI: 1.48, 2.36]. There 
was a large difference between statement-evidence inconsistencies made by liars and 
truth-tellers shortly after the crime, Mdiff = 2.83 [95% CI: 2.07, 3.58], d = 2.00 [95% 
CI: 1.35, 2.65], and crucially, two months after the crime, Mdiff = 2.55 [95% CI: 1.88, 
3.23], d = 1.94 [95% CI: 1.32, 2.56]. Moreover, long-delay subjects contradicted 
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evidence slightly more than short-delay subjects, Mlon = 6.20, SDlon = 1.83 vs. Msho = 
5.51, SDsho = 2.00, d = 0.36 [95% CI: –0.01, 0.73]. Finally, a follow-up independent 
samples t-test highlighted that short-delay liars made more statement-evidence 
inconsistencies than did long-delay truth-tellers, t(57) = 5.21, p < .001, Mdiff = 2.00 
[95% CI: 1.23, 2.76], d = 1.36 [95% CI: 0.78, 1.92]. Together, these results suggest 
that truth-tellers were uniformly at less risk of making statement-evidence 
inconsistencies than were liars. 
 
Figure 7.1. Mean statement-evidence inconsistency ratings of subjects’ responses, 
ranging from 3 (completely consistent with all three pieces of evidence) to 9 
(completely inconsistent with all three pieces of evidence). Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals.  
 
 Inconsistency with individual pieces of evidence.  Given that even truth-
tellers were contradicting some evidence after both time delays, it would be useful 
for the police to know which types of evidence truth-tellers and liars might be more 
likely to contradict. To this end, I examined how many subjects in each condition 
were completely consistent, partially or possibly consistent, and completely 
inconsistent with each piece of evidence. There are two key points to note from this 
analysis, shown in Table 7.2. First, many truth-tellers (39% short delay; 63% long 
delay) failed to report handling the bag and contradicted the fingerprint evidence. 
Unlike entering the bookshop and visiting the Law section, handling the black bag 
was irrelevant to the truth-tellers’ task of finding the hole-punch. Therefore, truth-
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tellers might have failed to initially notice the bag or later recall it, similar to past 
research in which people are less likely to notice or recall things that are irrelevant to 
their activity (Harvey et al., 2017; Rees et al., 1999; Simons & Chabris, 1999). 
Indeed, in Harvey et al.’s study, truth-tellers who incidentally encoded the social 
interaction later reported fewer details than truth-tellers who were instructed to 
attend to the social interaction as part of their task. Likewise, in this study, task 
irrelevance at the time of encoding could explain why truth-tellers contradicted the 
fingerprint evidence at surprisingly high rates, particularly after a long delay. Of 
course, the police might not be able to assess whether information was relevant to a 
suspect at the time of encoding without first knowing whether the suspect is lying or 
telling the truth. Nonetheless, it is important for the police to bear in mind that 
truthful innocent suspects could also make statement-evidence inconsistencies 
simply because information which is relevant to the police’s evidence was irrelevant 
to the activity of a truthful innocent suspect.  
 The second point to note is that liars’ contradictions of the evidence became 
more pronounced the more incriminating the evidence was. While some liars 
admitted to entering the bookshop, hardly any liars reported handling the black bag 
that contained the wallet. This result provides further support for liars’ counter-
interrogation strategy of denial in which they distance themselves from the crime 
(Granhag & Hartwig, 2008; Hartwig et al., 2014). In this study, the fingerprint 
evidence was both the most incriminating (leading most liars to contradict it) and the 
least relevant to truth-tellers’ activity (leading many truth-tellers to contradict it). 
Thus, when using statement-evidence inconsistencies to detect deception, police 
interviewers may need to consider how incriminating the evidence is as well as its 
potential irrelevance to truthful suspects.  
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Table 7.2. 
Percentage of suspects as a function of the consistency of their responses with each 
piece of evidence. 
Evidence 
 
 
Time  
delay 
 
Suspect 
condition 
 
Completely  
consistent 
subjects (%) 
Partially  
consistent 
subjects (%) 
Completely  
inconsistent 
subjects (%) 
  
Bookshop entry Short  Truth-teller 100 0 0   
  Liar 66 3 31 
  
 Long  Truth-teller 100 0 0 
  
  Liar 58 3 39 
  
Law section visit Short  Truth-teller 82 14 4   
  Liar 21 21 59 
  
 Long  Truth-teller 57 33 10 
  
  Liar 7 23 71 
  
Handling black bag Short  Truth-teller 54 7 39   
  Liar  7 0 93 
  
 Long  Truth-teller 27 10 63 
  
  Liar 0 0 100 
  
 
 Difficulty scores.  Across conditions subjects found answering interview 
questions moderately easy (M = 2.71, SD = 1.74). A 2 × 2  between-subjects 
ANOVA showed that overall, suspect condition and time delay had no main or 
interactive effects on subjects’ perceptions of difficulty, Fs(1, 114) < .01, ps > .95. 
Thus, surprisingly, subjects did not find it harder to answer interview questions 
about an activity from two months ago compared to an activity from the last few 
days.  
Overall, Experiment 4 showed that when liars are unaware of the evidence, 
they contradicted the evidence more than truth-tellers did, even after a two month 
delay—though a surprisingly high number of truth-tellers contradicted the 
fingerprint evidence, particularly after a long delay. Experiment 5 examined whether 
laypeople were sensitive to these differences between liars and truth-tellers by 
presenting mock suspect responses from Experiment 4 to a group of independent 
subjects and asking them to rate how deceptive they believe the mock suspects are. 
Experiment 5 
Method 
Subjects and design.  Each mock suspect’s response from Experiment 4 was 
presented to at least two laypeople. A sample of laypeople were recruited via 
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Amazon Mechanical Turk and paid 50 cents (USD) for participating. Only people 
who judged their fluency in English to be excellent or native could participate. In 
total, 250 people took part but 13 people were excluded from completing the study 
after failing the comprehension check. Thus, the final sample consisted of 237 
laypeople (M = 38.5 years, SD = 11.9, range = 18–76; 125 men and 112 women).  
Laypeople were shown a single mock suspect’s response from one of four 
cells produced by the 2 (suspect: truth-teller vs. liar) × 2 (time delay: short vs. long) 
between-subjects design. Cell sizes ranged from 56–62 subjects. The dependent 
variable was laypeople’s perceptions of mock suspects’ deceptiveness, measured 
using a forced-choice response and Likert scale. 
Procedure.  The procedure consisted of two stages. First, laypeople read 
some background case information. Then they read the interview questions and one 
mock suspect’s answers from Experiment 4 before judging the mock suspect’s 
deceptiveness. More specifically, laypeople were initially informed that they would 
be presented with a fictional case of theft and that their task was to judge whether a 
student being questioned about the theft was telling the truth. Mock suspects were 
referred to as students to prevent laypeople from judging all mock suspect responses 
as deceptive. Laypeople were shown a photo of the wallet and bag in the bookshop 
and informed that the wallet had been stolen from the bookshop. Next, laypeople 
were informed of the evidence from Experiment 4 implicating the student in the 
theft. It was emphasized that the evidence did not prove the student’s guilt—only 
that the student visited the bookshop and handled the bag, possibly accidentally. At 
this stage, laypeople answered a multiple-choice comprehension question about the 
information they had just read and only laypeople who answered correctly could 
proceed with the study.  
 In the second stage, laypeople were informed that the bookshop owner 
questioned the student about the theft but that the student did not know the evidence. 
The interview questions and respective mock suspects’ answers were shown to 
laypeople along with a reminder of the evidence. Laypeople were additionally told 
that there was a 50% chance that they were seeing a response from a truthful student 
and a 50% chance that they were seeing a response from a deceptive student. This 
instruction about the base rate of truthful and deceptive responses was included 
because laypeople might assume that anyone questioned about a crime is guilty 
(Hartwig et al., 2005; Kassin et al., 2003). Laypeople were then asked two questions. 
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First they were asked “Do you think the student is lying?” (yes or no). Next they 
were asked, “To what extent is the student lying?” (1 = completely truthful; 9 = 
completely lying). Finally, all laypeople were asked for demographic information 
before being thanked, debriefed, and paid. 
Results and Discussion 
Deception judgements.  Starting with laypeople’s responses to the forced 
choice question: Laypeople were more likely to indicate that liars were lying than 
truth-tellers after both time delays. I conducted a between-subjects logistic 
regression in which the suspect condition and time delay factors were dummy coded, 
including exploratory analyses on the interaction effect of suspect condition and time 
delay on people’s judgements about whether mock suspects were lying, Wald’s χ2(1) 
= 3.02, p = .082, OR = 3.67 [95% CI: 0.85, 15.92]. Specifically, laypeople perceived 
more liars to be lying than truth-tellers after a short delay (91.5% vs. 46.4%), Wald’s 
χ2(1) = 21.92, p < .001, OR = 12.46 [95% CI: 4.33, 35.83] and to some extent after a 
long delay too (90.3% vs. 73.3%), Wald’s χ2(1) = 5.54, p = .019, OR = 3.39 [95% 
CI: 1.23, 9.39]. Laypeople, however, perceived more truth-tellers to be lying after a 
long delay (73.3%) compared to after a short delay (46.4%), Wald’s χ2(1) = 8.49, p = 
.004, OR = 3.17 [95% CI: 1.46, 6.90]. Laypeople were equally likely to perceive 
liars to be lying after both a short delay (91.5%) and a long delay (90.3%), Wald’s 
χ2(1) = 0.05, p = .818, OR = 0.86 [95% CI: 0.25, 3.00]. Though laypeople perceived 
more liars to be lying than truth-tellers after both time delays, they also perceived a 
surprisingly high number of truth-tellers to be lying, particularly after a long delay. 
As Table 7.2 shows, even truth-tellers were not completely consistent with all three 
pieces of evidence and this could explain why laypeople incorrectly perceived so 
many truth-tellers to be lying. These results suggest that SUE might assist in 
detecting deception even with a two month delay between the crime and interview, 
but there is also a risk that truth-tellers might appear less credible after two months.  
Turning now to laypeople’s responses on the Likert scale: Figure 7.2 displays 
laypeople’s mean ratings of the extent to which they thought mock suspects were 
lying (1 = completely truthful; 9 = completely lying). Laypeople rated liars as less 
credible than truth-tellers both immediately after the bookshop visit and two months 
later, though they also rated truth-tellers as somewhat less credible after two months. 
A 2 × 2 between-subjects ANOVA revealed main effects of mock suspect condition, 
F(1, 233) = 50.38, p < .001, ηp2 = .178 and time delay, F(1, 233) = 16.12, p < .001, 
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ηp2 = .065, as well as an interaction effect of mock suspect condition and time delay 
on laypeople’s deceptiveness ratings, F(1, 233) = 4.31, p = .039, ηp2 = .018. 
Laypeople rated liars as more deceptive than truth-tellers, Mdiff = 1.94 [95% CI: 1.38, 
2.51], d = 0.87 [95% CI: 0.60, 1.14], and mock suspects questioned after a long 
delay as more deceptive than mock suspects questioned after a short delay, Mdiff = 
1.09 [95% CI: 0.48, 1.70], d = 0.46 [95% CI: 0.20, 0.72]. Follow-up analyses for the 
interaction revealed that laypeople rated liars as more deceptive than truth-tellers 
after both a short time delay, F(1, 233) = 40.87, p < .001, Mdiff = 2.54 [95% CI: 1.76, 
3.32], d = 1.13 [95% CI: 0.73, 1.53], and a long time delay, F(1, 233) = 13.00, p < 
.001, Mdiff = 1.39 [95% CI: 0.63, 2.15], d = 0.69 [95% CI: 0.32, 1.06]. Meanwhile, 
laypeople rated truth-tellers as more deceptive after a long delay than after a short-
delay, F(1, 233) = 18.16, p < .001, Mdiff = 1.69 [95% CI: 0.91, 2.47], d = 0.66 [95% 
CI: 0.28, 1.04]. Finally, time delay did not impact laypeople’s deceptiveness ratings 
for liars, F(1, 233) = 1.92, p = .167.   
As in Experiment 4, I conducted an independent samples t-test comparing 
laypeople’s deceptiveness ratings of short-delay liars and long-delay truth-tellers, 
t(105.43) = 2.35, p = .020. Laypeople rated short-delay liars as only slightly more 
deceptive than long-delay truth-tellers, Mdiff = 0.85 [95% CI: 0.14, 1.57], d = 0.43 
[95% CI: 0.07, 0.79]. Thus, truth-tellers questioned after two months may be at risk 
of appearing almost as deceptive as liars questioned immediately after the crime. 
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Figure 7.2. Laypeople’s mean ratings of the extent to which the mock suspect was 
lying (1 = completely truthful; 9 = completely lying). Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 
Relationship between deception ratings and statement-evidence 
inconsistencies.  Recall that, in Experiment 4, mock suspects received statement-
evidence inconsistency scores between 3 (completely consistent with all evidence) 
and 9 (completely inconsistent with all evidence). These statement-evidence 
inconsistency scores positively correlated with laypeople’s deception ratings of 
mock suspects, meaning the more mock suspects contradicted evidence, the more 
deceptive they appeared to laypeople, r(235) = .531 [95% CI: 0.43, 0.62], p < .001. 
Thus, as in past studies, laypeople likely relied upon mock suspects’ statement-
evidence inconsistencies when making deception judgements (Hartwig et al., 2005, 
2006). This correlation, however, does not explain why laypeople rated long-delay 
truth-tellers as more deceptive than short-delay truth-tellers on the Likert scale 
despite both groups having similar total statement-evidence inconsistency scores. As 
Table 7.2 shows, one key difference between the groups is that long-delay truth-
tellers contradicted the fingerprint evidence more than short-delay truth-tellers did. 
Indeed, laypeople’s deception ratings and mock suspects’ inconsistency with the 
fingerprint evidence are positively correlated, r(235) = .552 [95% CI: 0.46, 0.63], p 
< .001. Therefore, laypeople might have rated long-delay truth-tellers as more 
deceptive than their short-delay counterparts because they gave more weight to mock 
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suspects’ contradictions of the fingerprint evidence, the most incriminating evidence, 
than to contradictions of the less incriminating eyewitness evidence.  
General Discussion 
 To my knowledge, this is the first study looking at truthful and deceptive 
suspects’ responses to interview questions after an extended delay of two months. 
Extending past research on the SUE technique, the study showed that liars 
contradicted evidence more than truth-tellers did both shortly after and two months 
after the crime (Clemens et al., 2011; Hartwig et al., 2005, 2014). The pattern of 
mock suspects’ responses in this study is consistent with past research on liars and 
truth-tellers’ counter-interrogation strategies (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008, 2015). 
Liars adopted a denial strategy to distance themselves from the stolen wallet and 
appear credible, while truth-tellers were forthcoming and were more likely to 
disclose what they did in the bookshop. Moreover, laypeople, likely relying on 
statement-evidence inconsistencies, rated liars as more deceptive than truth-tellers 
after both time delays. Notably, laypeople rated truth-tellers questioned two months 
after the crime as more deceptive than truth-tellers’ questioned shortly after the 
crime—possibly because many truth-tellers who were questioned two months after 
the crime contradicted the fingerprint evidence. These findings are consistent with 
past research in which people infer that someone is being deceptive on the basis of 
their verbal inconsistencies (Brewer et al., 1999; Culhane & Hosch, 2012; Strömwall 
& Granhag, 2003). 
The finding that truth-tellers are more consistent with evidence than are liars 
even after a two month delay might appear to conflict with past research in which 
truthful, innocent mock suspects forget details of their past activities from only three 
weeks ago (Harvey et al., 2017; Strange et al., 2014). However, truth-tellers in this 
study likely forgot some details, such as handling the black bag, after the extended 
delay of two months too, but crucially, they still recalled enough of their past 
activity, such as visiting the bookshop and its Law section, to respond more 
consistently with the evidence than did liars. Thus, time delay and memory decay 
might constrain the effectiveness of some lie detection techniques which rely upon 
the richness of detail reported by suspects (Harvey et al., 2017), but perhaps not 
other lie detection techniques, such as SUE which relies upon how much suspects 
contradict police evidence. The pattern of mock suspects’ verbal responses in this 
study suggest that overall, liars’ tendency to distance themselves from the crime 
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outweighs any memory decay truth-tellers might experience in the two months 
following a crime. In other words, even if truthful suspects forget some details of 
their activity and contradict a single piece of evidence, they are still more likely to be 
consistent with the evidence overall than deceptive suspects who deliberately deny 
their connections to the crime to appear credible.  
On a practical level the findings provide further support for the SUE 
technique by showing that overall, statement-evidence inconsistencies could serve as 
diagnostic cues to deceit even after an extended time delay and that the police might 
be able to employ the SUE technique to detect deception effectively even when 
questioning suspects two months after the crime. Caution is recommended, however, 
when interpreting a suspect’s contradiction of an individual piece of evidence as it 
might be less indicative of deception and instead reflect a truthful suspect’s failure to 
encode or later recall task-irrelevant information from the time of the crime. This is 
crucial given that even all of the truth-tellers questioned shortly after the crime did 
not respond completely consistently with the evidence, and of course, the 
misclassification of even one truthful suspect as deceptive could have devastating 
consequences for the accused individual.  
In the current study, I created an everyday situation—a visit to a bookshop—
that innocent, truthful suspects might have to recall during a police interview. 
Crucially, truthful mock suspects were not informed that they would be questioned 
about their activity two months later to prevent them from attending to the activity 
more closely than an everyday activity or rehearsing their memory of the activity in 
preparation for the interview. Nonetheless, anecdotally, most of the subjects reported 
that they had never visited the University bookshop as part of a research study so 
their experience in this study might have been memorable, making it easier for truth-
tellers to respond consistently with evidence even two months later. Future research 
could test mock suspects’ memories for both mundane and novel tasks and locations, 
to better mirror the activities that truthful suspects might need to recall at interview.  
Another matter for future research is testing the effectiveness of the SUE 
technique with even longer time delays as truthful suspects might be increasingly 
prone to forgetting the past and contradicting evidence over longer timeframes. The 
obvious risk is that people within the criminal justice system, including police 
interviewers and jurors, might then perceive truthful suspects to be even more 
deceptive. Relatedly, while laypeople in this study rated short-delay liars as only 
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slightly more deceptive than long-delay truth-tellers, the laypeople were not 
informed of the time delay between the mock suspect visiting the bookshop and 
being questioned about the visit. It is likely that in practice, however, police 
interviewers and jurors will be aware of the time delay between an alleged incident 
and a suspect being questioned about the incident. Therefore, it would be useful to 
explore to what extent police interviewers and jurors adjust their deception 
judgements of suspects to account for the passage of time and its effect on the 
number of statement-evidence inconsistencies even an innocent truthful suspect 
might make.  
Finally, I scored mock suspects’ statement-evidence inconsistencies using a 
coding scheme that is typically employed in SUE research (e.g. Sorochinski et al., 
2014) to ensure that the results of the study are, to some extent, comparable with the 
growing number of past SUE studies in which shorter time delays are employed. 
Nevertheless, more sophisticated coding schemes could be used in future SUE 
research. For instance, given that mock suspects in this study contradicted different 
pieces of evidence at different rates depending on how irrelevant or incriminating it 
was, researchers could differentially weigh statement-evidence inconsistencies based 
on the importance of the evidence within the case. Moreover, a mock suspect’s claim 
that they do not know or cannot remember something, such as visiting a particular 
location, is not actually consistent or inconsistent with evidence showing that they 
visited that location. Thus, an alternative to assigning these ambiguous statements a 
score of 2 (possibly consistent with the evidence)—which still contributes to the 
suspects’ total statement-evidence inconsistency score—is to simply focus on mock 
suspects’ remaining statements for inconsistencies with the evidence. In other words, 
researchers could use a binary code and categorize mock suspects’ statements as 
either completely consistent or completely inconsistent with each piece of evidence. 
If necessary, suspects’ ambiguous statements, which might be more likely after 
greater time delays, could be treated as a separate measure to statement-evidence 
inconsistencies.  
In conclusion, though researchers suggested that an extended time delay 
between the crime and interview might make the SUE technique less diagnostic in 
lie detection, this study has demonstrated that truthful mock suspects might still 
recall enough information after two months to respond more consistently with the 
evidence than liars (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008; Hartwig et al., 2006; Vrij et al., 
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2010). So, even if you can’t recall exactly what you were doing two months ago 
when the police question you—chances are, you will still sound more credible than a 
liar. 
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Chapter 8: 
General Discussion 
 
This thesis aimed to investigate the broader implications of strategic 
disclosure of evidence in police interviews with suspects. In doing so, the research 
considered arguments and research on strategic evidence disclosure from both 
psychology and law, took quantitative methods from psychology and qualitative 
methods from law, and now forms part of the rise in interdisciplinary research (Jaffe, 
2009). From live observations of police station disclosure practices and surveys of 
criminal defence lawyers, to experiments with mock interviewers and mock suspects, 
this research programme used multiple research methods to address strategic 
evidence disclosure from the lawyer’s, police interviewer’s, and suspect’s 
perspectives. Bringing together the key findings from these studies, this chapter first 
provides a summary of each study, before considering the practical implications and 
directions for future research. 
Summary 
 In Chapter 4, fieldwork involving observations of police disclosure practices, 
lawyer-client consultations, and police interviews with suspects offered key insights 
into how English and Welsh police currently disclose their evidence to lawyers and 
suspects and how lawyers rely upon this disclosure to advise their clients prior to the 
interview. Specifically, this field study found that in the nine police stations 
observed, pre-interview disclosure was a fixed practice, though the format (verbal or 
written) varied and lawyers rarely saw the actual evidence prior to the interview. 
While the police did sometimes withhold details of the evidence from the lawyer, 
exaggerate evidence to the suspect, or introduce new information during the 
interview, limited pre-interview disclosure was not always a tactic—sometimes 
investigations were still on-going and the police simply did not have any further 
evidence to disclose. Occasionally, the lack of disclosure caused tension between 
police and lawyers. Finally, the lawyers observed always relied upon the evidence 
and information disclosed by the police when advising their clients in custody. 
Overall, the police were generally quite forthcoming in their disclosure meetings 
with lawyers and typically, only withheld specific details of the evidence. 
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 Chapter 5 then looked at how the timing of police evidence disclosure 
impacted custodial legal advice at the police station by asking 100 lawyers to advise 
a hypothetical client when given police evidence disclosure either before or during 
the hypothetical police interview. The study found that with pre-interview disclosure, 
lawyers offered detailed, case-specific legal advice and, particularly when the client 
claimed to be innocent, they tended to be more cooperative with the police and 
advise the client to put forward their account during the interview. In contrast, when 
lawyers did not receive the evidence until the interview stage, their advice to the 
client focused on how to respond to the lack of disclosure, for instance, by arguing 
with the police or advising the client to make no comment during the interview. 
Lawyers who received evidence during the interview stage also claimed they would 
interrupt the interview to advise their clients on the evidence disclosed more often 
than lawyers who received all the evidence prior to the interview. Additionally, 
lawyers consistently reported that pre-interview disclosure was fairest to suspects 
citing reasons such as suspects receiving effective legal advice, having an informed 
client, a more efficient police interview process, and the police maintaining their role 
as an impartial investigator. Finally, to be able to advise their clients effectively, 
lawyers reported that they would need different levels of evidence disclosure from 
the police, ranging from all of the evidence being released before the interview to 
only specific pieces, such as CCTV footage or DNA evidence. Taken together, this 
survey of lawyers highlighted how much lawyers rely on the evidence disclosed by 
police when advising their clients in custody. 
 Chapter 6 then shifted from lawyers’ arguments against the police 
strategically disclosing evidence in interviews and considered a potential benefit of 
planning strategic evidence disclosure for police interviewers: interviewers might be 
less likely to believe the suspect is guilty after having to generate alternative 
explanations for the evidence before the interview. Theoretically, generating 
alternatives should encourage people to more carefully evaluate evidence and make a 
less biased judgement (Hirt & Markman, 1995). In three experiments, laypeople read 
criminal cases and either generated alternative explanations for the evidence 
implicating the suspect, as interviewers might do while planning to strategically 
disclose evidence, or completed a control task before judging the suspect’s guilt. In 
Experiments 1 and 2, subjects who generated alternative explanations made similar 
guilt ratings to subjects who did not generate alternative explanations. In Experiment 
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3, some subjects were instructed to produce one alternative explanation and others 
were instructed to produce multiple alternative explanations. The multiple-
alternatives people made slightly lower guilt ratings. A mini meta-analysis of all 
three experiments suggested that, overall, generating alternative explanations, the 
way police interviewers might do before strategically disclosing evidence, had a very 
small effect, or possibly no effect at all, on people’s beliefs about the suspect’s guilt. 
It is possible that people’s initial beliefs about the suspect’s guilt persevered because 
their alternative explanations only changed the exact nature of the crime scenario, 
whereas in past debiasing research, when people generated alternative explanations, 
they constructed entirely different scenarios with different outcomes (Hirt & 
Markman, 1995; Sanna et al., 2002). It is also possible that a fluency effect was at 
play in which people inferred from their experienced difficulty of generating 
multiple alternative explanations, or even a single alternative explanation, that the 
alternative explanations were less likely than their initial hypothesis regarding the 
criminal case.  
 Finally, Chapter 7 explored the potential for strategic evidence disclosure to 
be used with suspects after a more forensically relevant time delay, such as two 
months, between the crime and interview. After two months, even truthful suspects 
might forget what they were doing, contradict the evidence, and risk looking like 
liars. In a mock crime experiment, mock suspects either committed a theft (liars) or a 
benign activity (truth-tellers) in a university bookshop. Shortly after or two months 
later, they were questioned about the bookshop event without being informed of the 
evidence implicating them in the theft—similar to strategic evidence disclosure 
protocols. Though truth-tellers contradicted some evidence after both time delays, on 
average, liars still contradicted the evidence more than did truth-tellers. In line with 
the theoretical underpinnings of the SUE technique, truth-tellers adopted a 
forthcoming counter-interrogation strategy when reporting their bookshop activity 
while liars adopted a denial strategy and distanced themselves from the bookshop 
theft. Crucially, liars’ tendency to distance themselves from the crime and appear 
innocent outweighed any memory decay that truth-tellers experienced in the two 
months following their bookshop visit. Thus, overall, liars made more statement-
evidence inconsistencies than truth-tellers after both time delays. 
In a follow-up experiment, the mock suspects’ responses were presented to 
an independent group of laypeople who were asked to rate how deceptive the 
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suspects were. Laypeople rated liars as more deceptive than truth-tellers after both 
time delays. However, laypeople also rated truth-tellers who were questioned two 
months later as more deceptive than truth-tellers who were questioned shortly after 
the crime. Together, these two experiments suggest that, even after two months, 
police interviewers might be able to detect lies by strategically withholding evidence 
from suspects and examining the extent to which suspects contradict the evidence in 
their statements—although truthful suspects might be at a greater risk of appearing 
deceptive when questioned two months after a crime. 
Practical Implications 
 In England and Wales, the police are largely free to decide how and when to 
disclose their evidence to suspects, and their lawyers, during the interview process 
(Cape, 2015; Clough & Jackson, 2012). Indeed, both the courts and the key 
legislation governing police disclosure allow the police to decide the extent and 
timing of their evidence disclosure during the interview process on a case-by-case 
basis (e.g., Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Code C, 2017; R v. Nottle, 
2004). Accordingly, past research has highlighted that police station disclosure 
practices can vary substantially from case to case (Blackstock et al., 2014; Kemp, 
2013; McConville & Hodgson, 1993; Quinn & Jackson, 2007). For instance, the 
police observed during the fieldwork in this thesis (Chapter 4) were generally quite 
forthcoming with lawyers when disclosing their evidence before the suspect 
interview. In contrast, police in other research preferred delaying evidence disclosure 
until later in the interview process (King, 2002; Smith & Bull, 2014; Walsh et al., 
2016).   
While police investigators vary in their evidence disclosure methods, 
academics from psychology and from law also hold very different perspectives on 
how the police should disclose evidence during suspect interviews. Recall that 
psychologists advocate the usage of strategic evidence disclosure in police 
interviews because it could help interviewers detect when suspects are lying (e.g., 
Hartwig et al., 2014), identify false confessions (Sellers & Kebbell, 2009), build 
rapport with the suspect initially (St-Yves & Meissner, 2014), remain more open-
minded about the suspect’s guilt (van der Sleen, 2009), and prompt more 
information or admissions from the suspect (Tekin et al., 2015; Walsh & Bull, 2015). 
Additionally, suspects might find it fairer to recount their story first before being 
presented with the evidence (Sellers & Kebbel, 2009). In contrast, lawyers and 
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criminal justice scholars argue that the police should disclose their evidence early in 
the interview process to make fair trial guarantees, such as the ‘equality of arms’ 
principle set out in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, effective 
in practice (see also Council Directive, 2012 on the right to information in criminal 
proceedings and Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Code C, 2017). Crucially, 
lawyers need to know the case evidence to be able to provide adequate legal advice 
to suspects (Cape, 2011) and earlier evidence disclosure avoids putting pressure on 
suspects who already find the interview process to be an emotionally charged, 
stressful situation (Hodgson, 1994; Sanders et al., 2010). Moreover, strategically 
disclosing evidence might be inefficient as lawyers might interrupt the interview or 
request second interviews once evidence is disclosed (Blackstock et al., 2014; Cape, 
2011; Kemp, 2010; Quinn & Jackson, 2007) and might sour relations between the 
interviewer and legal advisor, ultimately reducing cooperation from the suspect 
during the interview (McConville & Hodgson, 1993). The studies in this thesis 
address some of these conflicting arguments from psychology and from law 
regarding strategic evidence disclosure.   
Chapters 4 and 5 found empirical support for most of the arguments that 
lawyers posit against the police strategically withholding and disclosing evidence 
late in the interview process. Specifically, both the survey responses from lawyers 
and the fieldwork in this thesis made it apparent that lawyers rely heavily upon the 
police’s evidence when advising their clients (Sanders et al., 2010; Toney, 2001). 
Therefore, when the police strategically withhold their evidence, lawyers are less 
able to advise suspects adequately and the suspect’s right to legal assistance is 
essentially diminished. From the defence perspective, strategic evidence disclosure 
interferes with a suspect’s fair trial rights and prevents the defence lawyers and their 
clients from making informed decisions about whether and how to respond to police 
questions.  
In contrast, from the police’s perspective, strategic evidence disclosure is an 
investigative tool—a means to detect whether a suspect could be lying and to elicit 
further information from them (Hartwig et al., 2014; Tekin et al., 2015). Yet, the 
impact of strategic evidence disclosure on lawyers’ ability to advise suspects also 
carries implications for the police investigation. Indeed, Chapters 4 and 5, 
highlighted that, as in past research, lawyers might be less likely to cooperate with 
the police when evidence is withheld from them (Blackstock et al., 2014; Kemp, 
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2010, 2013; Quinn & Jackson, 2007; Skinns, 2009). For instance, lawyers might 
advise their client to make no comment during the interview, they might keep 
interrupting the interview process when new evidence is strategically disclosed, or 
they might argue with the police for further evidence disclosure. Such responses 
from lawyers might not only make the interview process less efficient, but might 
also prevent the police from gaining any information from the suspect that could 
help progress their investigation.  
Unless the police are aiming to build a case based on the suspect’s silence 
and the possibility of adverse inferences being drawn at trial, a ‘no comment’ 
interview is undesirable and prevents two key police goals of strategic evidence 
disclosure from being realised: detecting a suspect’s lies and gaining more 
information from the suspect. First, strategic evidence disclosure methods only 
facilitate lie detection when a suspect chooses to speak and the interviewer can 
compare what the suspect says with the evidence. Specifically, strategic evidence 
disclosure relies on verbal cues to deception, such as statement-evidence 
inconsistencies or within-statement inconsistencies, and the assumption that suspects 
will still speak during the interview in the absence of any evidence disclosure from 
the police. Yet, it is unlikely that a legally represented suspect will speak to the 
police when the police strategically disclose evidence as lawyers are likely to control 
the flow of information from the defence side too. Second, recent psychological 
research suggests that strategic evidence disclosure methods could lead guilty 
suspects to believe that the police have more information than they actually do and to 
unintentionally provide new information to the police (May et al., 2017; Tekin et al., 
2015). Again, in practice, the police are less likely to gain any information, let alone 
new information, from a legally represented suspect when they choose to 
strategically withhold and disclose their evidence because lawyers might simply be 
less willing to cooperate with the police.  
Overall, the findings of the survey and fieldwork converged with past 
research and provided further support for why strategic evidence disclosure, in 
practice where suspects might be legally represented, could be inefficient and 
crucially, prevent the police from both detecting lies and gaining information from 
the suspect during the interview. Meanwhile, for the defence side, strategic evidence 
disclosure could prevent suspects from receiving effective legal assistance at the 
police station. Ultimately, researchers developing police interviewing protocols need 
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to take into consideration the legal context of the interview process, in particular the 
increasingly active role of the lawyer at the police station, particularly in European 
countries, and the legal advice that they provide suspects (Council Directive, 2013 
on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings). 
Chapter 6 then considered the practical implications of interviewers having to 
generate alternative explanations of the evidence when preparing to strategically 
disclose evidence. Though the generation of alternative explanations of the evidence 
in a case could be useful for the police by highlighting new lines of investigation, 
could it also lead interviewers to be more open-minded about the suspect’s guilt? 
Note that this question is relevant not only to police interviewers but to various 
actors within the criminal justice system who might also suffer from tunnel vision 
and presume that a suspect is guilty (Belloni & Hodgson, 2000; Dixon, 1999; 
Findley & Scott, 2006). The belief that a suspect is guilty can have far-reaching 
consequences within the criminal justice system. Highly trained police investigators 
and forensic examiners may evaluate evidence according to their beliefs about a 
person’s guilt (Charman et al., 2017; Dror et al., 2006; Dror & Hampikian, 2011; 
Kassin et al., 2013). Moreover, research shows that mock interviewers who believe a 
suspect to be guilty are more likely to use coercive interview questions and elicit 
false confessions from innocent suspects (Hill et al., 2008; Kassin et al., 2003; 
Narchet et al., 2011). Past research is unclear as to whether generating alternative 
explanations could help interviewers be more open-minded about the suspect’s guilt 
(Ask & Granhag, 2005; O’Brien, 2009). The three experiments in Chapter 6 suggest 
that interviewers who prepare interview questions about alternative evidential 
explanations are unlikely to change their beliefs about a suspect’s guilt—regardless 
of the strength of the case against the suspect and the number of alternative 
explanations that they generate. Put simply, though interviewers following the SUE 
protocol must consider all possible alternative explanations of the evidence, 
currently there is no empirical evidence to suggest that this will produce fewer guilt-
presumptive interviewers and consequently, fairer treatment of suspects during the 
interview. 
Finally, the experiments in Chapter 7 demonstrate further empirical support 
for psychologists’ key argument in favour of strategic evidence disclosure: it helps 
interviewers detect a suspect’s lies (Clemens et al., 2011; Hartwig et al., 2005, 2006; 
Luke et al., 2016). Crucially, unlike past strategic evidence disclosure research, the 
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experiments in Chapter 7 introduced a forensically realistic time delay of two months 
between the crime and questioning of the suspect and yet, there was still a large 
difference between the amount of statement-evidence inconsistencies made by truth-
tellers and liars. Put another way, lying suspects overall contradicted the evidence 
more than did truthful suspects and thus, suspects’ statement-evidence 
inconsistencies emerged as a diagnostic cue to deception even two months after the 
crime. Given that laypeople rated liars’ responses as more deceptive than truth-
tellers’ responses, likely relying upon suspects’ contradictions with the evidence, 
strategic evidence disclosure might assist the police in detecting whether a suspect is 
lying even a few weeks or months after a crime. Indeed, after an extended time 
delay, strategic evidence disclosure might be more effective in lie detection than lie 
detection techniques that rely upon the number of details suspects report because the 
latter become less diagnostic of deception as truthful suspects forget specific details 
over time (Harvey et al., 2017).  
Of course, the critical caveat is that even truthful mock suspects in 
Experiment 4 forgot some precise details of their activity and contradicted individual 
pieces of evidence at surprisingly high rates. Thus, it might be less diagnostic for the 
police to rely upon individual contradictions of the evidence when detecting 
deception via strategic evidence disclosure protocols. While Chapter 7 looked 
specifically at the influence of a time delay on the effectiveness of strategic evidence 
disclosure methods in lie detection, the experiments highlighted that truthful suspects 
could also contradict the evidence for reasons other than forgetting, such as a failure 
to encode or notice something at the time of the crime. It is well-documented that 
people can fail to notice and later recall objects and events that are irrelevant to their 
current activity (Harvey et al., 2017; Rees et al., 1999; Simons & Chabris, 1999). 
Given the dangers and consequences of mistaking a truthful suspect for a deceptive 
suspect, the police must exercise caution when considering individual statement-
evidence inconsistencies and determining whether they actually indicate deception 
on the part of the suspect. 
 Taken together, these studies carry mixed practical implications. On the one 
hand, the survey and fieldwork (Chapters 4 and 5) support many of lawyers’ 
arguments against using strategic evidence disclosure in suspect interviews and 
Chapter 6’s experiments suggest that interviewers preparing strategic evidence 
disclosure are unlikely to be less guilt-presumptive regarding the suspect. On the 
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other hand, the mock-crime experiments (Chapter 7) suggest that strategic evidence 
disclosure could be as useful a lie detection tool for the police when they question a 
suspect two months after a crime has occurred as when they question a suspect 
immediately after the crime has occurred. Of course, even if strategic evidence 
disclosure has the potential to draw out verbal cues to deception months after a 
crime, in practice, it might impinge upon suspects’ legal rights and lawyers might 
advise suspects not to speak to the police at all during the interview. Instead, the 
police could hold back only specific details of the evidence or a single piece of 
evidence, as they did during the field observations (Chapter 4)—a level of disclosure 
that some lawyers find sufficient to advise their clients effectively (Chapter 5). 
However, the suspect’s contradictions of the individual piece of evidence might not 
be indicative of deception as even truthful suspects can accidentally contradict a 
single piece of evidence (Chapter 7). These mixed practical implications highlight 
the importance of an interdisciplinary approach when investigating an applied issue 
such as the strategic disclosure of evidence during police interviews. For instance, 
recommendations about interviewing techniques and corresponding suspect 
behaviours made by psychological research may be theoretically sound but might not 
translate effectively to practice without consideration of the legal context within 
which suspects are questioned. In practice, suspects might have lawyers present or 
the police might only question suspects months after a crime—both important 
considerations, the former of which is likely to limit the ability of police interviewers 
to detect lies using strategic evidence disclosure.  
 In sum, to make an interviewing technique such as the strategic disclosure of 
evidence effective in practice, researchers need to consider both the police’s goals in 
eliciting useful information, or improving the diagnosticity of the police interview 
which is what psychological research aims for, as well as upholding suspect’s legal 
rights in practice which criminal justice scholars focus on. These different goals are 
crucial given that strategically disclosing evidence during suspect interviews carries 
implications for not only the police, but also suspects and their lawyers. While past 
psychological research has already examined the effectiveness of strategic evidence 
disclosure in lie detection with different populations (e.g., Clemens et al., 2010; 
Hartwig et al., 2006) and different crime scenarios (Clemens et al., 2011; Dando et 
al., 2013; Granhag et al., 2015), research on this topic is still a work in progress 
(Hartwig et al., 2014). Thus, this thesis has built on both the existing psychological 
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and legal literatures and made some advances in better understanding the broader 
implications of strategically disclosing evidence in suspect interviews. Nonetheless, 
many empirical questions arise from both the current research and psychologists’ 
and lawyers’ conflicting arguments regarding police disclosure of evidence.  
Future Research 
 Each study in this thesis raises matters for future research. Chapter 4 provides 
insights into police disclosure practices with legally represented suspects, but future 
research could explore whether the police are more strategic when disclosing 
evidence during interviews with legally unrepresented suspects or in particular 
offence categories. The formal pre-interview disclosure briefing occurs between only 
the police and suspect’s legal representative and only in exceptional cases do the 
police disclose evidence directly to the suspect before the interview (see Chapter 4). 
Thus, when interviewing legally unrepresented suspects, the police might choose to 
disclose their evidence at any stage during the interview or not at all during that 
particular interview. Based on lawyers’ comments from the field study, the police’s 
disclosure strategy might also depend on the seriousness of the case. For instance, 
the police might only prepare to strategically withhold and disclose multiple pieces 
of evidence for suspect interviews regarding serious crimes such as rape. A large 
scale field study could explore more thoroughly the factors that influence police 
disclosure practices with both legally represented and unrepresented suspects. 
Chapter 5 examines lawyers’ advice to suspects when given all of the 
evidence either before or during the interview. Future research could investigate how 
other evidence disclosure methods impact custodial legal advice, for instance, when 
the police disclose some evidence before the interview and the remaining evidence 
during the interview. Similar to police disclosure practices observed in Chapter 4’s 
field study, the police might only withhold specific details of the evidence from the 
suspect and lawyer until the interview. Future research could examine to what extent 
lawyers can advise their clients effectively and are cooperative with the police when 
they are given a general overview of the case evidence before the interview and then 
informed of the specific details of the evidence only during the interview.  
 Chapter 6 examined how laypeople judge a suspect’s guilt after generating 
alternative explanations for evidence in fictional criminal cases. While generating 
alternatives has been shown to reduce cognitive biases in non-forensic domains (e.g., 
Mussweiler et al., 2000; Sanna et al., 2002), the precise psychological mechanisms 
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underlying this debiasing effect remain unclear. Research has highlighted, however, 
that the ease with which people generate alternatives can moderate the debiasing 
effect (Sanna & Schwarz, 2006; Sanna et al., 2002). Thus, future research could ask 
police interviewers to generate alternative explanations for a real criminal case that 
contains both incriminating and exculpatory evidence regarding the prime suspect 
making it easier for interviewers to imagine entirely different scenarios in which the 
suspect is innocent.  
Chapter 7 tested the potential for interviewers using strategic evidence 
disclosure methods to detect lies when both truthful and lying suspects are 
questioned months after a crime in a real-world location—the University bookshop. 
A visit to the University bookshop, however, might have been easy to recall for 
truthful suspects, even months later, given that many research subjects reported that 
they had never before visited the bookshop as part of a research study. Future 
research could test the generalizability of the study’s findings to the various 
situations truthful suspects might need to recall at interview by conducting similar 
mock-crime experiments in both memorable and mundane locations. Given that 
Experiment 4 was the first empirical test of an extended time delay on the diagnostic 
utility of statement-evidence inconsistencies as a cue to deception, further 
experiments are required to identify the time delays after which strategic evidence 
disclosure might no longer help distinguish between truthful and deceptive suspects. 
Moreover, Experiment 5 asked laypeople to judge truthful and deceptive responses 
while unaware of the time delay between the questioning of the suspect and the 
crime. It would be useful for future research to explore whether knowledge of this 
time delay leads people to adjust their deception judgements of suspects by taking 
into account how time delay can impact truthful suspects’ memories and thus, their 
propensity to make statement-evidence inconsistencies.  
 Aside from the research questions that arise from studies in this thesis, there 
are still empirical questions raised by psychologists’ and lawyers’ contrasting 
arguments regarding strategic evidence disclosure in suspect interviews. First, how 
does the timing of evidence disclosure impact police-suspect relations? Psychology 
research suggests that disclosing evidence to the suspect may interfere with rapport-
building (Goodman-Delahunty et al., 2014). For this reason, the police may choose 
to initially build rapport with the suspect and then strategically disclose the evidence 
later in the interview. However, legal research, including the fieldwork and survey in 
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this thesis, indicates that when the police strategically disclose evidence, there is 
greater tension between the lawyer and police interviewer, and consequently the 
suspect and police interviewer too (e.g., Kemp, 2013; McConville & Hodgson, 
1993). Thus, more research is needed to advance our understanding on when 
evidence should be disclosed for improved police-suspect relations, which in turn 
could increase the amount of information that the suspect is willing to provide to the 
police. Future research should also take into account the role of the suspect’s lawyer 
before and during the police interview as the presence of the lawyer is likely to 
moderate the impact of strategic evidence disclosure on police-suspect relations.  
Second, how do suspects perceive the strategic disclosure of evidence? Some 
psychologists claim, for instance, that suspects might find it fairer to offer their side 
of the story first before being presented with the evidence (Sellers & Kebbell, 2009). 
Meanwhile some lawyers argue that when the police strategically disclose evidence, 
suspects feel ambushed with the evidence and consequently find the interview more 
stressful (see Chapter 5). Once again, how the suspect perceives the police’s 
disclosure of evidence could influence the suspect’s willingness and ability to 
provide an accurate account of what transpired. The question of how suspects regard 
strategic evidence disclosure would benefit from field research with police 
interviewers and suspects because it may not be possible to recreate the high stakes 
of a police interview, one that involves the strategic disclosure of evidence, in the 
laboratory.   
More generally, psychological research focused on diagnostic lie detection 
methods and police interviewing techniques could benefit from a greater 
consideration of existing criminal justice research and the legal context within which 
the police detain and question suspects. Indeed, future interdisciplinary psychology-
law research efforts could explore criminal justice scholars’ concerns regarding other 
police interviewing techniques that are based on psychological principles. Such 
interdisciplinary efforts could also identify interviewing techniques that are most 
effective in practice, in a similar fashion to the collaboration between psychologists, 
lawyers, and police practitioners that led to the development of the PEACE model in 
England and Wales (Kassin, Appleby, & Perillo, 2010). 
Concluding Remarks 
 This thesis aimed to explore the broader implications of strategically 
disclosing evidence in police interviews with suspects. Through a series of 
141 
 
interdisciplinary studies, this research programme highlighted that strategic evidence 
disclosure could prevent lawyers from advising custodial clients effectively, make 
the interview process less efficient, lead the police to gain less information from the 
suspect, plausibly have no influence on interviewers’ pre-interview beliefs about the 
suspect’s guilt, but could help interviewers detect a suspect’s lies even if the 
interview takes places months after the crime. Bringing together the arguments and 
research traditions of two disciplines such as psychology and law might be 
challenging, but ultimately, such interdisciplinary efforts might be the most useful 
when informing policy and practice on a topic such as the strategic disclosure of 
evidence. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Main Analyses with Excluded Subjects from Chapter 6 
 
Experiment 2 
Here I present the results of all the main analyses when including the eight 
subjects who did not produce alternative questions for one or more of the cases 
despite being in the alternative questions condition. Including these subjects led to a 
total sample size of 148 subjects: 47 control, 53 suspect questions, and 48 alternative 
questions subjects. Overall, the same pattern of results emerged when including 
these eight subjects. 
Comparing conditions.  Subjects made similar judgments about the case 
regardless of which condition they were in, see Figure A.1. For each case, a 
MANOVA was run for subjects’ ratings of guilt, confidence, and evidence strength. 
Between conditions, subjects did not differ on any measure for the murder, arson, 
and criminal damage cases, Pillai’s trace = .047, F(6, 288) = 1.17, p = .324, ηp2 = 
.024; Pillai’s trace = .006, F(6, 288) = .14, p = .991, ηp2 = .003; Pillai’s trace = .029, 
F(6, 288) = .71, p = .646, ηp2 = .014, respectively. 
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   A.  
   B.  
   C.  
Figure A.1. Subjects’ mean ratings of (A) their belief in suspect’s guilt, (B) their 
confidence, and (C) evidence strength when including all subjects in Experiment 2. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Comparing cases.  Like in the main analysis, subjects found the criminal 
damage case to be the strongest, followed by the murder case, and then the arson 
case. Repeated-measures ANOVAs showed that subjects’ ratings for all three 
measures differed between cases, Guilt, F(2, 294) = 95.52, ηp2 = .394; Confidence, 
F(2, 294) = 33.90, ηp2 = .187; Evidence strength, F(2, 294) = 111.98, ηp2 = .432, all 
ps < .001. Pairwise comparisons were run for all three measures with the Bonferroni 
corrected critical p-value of .017. Guilt ratings for all three cases were significantly 
different from each other, Mmur = 4.54 SDmur = 1.29; Marso = 3.53, SDarso = 1.30; Mcrim 
= 5.27, SDcrim = 1.33, ps < .001. Confidence ratings for the criminal damage case, M 
= 4.95, SD = 1.58, were significantly higher than confidence ratings for both the 
arson case, M = 3.88, SD = 1.60, and murder case, M = 4.20, SD = 1.63, ps < .001. 
Unlike in the main analysis, subjects made slightly higher confidence ratings for the 
murder case than the arson case, p = .013. Evidence strength ratings were 
significantly different from each other for all three cases, Mmur = 4.05, SDmur = 1.67; 
Marso = 2.89; SDarso = 1.45; Mcrim = 5.22, SDcrim = 1.51, ps < .001. There were no 
interaction effects between condition and case for guilt, confidence, and evidence 
strength, ps = .734, .707, and .226 respectively. 
Difficulty ratings.  As shown in Figure A.2, subjects found the control task 
the easiest for all three cases. For the murder and criminal damage cases, subjects 
found the suspect questions task harder, followed by the alternative questions task. 
For the arson case, subjects found the suspect questions and alternative questions 
tasks to be similarly difficult. Case type and condition had an interactive effect on 
subjects’ perceptions of task difficulty, F(4, 290) = 7.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .090. 
Between-subject ANOVAs showed that for all three cases, subjects’ ratings of 
difficulty differed between conditions, ps < .001. Post-hoc Tukey tests showed that 
for the murder and criminal damage cases, subjects found the control task easier than 
the suspect question task, Mdiff = 1.18 [95% CI: 0.53, 1.83]; Mdiff = 1.31 [95% CI: 
0.65, 1.98] respectively, ps < .001. Subjects also found the control task easier than 
the alternative questions task, Mdiff = 2.26 [95% CI: 1.60, 2.93]; Mdiff = 2.08 [95% 
CI: 1.40, 2.76], ps < .001. Finally, subjects found the suspect questions task easier 
than the alternative questions task, Mdiff = 1.08 [95% CI: 0.44, 1.73], p < .001; Mdiff = 
0.77 [95% CI: 0.10, 1.43], p = .019. For the arson case, subjects found the control 
task easier than the suspect task, Mdiff = 1.72 [95% CI: 1.06, 2.38], and alternative 
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questions task, Mdiff = 1.41 [95% CI: 0.74, 2.09], ps < .001, but found the suspect 
and alternative questions tasks similarly difficult, p = .498.  
 
Figure A.2. Subjects’ mean difficulty ratings when including all subjects in 
Experiment 2. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Experiment 3  
Here I present the results of all the main analyses when including the 52 
subjects who failed to follow instructions and produce either one alternative question 
in the single alternative condition or multiple alternative questions in the multiple 
alternatives condition. Including these subjects led to a total sample size of 218 
subjects: 60 control, 78 single alternative, and 80 multiple alternatives subjects. A 
similar pattern of results emerged when including these 52 subjects. 
Difficulty ratings.  As shown in Figure A.3, subjects found the task similarly 
difficult for the murder case regardless of condition. In contrast, for the arson case, 
subjects found the control task easiest, followed by the single alternative and 
multiple alternatives tasks in order of increasing difficulty. Case and condition had 
an interactive effect on subjects’ ratings of task difficulty, F(2, 215) = 48.22, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .310. For the murder case, unlike in the main analysis, subjects’ difficulty 
ratings did not differ between conditions, F(2, 215) = 1.79, p = .169, ηp2 = .016. For 
the arson case, subjects’ difficulty ratings differed between conditions, F(2, 215) = 
83.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .437. Post-hoc Tukey tests showed that control subjects found 
their task easier than did subjects in the single alternative condition, Mdiff = 2.54 
[95% CI: 1.90, 3.18], and the multiple alternatives condition, Mdiff = 3.40 [95% CI: 
2.76, 4.03], ps < .001. Crucially, subjects found thinking of a single alternative 
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question easier than thinking of multiple alternative questions, Mdiff = 0.85 [95% CI: 
0.26, 1.44], p = .002.  
 
 
Figure A.3. Subjects’ mean difficulty ratings when including all subjects in 
Experiment 3. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Comparing conditions.  The analysis showed no effect of generating 
alternatives on subjects’ judgments about both the murder and arson cases. Subjects 
rated the likelihood of the suspect’s guilt, their belief in the suspects’ guilt, their 
confidence, and the evidential strength similarly across conditions, see Figure A.4. 
For the murder case, like in the main analysis, a MANOVA suggested that subjects’ 
ratings of guilt likelihood, guilt belief, confidence, and evidence strength did not 
differ between conditions, Pillai’s trace = .052, F(8, 426) = 1.42, p = .187, ηp2 = .026. 
For the arson case, unlike in the main analysis, a MANOVA suggested that subjects’ 
ratings of their belief in the suspect’s guilt, likelihood of the suspect’s guilt, their 
confidence, and evidence strength also did not differ between conditions, Pillai’s 
trace = .058, F(8, 426) = 1.59, p = .127, ηp2 = .029.  
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D.  
Figure A.4. Subjects’ mean ratings of (A) the likelihood that the suspect is guilty, 
(B) belief in suspect’s guilt, (C) their confidence, and (D) evidence strength when 
including all subjects in Experiment 3. Error bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
Comparing cases.  Like in the main analysis, subjects perceived the murder 
case to be stronger than the arson case, see Table A.1. There were no interaction 
effects of case and condition on subjects’ guilt likelihood, guilt belief, confidence, 
and evidence strength ratings, ps = .756, .608, .235, and .604 respectively. 
 
Table A.1 
All subjects’ judgments of the murder and arson cases 
Measure Means for  
murder case  
(SD) 
Means for  
arson case  
(SD) 
Mean difference 
[95% CIs] 
 t 
Guilt likelihood 65.50 (20.63) 57.54 (21.89) 7.96 [4.91, 11.01] t(217) = -5.15** 
Belief in guilt 4.78 (1.35) 4.18 (1.42) 0.60 [0.40, 0.81] t(217) = -5.80** 
Confidence  4.64 (1.62) 4.37 (1.57) 0.27 [0.07, 0.47] t(217) = -2.63* 
Evidence strength 4.59 (1.67) 3.78 (1.72) 0.82 [0.55, 1.08] t(217) = -6.10** 
Note. * p = .009; ** p < .001.  
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Appendix B: Mini Meta-Analysis on the Effect of Generating Alternative 
Explanations on Guilt Judgments with Excluded Subjects from Chapter 6 
 
Like in the main text, I looked at the size of the difference between the guilt 
belief ratings made by the control and alternative (or ‘multiple alternatives’ group in 
Experiment 3) groups in each experiment when including subjects who did not 
follow instructions in Experiments 2 and 3. A random-effects model meta-analysis 
was run using ESCI software (Cumming, 2013) and Figure A.5 shows the resultant 
forest plot. The meta-analytic result showed that the alternative group made guilt 
belief ratings that were an estimated 0.12 units [95% CI: –0.68, 0.45] lower than the 
control group, z = –0.401, p = .688. 0.12 units on the 1–7 guilt belief scale translates 
to a 1.92% reduction in guilt belief ratings for the alternative group. Thus, even 
when including subjects who did not follow instructions, there was only a small 
difference between the alternative and control groups’ judgments about the suspect’s 
guilt. Moreover, given that the confidence intervals once again include zero, there is 
plausibly no difference between the alternative and control groups’ guilt beliefs 
about the suspect.  
 
 
Figure A.5. Forest plot displaying mean differences in guilt belief ratings between 
the control and alternative groups in Experiments 1–3 when including subjects who 
did not follow instructions. The mean difference between the two groups in each 
experiment is indicated by the location of the square on the horizontal axis. The size 
of the square indicates how the study was weighted in the meta-analysis. Studies 
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Experiment 3 
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with larger squares had a bigger sample size and a smaller standard deviation and 
thus, a higher weighting in the meta-analysis. The meta-analytic result is represented 
by the diamond. When the symbol is to the right of the zero line, the alternative 
group was more likely to believe the suspect was guilty compared to the control 
group. When the symbol is to the left of the zero line, the alternative group was less 
likely to believe the suspect was guilty compared to the control group. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Appendix C: Time Delays Used in Published Studies of Strategic Evidence 
Disclosure 
 
Table C.1 
Time delay between mock crime and interview in published studies of strategic 
evidence disclosure  
Study Time delay 
Clemens et al. (2010) Immediately after 
Clemens, Granhag, & Strömwall (2011) Immediately after 
Dando & Bull (2011) 1 hour 
Dando, Bull, Ormerod, & Sandham (2013) 45 minutes 
Granhag, Rangmar, & Strömwall (2014) Immediately after 
Granhag, Strömwall, Willen, & Hartwig (2013) Immediately after 
Hartwig et al. (2011) 10 minutes  
Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall (2007) Immediately after 
Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Kronkvist (2006) Immediately after 
Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij (2005) 1 week 
Jordan, Hartwig, Wallace, Dawson, & Xhihani (2012) Immediately after 
Lingwood & Bull (2013) Immediately after 
Luke et al. (2013) Immediately after 
Luke et al. (2016) Immediately after 
Luke, Dawson, Hartwig, & Granhag (2014) Immediately after 
Luke, Hartwig, Shamash, & Granhag (2016) Immediately after 
May, Granhag, & Tekin (2017)   Immediately after 
McDougall & Bull (2015) 7–10 days 
Sorochinski et al. (2014) Immediately after  
Tekin et al. (2015) Immediately after 
Tekin, Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij (2016) Immediately after 
Wachi et al. (2017) Immediately after 
Note. Some studies gave subjects a few minutes to prepare for the interview.  
 
 
 
